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This thesis addresses the often remarked shift since the 1990s from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’. A key part of the governance paradigm has been the construction of public 
authority at a supranational and local level beyond the central nation-state, and the explosion of 
managerial policy instruments like benchmarks and indicators. Compared to neoliberalism’s 
assault on the state in the 1980s, the concept of governance highlighted the return of planning 
as a networked, entrepreneurial, and strategic endeavour of Third Way social democracy. 
Puzzlingly missing in depictions of a new age of state activism was a major instrument of public 
policy – the budget. The governance paradigm referred to private finance, not public finance; 
policy networks, not budgetary appropriations.  
 
This thesis addresses European integration in the 1990s as a paradigmatic case of the governance 
turn. The creation of the EU in 1992 deeply integrated markets but without a joint supranational 
budgetary capacity to match. Instead, member states were meant to coordinate their policies 
through rules, guidelines, and quantitative benchmarking exercises collectively characterised as 
‘EU governance’. Critical literature on the EU explains governance as the triumph of 
neo/ordoliberalism. The trouble with this critical literature is that the managerial policy 
instruments that characterise the governance paradigm fit uncomfortably with the principle-
based rule of ordoliberalism and neoliberal antipathies to state information processing.  
 
I instead retrace the governance turn to state planning in the mid-twentieth century. I show how 
the governance paradigm in the 1990s reflected the re-articulation of planning at a supranational 
level using techniques of information processing and strategising by new social forces of public 
management. The significance of the governance paradigm is therefore how supranational 
institutions in the EU have used the forces and format of public management to overcome the 
familiar challenge of international organisations that they lack both budgetary and coercive 
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The COVID-19 pandemic must be the most data visualised crisis ever. As the virus developed 
over 2020, we have watched through a deluge of statistics. Creeping graphs of rolling averages 
rack up the body count of the infection. World maps with ever-expanding red circles plot the 
virus’s global spread. Ticking numbers on scoreboards calculate case growth in our community, 
country, region, and world. While we all know the numbers of reported cases and deaths do not 
directly correspond to the virus’s microscopic existence, it is through our visualisations of the 
data that we have come to see the invisible virus. 
Our armchair epidemiology watching the virus unfold has relied on a variety of sources 
besides our national governments. International organisations (IOs) like the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) or the European Union’s (EU) executive agency the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) have moved from technical bodies working in the 
shadows of disease control to hotly clicked online source funnelling us the latest information 
and advice.1 The elite research institution Johns Hopkins University has become a global 
repository of COVID-19 information, their online dashboard becoming a data command centre 
for the average citizen.2 Global media organisations like the Financial Times’ epidemiological 
tracker has turned data journalists into Twitter celebrities feeding us daily numbers.  
The reliance on managerial techniques of data dashboards and the proliferation of 
authorities in world politics that COVID-19 has manifest speaks to one of the major theoretical 
developments in international relations this millennium – the transition felt from the 
territorialised unitary authority of national ‘government’ to a spatially and organisationally diffuse 
global ‘governance’ (Barnett & Duvall, 2004; Rhodes, 1997; Weiss & Wilkinson, 2013). 
A key focus of the remarked rise of a governance paradigm that this thesis will address 
has been the growing weight of IOs in the global political economy. IOs have been key actors 
in building the world of numbers the COVID-19 pandemic has manifest. Michael Barnett and 
Martha Finnemore made a crucial observation at the turn of the millennium that IOs were more 
than puppets of powerful national governments. Instead, IOs were authoritative and semi-
autonomous bureaucracies that were becoming key actors in the new world of global governance 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, 2004).  
 
1 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19-pandemic; https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019  
2 https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html  
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A pivotal aspect of Barnett and Finnemore’s intervention was that IOs were building 
their power despite lacking the policy tools familiar to nation-states – namely a means of 
financing and infrastructures of policy implementation. Supranational authority was instead 
constructed by IOs by ‘regulating’ and ‘constituting’ the world in norms, procedures, and ideas. 
Building on this observation, André Broome and Leonard Seabrooke argue that IOs are 
‘cognitive authorities’ that use their ‘analytical institutions’ to constitute the world in quantified 
benchmarks, standards, and best practices (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).  
A key feature of the growing literature on the cognitive authority of IOs is the power 
of numbers in policy-making (Clegg, 2010; Cooley & Snyder, 2015; H. K. Hansen & Mühlen-
Schulte, 2012; H. K. Hansen & Porter, 2012; Mügge, 2016; Rottenburg et al., 2015). Lacking the 
carrot and stick leverage of financial resources to implement public policy, IOs have used 
techniques of performance management like indicators, benchmarks, or rankings to construct 
supranational authority. In this way, a key feature of the governance paradigm has been that 
supranational institutions seem to be able to manage without a budget.  
The EU is a paradigmatic case of the changes that led scholars to remark at a new age of 
‘governance’. What is unique about the EU is that, despite having many of the responsibilities 
of a state, the EU has the governance tools more familiar to an IO.  Similarly to a state, the EU 
manages the internal affairs of a single market and currency. In addition, and much like a state, 
the EU is partly responsible for maintaining a sovereign border and negotiating with third 
countries on a variety of issues. Unlike national government counterparts, however, the EU’s 
supranational institutions mostly do not exert administrative influence through resource 
allocation.3 Indeed, when the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was agreed at the end of 
the last millennium, it confounded observers that common financial resources through a fiscal 
union were not agreed alongside the monetary union of the Euro. Instead of exercising fiscal 
policy jointly, the EU has attempted to coordinate the social and economic policies of member 
states through a variety of policy instruments of performance management that have been 
collectively labelled as ‘EU governance’. 
EU governance is today built from a patchwork of managerial techniques like 
benchmarking, scoreboarding, and evaluation. These techniques are used by supranational 
institutions and their national bureaucratic counterparts in partnership with an entire industry of 
 
3 The supranational administration of bailouts during the Eurozone crisis was an exception to this. The controversy of these bailouts reflects 
their extraordinary nature. 
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policy consultants, analysts, evaluators, and auditors swirling the EU’s policy machinery through 
framework contracts and tenders. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) monitors the fiscal 
performance of member states through fixed and enforceable rules on public deficits and debts. 
The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) attempts to do the same in macroeconomic 
affairs. Since the 1990s a jumble of Open Methods of Coordination (OMsC) and development 
strategies of the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 set a strategic direction and monitor 
performance in the EU under a banner of benchmarking competitiveness. Since 2010, the 
European Semester policy-making architecture has turned the many policy instruments in the 
EU into a systematic cycle of coordination. Strategic management and information processing 
dominate EU governance.  
While scholars of public administration remarked at the rise of a governance paradigm 
in the EU, most critical literature on integration wrote ‘governance’ off as an ideological fad 
normalising neo/ordoliberalism. Indeed, there was good reason for this. Critical perspectives on 
the EU have documented the political weight of neoliberal marketization in steering the recent 
history of European integration (Cafruny & Ryner, 2003; van Apeldoorn, 2003; Warlouzet, 
2018). There is significant variation within the literature on neoliberalism and European 
integration. But it has broadly conceived of the process as stemming from a ‘globalist’ ordoliberal 
project, anxious over the encroachments of majoritarian democracy on the functioning of 
markets and nationalistic public choice arguments over the illegitimacy of international fiscal 
transfers across communities unbound by blood (Slobodian, 2018). Through international law 
and rules, the EMU is seen as an ‘economic constitution’ that removes monetary and fiscal policy 
from the whims of national democratic politics (Bonefeld, 2001). In this way, the EMU is 
conceived as part of a ‘new constitutionalism’ that locks in a disciplinary neoliberal agenda of 
deepened marketization in the interests of US-centred transnational capitalism (Bieler & Morton, 
2001; Cafruny & Ryner, 2003; Gill, 1998; van Apeldoorn, 2003). 
Against the political weight of neoliberal marketization, the introduction of managerial 
policy instruments was not a development that warranted proclamations of a paradigmatic shift 
to ‘governance’. Instead, critical scholars of the EU have mostly read the governance paradigm 
in terms of how it reproduces neoliberal integration rather than anything distinctive from it. 
Often placed in Neo-Gramscian and neo-Polanyian terms, managerial instruments of 
benchmarking are seen as the technical means through which neoliberalism exercised hegemony 
at a discursive or symbolic level (van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010). Benchmarking is seen to 
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marketize policy-making by turning democratic politics into a competitive process of quantified 
policy comparison and a race to climb rankings (Bruno, 2009). 
While critical literature has often played down the significance of the governance 
paradigm, we often overlook the fact that the managerial techniques that have defined it are not 
so easy to square with the ideas of the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). 
Neo/ordoliberals had specific interpretations of the appropriate role of political institutions that 
explicitly spoke against techniques of planning that are the hallmark of the governance paradigm. 
Long-serving ECB economist and self-avowed ordoliberal, Otmar Issing, for example, argued 
that ‘there are no convincing arguments in favour of attempts to coordinate macroeconomic 
policies ex-ante’ in the ways the EU’s complex policy-making system has attempted since the 
1990s (Issing, 2002, p. 245). For ordoliberals like Issing, political institutions must act according 
to fixed rules and principles of market competition, not shaky projected expectations of policy 
performance that techniques like scoreboarding or benchmarking rely on. Similarly, in the late 
1980s, former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl blasted the use of quantitative indicators 
to guide monetary policy cooperation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 
‘robotization’. He argued that it would ‘never occur to anybody to depersonalize decisions in the 
field of foreign policy and to pre-program them by means of objective indicators’ (Pöhl, 1987, 
p. 20). 
The complaint of Issing and Pöhl reflects a neo/ordoliberal contempt for planning. 
The foundation of a neoliberal perspective on rule is a Hayekian belief in the fallibility of 
governmental knowledge, grounded in the socialist calculation debates of the 1930s (von Hayek, 
1945). In contrast, a key feature of the governance paradigm has been the proliferation of policy 
instruments that precisely rely on the gathering and processing of data by government in ways 
that fundamentally contradict this Hayekian principle. Rather than the data driven responses to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, neoliberals put their policy faith in the information processing power 
of the decentralized market (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017), or the principled expertise of the 
ordoliberal economist and lawyer (Hien & Joerges, 2017).  
Despite the governance paradigm not fitting with a neoliberal vision of rule, we have 
nevertheless understood governance through the lineage of neoliberalism. This has specific 
consequences for how we understand the rise of supranational authority, as a key feature of the 
governance paradigm.  By theorising the internationalisation of political authority since the 1990s 
in terms of the neoliberal constraints put on national governments through EU public 
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expenditure or WTO state aid rules, we have overlooked what has been constructed at a 
supranational level through the managerial transformation of public policy.   
 
Revisiting Governance Through Budgeting 
This thesis revisits the governance paradigm as a way to theorise the growth of 
supranational authority in the EU through managerial policy instruments. Governance as a 
concept is often invoked as a banal description of social organisation or an ideological referent 
for the corporatization of policy-making. Here, I argue that governance was a historically specific 
project of public management. This means to say that I understand governance as a set of policy-
making practices and a rationalised set of normative commitments connected to the social forces 
of public management.4  
To unpack this historicist perspective on the governance paradigm, I propose 
theoretically framing it around the history of public budgeting. At first, this might seem unusual. 
As mentioned earlier, a remarkable feature of the governance paradigm is that it captured a form 
of policy-making that was less reliant on public resource allocation. Governance is a concept 
that more readily refers to private finance rather than public finance. The Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFI), for example, built schools and hospitals funded by private investors rather than 
public borrowing. Taxpayers were ultimately liable for new capital projects – and at great 
expense. But the vehicle for delivering new public infrastructure was not the public balance 
sheet. It was global finance. Meanwhile, utterances of governance within this process referred to 
the organisational form of policy delivery, rather than the financial means. Governance referred 
to public-private networks of inter-organisational policy delivery; not expenditure lines, revenue 
streams, or budgetary appropriations. 
But I argue that this conception of policy-making working outside of public finance was 
a huge shift that built on a specific innovation in budgeting in the mid-twentieth century. The 
rise of ‘budgetary planning’ in OECD countries since the 1960s reimagined public budgeting 
from a technique of resource allocation or expenditure control, to a technique of strategic 
 
4 The ubiquity of governance as a generic signifier for administering social affairs makes it tricky to write about as 
an object itself. It is all too easy to slip into using governance in this general way, muddying the waters of the thesis’ 
purpose to argue that the governance paradigm was a concrete historical project of 1990s public management. In 
general in the thesis, the use of ‘governance’ as a signifier refers either directly to this project or to contemporaneous 
conceptual reflections on historic changes to public administration in the 1990s. As a result, there has been an 
exhaustive use of the thesaurus to find alternative signifiers for the generic administration of social affairs. 
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decision-making (Schick, 1966).This meant that budgeting did not just set limits on expenditure, 
allocate resources, or register the efficiency of government spending. Instead, budgeting was 
reimagined as a process to choose between alternatives in pursuing defined policy objectives. By 
rethinking budgeting as a decision tool, rather than just a financial tool, a form of budgeting was 
created that was less directly reliant on the appropriation system budgeting was traditionally 
attached to.5 In this way, budgetary planning set in motion a managerial form of policy-making 
that came to characterise the governance paradigm. 
We often miss the significance of the fact that the governance paradigm captures a form 
of policy-making that manages without a budget because we tend to take budgeting for granted.6 
There are good reasons for this. Budgets are mundane, detail-oriented, and overly procedural. 
Moreover, given the governance paradigm is defined by constrained financial resources, digging 
into the technicalities of budgeting as a practice seems redundant. Where budgeting does figure 
in political economy, it is as a Keynesian hangover. It is concerned with macro-fiscal 
interventions, the size of deficits and debt, or the effects of public expenditure and debt on 
economic growth. This is visibly the case in Europe. Fiscal coordination is seen as a push and 
pull between Northern and Southern Europe over the size and spend of national budgets, fiscal 
rules vs discretion (Brunnermeier et al., 2016), austerity vs stimulus (Blyth, 2013).   
This macro perspective on budgeting means we miss its significance as a micro-
technique of public policy that has been historically fundamental to statecraft. A budget is more 
than a register of expenditure. As Wildavsky describes, ‘budgeting is concerned with the 
translation of financial resources into human purpose’ (Wildavsky, 1974). Budgets determine 
who gets what and set what is to be done. To this extent, budgets also hold palpable ideological 
power in shaping politics. Budgets are a paranoia of the possible. Costing and affordability are 
the benchmark of possibility in public policy. No issue has prohibited radical policy change in 
recent years than anxieties over budgetary deficits and ticking debt clocks.  
Not only are budgets of crucial practical importance in the execution of policy, public 
finance touches closely on core political issues of democracy and sovereignty. They are a register 
of action and resource use, against which democratic accountability is held. The ability to set a 
budget is a key marker of democratic self-determination. A European Commission official 
 
5 An appropriation is a budgetary act of allocating finance for specific tasks 
6 An exception to this is the work of Sarah Quinn (Quinn, 2017). Whereas Quinn explores the relationship between financial innovations and 
public finance in the US, this thesis explores the relationship between public finance and innovations of public management in the EU 
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described to Charlotte Rommerskirchen that ‘the budget is one of the ultimate expressions of 
sovereignty’ (Rommerskirchen, 2019, p. 12). The affront of Eurozone bailouts, breaching the 
fiscal sovereignty of bankrupt nations, revealed the bonds that are felt to exist between (national) 
democracy and the control of public finances. Budgets delineate communities in terms of 
external sovereignty and internal inequality, captured in the claim to the sanctity of ‘taxpayer 
money’. The link felt between democracy and public finance has meant the controversy of EU 
fiscal union is predominantly framed not around its potential macroeconomic utility, but 
tensions in the relationship between blood, budgets, and democracy.  
Budgeting matters. But in a world of global governance and austerity, where power is 
decentred and public finance constrained, we rarely appreciate how. Given the significance of 
budgeting to public policy, the rise of the governance paradigm is a remarkable transformation. 
In part, this transformation has seen IOs build a form policy-making capacity without relying on 
significant financial resources but, instead, using techniques of managerial planning. To unlock 
this theoretically, we must revisit the history of budgetary planning. 
 
Rethinking Governance as Planning 
State planning in the mid-twentieth century revolutionised the role of budgeting in public 
policy through the introduction of budgetary planning. Most notably, the trial of the Planning 
and Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) in OECD countries in the 1960s was a major shift 
in budgeting associated with modern techniques like programme budgeting, performance 
management, or cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The distinction of budgetary planning was to use 
the appropriations cycle not only to allocate resources but to strategically decide what were the 
purposes of public policy. PPBS attempted to turn the budget from line item lists of expenditure 
(e.g. how many pencils or computers were purchased) into detailed policy ‘programmes’ that 
linked financial costs to the achievement of quantified policy objectives (e.g. the financial 
requirements to treat a health condition or maintain nuclear defence).  
 PPBS itself failed. It was discarded as a project for budgetary reform around a decade 
after it was introduced. Nevertheless, the significance of budgetary planning was to transform 
the nature of public policy with the broader rise of ‘managerial governance’ (Amadae, 2003; 
Christian et al., 2018; Erickson, 2015; Erickson et al., 2013; Knafo et al., 2018; Mirowski, 2008; 
Rindzevičiūtė, 2016). The governance turn was one specific historical legacy of budgetary 
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planning. As chapter two will elaborate, the governance paradigm reflected a particular 
innovation of budgetary planning that detached strategic planning from budgetary 
appropriations. Detaching appropriations from planning was the work of a new class of public 
managers (Knafo, 2020). It was this public managerial class, carrying techniques of 
systems/policy analysis beyond appropriations, that I argue has driven the managerial 
transformation of the governance paradigm. 
Governance as planning without financial resources found special favour with IOs. 
IOs enthusiastically took up governance as an explicit reform agenda, thrusting managerial 
techniques like benchmarking into the core of their activities. Governance as a form of planning 
that operated without financial resources was well suited to deal with the constraints IOs faced. 
By drawing authority and autonomy not from the allocation and distribution of funds they did 
not have, but from strategising, analysing policy performance, or acting in partnership with other 
policy actors, IOs have been enthusiastic advocates of the governance turn. I argue that the rise 
of supranational authority in the governance paradigm is built from the social forces and format 
of public management. By reformatting policy-making in the spirit of budgetary planning and 
mobilising the social power of a public managerial class, IOs could construct a stake in a 
globalising policy-making system.  
Reformatting means here a process by which the technical instruments, modes of 
thinking, or internal organisation of public institutions are shifted. This does not refer to a 
paradigmatic shift from one model to another. Instead, reformatting works as subtler layered 
process of bricolage through the adoption of specific techniques on top of, or alongside, existing 
policy-making processes. The effects of reformatting as it is deployed in this thesis is to opens 
questions over the allocation and distribution of public authority – i.e. questions of who has 
what kind of a ‘stake’ in policy-making. The managerial reformatting of policy-making discussed 
in the thesis has had the effect of privileging policy actors with information processing 
responsibilities by making tasks like strategizing and evaluating central to the purpose of 
governance. The thesis will therefore bring new perspective to the rise of IOs as ‘cognitive 
authorities’ by placing the governance turn that drove the rise of supranational authority in the 
historical lineage of public management and budgetary planning (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).  
In making this argument in relation to the EU, there are three main aspects. The first 
aspect is how the format of policy-making in the EU has been transformed from fixed rules of 
neo/ordoliberalism to information processing and strategising of public managerialism. The 
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terms of EU coordination at critical junctures has typically been the writing of rules, said to be 
inspired by neo/ordoliberalism. This was first seen with the SGP in the 1990s and later with the 
New Economic Governance (NEG) amidst the Eurocrisis in the 2010s. In comparison to these 
rules, techniques of benchmarking and performance management are often seen as a weaker 
approximation. As the thesis will show, however, the inflexibility and impracticality of rules has 
consistently meant they have been disputed, watered down, manipulated, or even suspended. 
Despite the neo/ordoliberal design of the EU, it has proven politically impossible to wield the 
legalised sanctioning powers of the EU as an ‘economic constitution’. Instead, policy-making in 
the EU has consistently relied on the managerial techniques that led to proclamations of a 
governance turn in the 1990s. This managerial approach to policy-making is radically different 
from neo/ordoliberalism's approach. Neo/ordoliberalism emphasizes the role of political 
institutions in bringing a stable order for market processes to unfold. In contrast, public 
management emphasizes organizing the policy-making process to empower decision-makers as 
information-driven strategizers. Whereas neoliberalism builds on a thought collective of 
Friedrich von Hayek or Walter Eucken, public management builds on the cybernetic systems 
thinking of Herbert Simon, Stafford Beer, or Karl Deutsch.  
The second aspect is the rise of public managers as a set of social forces within the 
EU. Depending on theoretical inclination, power in the EU is understood in either geopolitical 
inter-state terms of Europe’s Great Powers (Dyson & Featherstone, 1999; Warlouzet, 2018), 
inter-institutional terms between supranational institutions and intergovernmental institutions 
(Moravcsik, 1993; Sandholtz & Sweet, 1998), or macro capitalist class power within globalising 
capitalism (Bieler & Morton, 2001; Cafruny & Ryner, 2003). Here, the thesis addresses the 
institutionalised social power of a public management class in constructing supranational policy-
making authority. 
The emergence of ‘managerial governance’ spawned a new class of public managers 
(Knafo, 2020; Knafo et al., 2018). Public managers are trained in the business studies and public 
policy of Herbert Simon’ decision-sciences or James March and Johan Olsen’s game-theoretic 
organisational sociology. They worked in new ‘think tanks’ like RAND, the Urban Institute, the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), or one of the many other research 
institutes that have exploded in recent decades. They were defined by the application of an 
economic perspective to social life, wielding techniques like cost-benefit analysis and 
policy/systems analysis. Public managers have increasingly infiltrated political institutions 
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through the experiments of PPBS in the 1960s, the turn to New Public Management (NPM) in 
the 1980s, and in the 1990s/2000s as the governance paradigm 
Managerialism in the thesis refers to a contemporary situation where practices and 
modes of thinking connected to the social forces of public management have deeply shaped the 
ways in which public institutions function. The thesis therefore opts for a definition of 
managerialism that centres public management as a set of social forces tied to histories of state 
planning, as distinct from a conception of managerialism that equates it with a distinguishable 
‘private sector’ intruding into the domain of the ‘public sector’. The reason for this is twofold. 
First, it is to acknowledge that managerial governance has deeply affected the corporate world 
(Beck and Germann, 2018), but to delineate public management as a distinct set of social forces 
connected to histories of planning that will be addressed in this thesis. Second, by framing 
managerialism not in terms of the outside incursion of corporate actors into policy-making, I 
want to draw attention to the new ways in which policy-making itself is turned into a space of 
capital accumulation. This means how, in the new managerialism, processes like strategizing, 
evaluating, benchmarking, or implementation are turned into money-making ventures (in 
addition to the public social purpose to which they are directed) circled by public managerial 
actors in consultancies, outsourcing conglomerates, or accountancy firms. While this is not a 
development dealt with substantially in the thesis, it is an orientation to bear in mind. 
A European public management community arose following the translation of PPBS 
into the bureaucracies of Europe in the 1960s/1970s. Public management institutionalised itself 
in Europe through universities reorienting towards a ‘policy perspective’ and the explosion of 
think tanks, research institutes, and policy consultancies. Four individuals that I use in the thesis 
to represent this new European public management class are Fritz W. Scharpf, Giandomenico 
Majone, Michel Crozier, and Les Metcalfe. These academic-practitioners of public management 
turned their attention in the 1980s/1990s from national problems of planning to European 
integration. More broadly, a public managerial class in the EU operationalised the Single Market 
from a neoliberal fantasy of slashed red tape and falling trade barriers to an internal site of capital 
accumulation made up of quangos and agencies coordinating product and market regulations. 
They turned the SGPS’s political proclamations on nominal deficit and debt limits into a vastly 
complicated system driven by elusive calculations of structural deficits and fiscal ‘sustainability’. 
They populated the endless committees tasked with designing social indicators that would fill 
the scoreboards on social and economic policy in various OMsC. 
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The third aspect is how democracy has been reconceived in managerial terms in the 
EU. Few issues provoke greater concern in the EU than its ‘democratic deficit’. As the EU 
gained more legal authority to govern Europe, and supranational institutions increasingly 
touched everyday life, the legitimacy of European institutions has been continuously questioned. 
There has been a multitude of ways in which the so-called democratic deficit has been conceived, 
accounted, or apologized for (Eriksen & Fossum, 2002; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Moravcsik, 2002). 
For critical political economy, democracy in the EU has largely been conceived in terms of 
depoliticisation (Burnham, 2000; Gill, 1998). This has meant the removal of budgetary and 
monetary issues from popular decision-making and into the hands of technocratic experts.  
The thesis will highlight how public management put a distinctively problematic spin 
on EU attempts to legitimate themselves. While seeking to insulate supranational institutions 
from popular majoritarian pressure, a public management perspective was not technocratic. 
Chapters four and six will show how public managers were critical of the arrogant claims to 
specialist knowledge expertise implied. Instead, public managers saw the EU’s claim to 
legitimacy as coming down to a criterion of effectiveness accountability. What this meant was 
that the EU’s legitimacy should be claimed through horizontal lines of intra-executive 
accountability around benchmarks of effectiveness. Democracy in this image was reconfigured 
in the idiom of key performance indicators (KPIs) and, when they were not met, intra-executive 
accountability. Excluded in this managerial vision of democracy, therefore, was people – but not 
in the ways of technocracy. 
 
Research Methods and Data Sources 
This thesis takes up the lineage of ‘managerial governance’ as a methodological starting 
point to make sense of the building of supranational authority in the EU since the 1990s (Knafo 
et al., 2018). This thesis is therefore a historical study of the ‘governance turn’ to European 
integration. I use the history of budgetary planning (as a particular aspect of managerial 
governance) to theoretically rethink the significance of the governance paradigm in the EU. In 
doing so, I build on the diverse methodological tradition of critical political economy 
(Montgomerie, 2017). In particular, I pursue an historicist approach (Knafo, 2010, 2017). An 
historicist approach as deployed in this thesis has two components. First, it is a philosophical 
orientation to drawing theoretical insights from historical analysis. It is distinguished from 
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directly conducting the work of a historian by not necessarily (though not excluding the 
possibility) building an analysis directly from primary historical materials. Instead, an historicist 
approach draws theoretical abstractions through historiographical research. To do so, a 
historicist approach relies on a particular set of methodological commitments that centres a task 
of identifying the concrete agency of social agents. This means that rather than taking structure 
(broadly conceived) as in any way determinative of social change, a historicist approach takes as 
a methodological precondition the need to identify moments of innovation that transforms 
social institutions. Institutions here refers to not just norms or discourse patterning behaviour, 
but infrastructural questions of power (Könings, 2007). Infrastructural power refers to the ability 
of state institutions to affect deep and lasting policy change across the social space they 
administer (Mann, 1984). Connected to this, infrastructural capacity refers to the technical 
means, the policy practices or instruments, through which state institutions affect this change. 
The thesis is particularly concerned with the infrastructural capacities of the supranational 
institutions of the EU, uniquely relevant because these institutions are typically seen to lack the 
traditional infrastructural tools of nation states – namely sufficient financial resources and a 
coercive legal apparatus.  
My method has three steps. First, I historicise the governance paradigm by putting it in 
its political economic context. This means to unravel the problems facing European policy-
makers in the 1990s that the governance turn responded to. By specifying the historical context 
before the governance turn, this step puts in perspective what is new about the governance 
paradigm and, therefore, what requires explanation. I highlight a dilemma of supranational 
authority as the problem facing policy-makers that manifest in a unique way under the condition 
of European integration in the 1990s. Second, I pinpoint the innovations of the social forces of 
public management responding to the problems facing European policy-makers in a way that 
drove the conceptual rise of a ‘governance turn’. This involves analysing the distinctive 
perspective of an academic-practitioner public management community on the issue of 
European integration in the 1990s/2000s and tracking the agency of this class within an explicit 
‘EU governance’ reform project. This step locates the agency of public management by 
highlighting the necessary work of translation in moving public management practices from 
national planning to the new historical context of EU governance in the 1990s/2000s. Third, I 
analyse the (unintended) consequences of the managerial reformatting of EU policy-making. 
This means addressing the legacies and new problems that were created by the reformatting of 
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European integration as a managerial process. This step therefore treats the contemporary 
political economy of the EU not as the deliberate outcome of a public managerial overhaul of 
EU governance. Instead, I understand it in terms of the unintended outcomes of the managerial 
reformatting of EU governance that attempted to solve problems unique to the historical 
moment of the 1990s 
To take these three steps, I used multiple sources of data that triangulated between 
different levels of analysis studying the EU and European political economy. The levels of 
analysis I captured in my research were 1) a broad political economic history of post-second 
world war Europe; 2) the intergovernmental and inter-institutional politics of the EU (in 
particular in relation to fiscal, macroeconomic, and social policy coordination since the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty); 3) the evolution of the European Commission as an organisation, and its 
forerunner the High Authority, since its creation by the 1951 Treaty of Paris (with a particular 
focus on the Kinnock management reforms of 2000-2004); and 4) debates and developments of 
public management as an academic-practitioner community. 
To access these levels of analysis, I analysed the following data sources. First, I used 
secondary literature on European history and political economy (level of analysis 1). Second, I 
analysed internal and external policy documents of the European Union, including White Papers, 
Staff Working Papers, communications, conclusions, regulations, directives, and internal 
correspondence (levels of analysis 2 and 3).7 Third, I used archival material from two sources: 
the Kinnock Papers at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge and the Historical Archives 
of the European Union in Florence. This archival material provided added depth to an analysis 
of publicly available and official documents on the internal politics of the European Commission 
at a pivotal moment when it underwent major management reforms in the 2000s (level of 
analysis 3). Fourth, I conducted 17 interviews in Brussels, Maastricht, Frankfurt, and London 
between October and December 2017.8 The interviews were held with a range of national 
officials working in Permanent Representations to the EU; European officials working in the 
EU’s institutions; and public management experts focused on EU affairs. The interviews 
provided crucial background material that guided the gathering of further empirical data and 
 
7 This included using material publicly available from the Official Journal of the European Union. In addition, I analysed documents received 
through two ‘access to documents’ requests to the European Commission respectively in June 2017 and July 2017. First, I received documents  
related to the internal inter-governmental deliberations in the European Council President Herman van Rompuy’s Task Force on Economic 
Governance (TFEG) that negotiated the reforms of the Six-Pack and Two-Pack in 2010. This included correspondence and draft reports. 
Second, I received documents related to the Commission’s internal think tank the ‘Forward Studies Unit’ (FSU; now European Political Strategy 
Centre – EPSC) in relation to their ‘Governance Project’ (1996-2000). Documents included seminar proceedings and programmes of work. 
8 See Annex 1 for the list of interviews 
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shaped the analysis in relation to the post-crisis reforms of economic governance and the 
evolution of a managerial function in the EU’s institutions (levels of analysis 2 and 3). Fifth, I 
surveyed major international news publications (e.g. the Financial Times) to contextualise my 
close reading of internal and public policy documents within broader public debates since 
Maastricht (levels of analysis 2 and 3). Sixth, I analysed the published work of public 
management and policy analysis (level of analysis 4). In relation to the EU, three individuals were 
important here: Les Metcalfe, Giandomenico Majone, and Fritz Scharpf. The work of these 
academic-practitioner public managers was used as a primary source on public management 
perspectives on EU governance. 
 
Synopsis 
The thesis has six chapters. The first chapter reviews how four approaches understand 
the EU governance turn in the 1990s/2000s. These approaches are institutionalist political 
economy, critical political economy, accounts of ordoliberalism in Europe, and governmentality 
studies. I argue that these accounts have, in different ways, registered the governance turn to 
policy-making but have underplayed its significance. Critical accounts of European integration 
are dominated by the story of a market-led project of neoliberalism. The significance of 
neoliberalism for critical literature has been how European integration has undermined the 
progressive uses of public finance. The governance paradigm has been inserted into these 
accounts in terms of how new managerial techniques recreate the policy world and governed 
subjects in the image of a neoliberal market utopia. In contrast, I argue in chapter one that the 
governance paradigm needs to be given significance outside of neoliberalism. Rather than 
marketizing policy-making by disempowering public finance, I argue that observations of a shift 
from government to governance reflected the building of supranational authority through an 
alternative conception of public budgeting.  
Building on this critique, chapter two revisits the conceptual rise of governance 
through the history of state budgeting. I argue that budgeting’s history offers an important 
perspective on the transformation to public policy that scholars described as a transition from 
government to governance in the 1990s. I show how budgeting was transformed in the mid-
twentieth century through the use of new planning techniques like PPBS. Budgetary planning 
was an attempt to transform the appropriation cycle from a system of resource distribution and 
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expenditure control into one of rationally deciding the purposes of public policy. I show that 
while budgetary planning struggled to remake the appropriations cycle, it had a transformative 
impact on public policy. I argue that it was from the legacy of budgetary planning that we should 
read the governance turn. This legacy was the reformatting of policy-making in a managerial 
template in terms of a strategic orientation to decision-making and the proliferation of 
quantitative performance monitoring techniques. Whereas budgetary planning applied this 
managerial approach within the appropriations system, the governance paradigm referred to how 
public management refocused policy-making more broadly on strategising and left policy 
delivery to organisations external to the infrastructure of the state in the form of ‘partnerships’ 
and ‘networks’. Finally, I show in this chapter how, while the governance turn had national 
origins, the managerial reformatting of public policy had significant appeal for IOs to deal with 
a dilemma they faced of limited financial resources and weak enforcement tools. 
Chapters three to six elaborates this point by historicising how EU governance arose 
as a response to the dilemma of supranational authority since the 1990s. Chapter three 
establishes the challenge of supranational authority in the history of European integration to 
provide the historical grounding from which governance would arise as a reform agenda. I show 
how the neoliberal drive of integration, first in the Single Market and later in the EMU, rejected 
the financial empowerment of supranational authorities and instead attempted to use 
supranational legal authority to build market rule. I show how this neoliberal design of the EU 
fell apart in the 2000s as national governments refused to be subjected to the legal sanctioning 
power of supranational institutions. The chapter argues that supranational institutions were 
being asked to govern more than ever in the 1990s/2000s, but were denied the financial 
resources and legal authority that was required for the task. 
Chapter four shows how, facing this dilemma of supranational authority in the 1990s, 
European institutions turned to the template of public management in the shift that has been 
labelled as the rise of EU governance. In response to the failure of rules and limits to 
supranational authority, the European Commission gained an alternative stake in national policy-
making by reformatting its work along managerial lines. Supranational authority was constructed 
not through the wielding of financial resources that governments refused to allow, nor the 
control of expenditure through rules that governments refused to obey. Instead, the governance 
turn was an attempt of supranational institutions to empower themselves as centres strategy and 
information processing. I show this through three sites of reform: benchmarking 
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competitiveness through the Lisbon Agenda, the 2005 reform of the SGP, and the 2000-2004 
Commission management reforms. 
I show in this chapter how the managerial pivot to the EU brought with it an 
alternative answer to the EU’s perennially accused democratic deficit. Rather than the EU 
making legitimacy claims through classic tropes of the technocratic delivery of ‘peace and 
prosperity’ through ‘ever closer union’, nor the replication of representative democratic models 
from the nation-state, the managerial reformatting of the EU grounded its legitimacy claims in 
the achievement of quantified KPIs.  
Chapter five demonstrates how this experiment in ‘governance’ ran aground with the 
onset of the financial crisis at the end of the 2000s. I show how whereas governance promised 
a more effective and democratic union, the Eurocrisis starkly revealed that new modes of 
‘governance’ had not resolved the dilemma of supranational authority. There were two 
interpretations of what went wrong. For those seeking an equitable solution to the crisis through 
deepened integration, the Eurocrisis revealed that the EU needed the fiscal firepower it had been 
denied in the 1990s and not the targets of the 2000 Lisbon Agenda that by 2010 had been 
embarrassingly missed. For the advocates of austerity, the EU needed a means to discipline 
member states felt to have flouted the EMU’s budgetary obligations, not voluntary managerial 
tools that had little purchase on domestic policy change. I show in this chapter how the 
Eurocrisis led to an overhaul of governance in the EU and the rise of a NEG. A first glance at 
these reforms looked like rules and sanctions were back and, this time, they mattered. Despite 
this, I show how in practice the EU’s strengthened rules were quickly watered down, qualified, 
and resisted in their use. 
Chapter six demonstrates how, in the shadow of abandoned rules, the managerial 
orientation of EU policy-making has been consolidated rather than abandoned. I show how, 
while the rules of the NEG were never used as legal sanctioning instruments, there has been a 
consolidation of the Commission’s managerial function. Provisions within the NEG providing 
the Commission with sweeping access to performance data from member states, and a new 
policy-making architecture to leverage this information supply, has empowered the 
Commission’s as a planner. 
To conclude, the thesis considers the political implications of a world where IOs have 
grown their presence in policy-making, and where our political institutions increasingly take a 











Chapter 1: Governance and Neoliberal European Integration 
 
Introduction 
At the end of the last millennium, public policy-making was going through a transformation – 
of which the relaunch of European integration was a major example. The agreement to form 
the European Union at Maastricht in 1992 brought with it a new conception of policy-making. 
The new EU deeply integrated markets and created a monetary union. But the new union was 
not a state. A marker of distinction was that supranational authorities in the EU had few of the 
traditional budgetary instruments familiar to national policymakers. Rather than member states 
exercising fiscal and economic policies jointly, the EU would coordinate national policies 
through a jumble of performance management instruments like indicators, targets, 
benchmarks, policy evaluation, peer review, and rankings. 
For many observers of this process, the Europeanising policy system that arose over 
the 1990s heralded a new paradigm of ‘governance’. The centralised and territorialised political 
authority of national ‘government’ was giving way through European integration to a more 
diffuse and iterative ‘multi-level governance’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Supranational 
institutions were becoming key nodes in globalising network-based policy-making (Börzel, 
1997; Dehousse, 1997). An ‘experimentalist’ public policy was taking over from traditional 
bureaucratic hierarchies and procedures (Zeitlin, 2005). Recognising this shift, the European 
Commission was among the governance concept’s most enthusiastic adopters. The 2001 White 
Paper on Governance mobilised the language of governance to propose a new practice and 
democratic ethos of public policy that gave supranational institutions an important role 
(European Commission, 2001).  
For critical observers, when governance is invoked as more than a generic category, 
it is associated with neoliberalism (Brown, 2015, p. 122; Cahill & Konings, 2017, p. 92). 
Concerning the EU, Laura Horn, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, and Jan Drahokoupil described the 
rise of managerial techniques of European governance as the ‘zenith’ of a neoliberal project of 
market integration (van Apeldoorn et al., 2009, p. 4). From this perspective, rather than the 
supranational welfare state imagined in earlier years of integration, the rise of ‘European 
governance’ reflected a form of supranational rule governing at the behest of markets and 
through market-like policy instruments like benchmarking. 
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Despite governance having come to be associated with neoliberalism, critical 
scholars have consistently observed that there was little in the work of neoliberal thinkers that 
could have predicted the managerial form neoliberalism took under the banner of ‘governance’ 
in the 1990s. Wendy Brown, for example, identifies that governance ‘was not part of the 
neoliberal imaginary set out by Milton Friedman or F. A. Hayek’ (Brown, 2015, p. 122).  This 
oversight should be no surprise. The form of policy-making imagined by neoliberals and that 
practiced in the age of ‘governance’ are in many ways contradictory. Scholars of neoliberalism 
like Stephen Gill, Claire Cutler, or Quinn Slobodian describe neoliberalism as a project that 
uses the stability of international law and constitution to constrain the majoritarian democratic 
impulses of nation-states for expanded public spending and market regulation (Gill & Cutler, 
2014; Slobodian, 2018). In contrast, European governance in the 1990s attempted to build 
supranational public authority using practices of dynamic and flexible information processing 
that are enough to make Hayek squirm.  
Building on this apparent contradiction between the neoliberal project and the 
managerial policy-making transformation of the 1990s, this chapter will argue that we have 
been too quick to square governance with neoliberalism. We know that the governance 
paradigm differs from the agenda neoliberals advance but we nevertheless theorise governance 
as a neoliberal phenomenon. To unpack this argument, the chapter will review how four 
literatures account for the ‘governance turn’ in the EU at the turn of the millennium. The four 
literatures are institutional political economy, neo-Gramscianism, a literature on the ordoliberal 
lineage, and Foucauldian approaches.  
Although these literatures differ considerably in their theoretical and political 
inclinations, they all rely on three assumptions that this chapter will unpack. In various ways, 
these assumptions have undermined a substantive theorisation of the governance paradigm in 
critically understanding policy-making in the EU’s peculiar monetary union. What is missed in 
particular is the historical significance of the social forces and format of public management in 
building a supranational  governance capacity since the 1990s. The three assumptions are: 
First, the rise of governance in the EU has been interpreted through a binary between 
social and fiscal/economic policy. Both Marxist and institutional political economy frame their 
analysis through a Polanyian tension between ‘marketizing’ economic and fiscal policy and the 
possibilities of a ‘market-correcting’ social policy (Dale, 2012). In the EU, marketizing 
economic policy is considered to take place in the realm of Single Market regulation and the 
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fiscal rules of the SGP. In a widely adopted framing, Fritz W. Scharpf describes economic 
policy coordination in the EU as ‘negative integration’ (Scharpf, 1999). This refers to how 
marketizing economic policy has historically focused on the removal of trade barriers (e.g. 
through the Single Market) or agreements to limit government action (e.g. through the SGP’s 
deficit rules). In contrast to marketizing economic policy, social policy in the EU is imagined 
as taking place in the sphere of welfare coordination or labour market regulation. Social policy 
in the EU is considered by Scharpf as ‘positive integration’ because it implies the use of 
collective political authority to build social protection institutions or correct inequitable market 
outcomes (Scharpf, 1999). Within this binary, scholars have debated to what extent the move 
to the EMU in the 1990s created an asymmetry between social and fiscal/economic policy in 
the EU (Crespy & Menz, 2015; Maricut & Puetter, 2018; van Apeldoorn et al., 2009). Scholars 
typically conclude that the EU privileges a marketizing economic and fiscal policy over 
redistributive social protection institutions. 
Second, building on the above binary, a distinction is made whereby social policy is 
seen as governed through the managerial techniques of the governance paradigm, whereas 
fiscal and economic policy is governed through neoliberal hierarchical techniques of law and 
constitution (Jacobsson, 2004; Trubek & Trubek, 2005; van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010). The 
Single Market and the SGP, for example, are both hierarchically enshrined in the EU treaties 
and the body of Community regulation that has developed around them. In contrast, while 
social policy coordination has a treaty basis, it is practiced through horizontal and voluntary 
techniques of coordination like the OMC that came to be associated with the governance turn. 
It is the relative balance of this binary between hard ‘marketizing’ law vs soft ‘social’ governance 
that frequently constitutes the asymmetry observed in the first assumption. 
Third, budgeting is typically conceived in macroeconomic terms. This means that 
budgeting is considered relevant in terms of three functions of macroeconomic stabilisation, 
political redistribution, and expenditure control.  Fiscal politics in the EU is read through the 
clashing pursuit of these three functions (Blyth, 2013; Chang, 2016; Heipertz & Verdun, 2010). 
For advocates of a supranational Keynesian welfare state, the governance turn in the 1990s 
reflected how new policy techniques like benchmarking inadequately plugged the gaps of 
missing fiscal instruments that could perform a stabilisation or redistributive role in the EMU. 
For the neoliberal architects of the EMU and advocates of austerity, the EU’s expenditure 
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control function needs strengthening through supranational and national instruments of 
discipline and control. 
I argue that these assumptions, while not incorrect, have directed analysis in such a 
way that the significance of governance in remaking policy-making in the EU has not been 
fully reckoned with. There are two ways in which this has been the case. 
First, the asymmetry between an ameliorative social policy governed by voluntary 
performance management, and a marketizing economic policy governed through obligatory 
law and regulation, has meant the managerial policy techniques of the governance paradigm 
have been analytically implicated with the politically subordinate role of the progressive use of 
public finance in the EU. Managerial policy techniques are in this sense treated as evidence of 
a lack in the EU rather than something distinctive in their own right. The EU certainly places 
limits on public expenditure. But this framing is problematic because it overlooks the 
significance of the governance paradigm as introducing a new and distinctive form of rule. I 
will show how, rather than being on the margins of EU policy-making, the managerialisation 
of policy-making was a historically specific innovation responding to a felt dilemma that law 
was an inadequate instrument to govern an international polity the size and complexity of the 
EU.  
Second, the consequence of overlooking the foundational role of managerial policy 
techniques in the EU has meant the politics of the governance paradigm have been 
misconceived. By analytically subordinating the significance of managerial policy-making, the 
politics of governance has often been read in terms of the symbolic or discursive role numbers 
play in entrenching market rule. Instead, I argue that the politics of governance is more related 
to the institutionalisation of public managerial power in the EU. This refers to both the 
enthronement of managerial techniques to govern the EU and the embedding of a managerial 
class within the EU’s institutions. Chapters four and six will make this point through the history 
of management reform in the European Commission and the evolution of the EU’s 
governance system since the Eurocrisis. 
The rest of this chapter will explore the four literatures in terms of how they have 
understood the emergence of the governance paradigm since the 1990s. Each literature will be 





1.1 EU Governance as Asymmetric Integration 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty that established the EMU was built on a double asymmetry. First is 
an asymmetry between monetary and economic policy, Monetary policy was governed 
collectively through the supranational ECB. Meanwhile, fiscal, economic, and social policy was 
left to national governments. Despite previous proposals in the 1970 Werner Report and the 
1977 McDougall Report for collective budgetary and macroeconomic policy-making for Europe, 
Amy Verdun noted how ‘by the late 1980s economic governance was to be attained without 
major centralization and transfer of powers to a supranational body’ (Verdun, 2013, p. 33). This 
meant that the Maastricht settlement did not include provision for performing budgetary 
functions of macroeconomic stabilization or political redistribution that one would expect in a 
monetary union. Rather than exercising fiscal/economic/social policy jointly, a new system 
developed over the course of the 1990s whereby national governments coordinated their policies 
through guidelines, benchmarks, peer pressure, and rules. 
Second is an asymmetry within this coordination system. Economic policy is often 
seen as in the realm of ‘negative integration’ in terms of how trade barriers between states are 
lowered or institutions reregulate in the interests of marketization. Social policy is seen as 
‘positive integration’ in terms of how collective policies might tame or ameliorate the excesses 
of market integration.  
This section will review how institutionalist political economy has made sense of this 
of this peculiar asymmetric system European policy coordination. Institutionalist political 
economy refers here to a variety of approaches using an institutionalist analysis to make sense 
of the EU at the crossroads of comparative political science, international relations, and 
international political economy (Pollack, 2018). This literature has observed that the rise of 
managerial policy coordination has been subordinate to the marketizing drive of integration 
through the Single Market and the EMU. By reifying budgetary functions of macroeconomic 
stabilisation and redistribution, the governance paradigm is seen as consistently falling short. As 
a result, while remarking at the novelty of governance, they have generally downplayed the 
political significance of the governance paradigm.  
 
Market Discipline vs. Social Coordination 
Institutional political economists look at the EU’s coordination system and see an 
asymmetry between economic and social policy. Amy Verdun describes an asymmetry between 
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how the ‘coordination of “economic governance” (budgetary and fiscal policy) was to be 
achieved via rules and social matters were considered the responsibility of Member States’ 
(Verdun, 2013, p. 33). Dermot Hodson likewise describes how whereas budgetary coordination 
takes places through ‘harder forms of coordination’ like the excessive deficit procedure of the 
SGP, the ‘open method’ to govern employment and welfare ‘relies on neither legal obligation 
nor the threat of financial penalties but rather on the ability of member states to build consensus 
on the goals of policy and on the effectiveness of peer pressure as a sanction mechanism against 
non-compliance’ (Hodson, 2004, p. 232). John Grahl similarly highlights an asymmetry whereby: 
 ‘social policy is a realm of soft law, of declarations of principle, of ‘policy communities’, of 
the non-binding social charter and the open method of co-ordination. If the topic changes to 
economics – to the single market or fiscal deficits – one is in a very different world of hard 
law and justiciable rights, of detailed supervision, of precise numerical constraints and 
quasi-automatic sanctions for transgressors’ (Grahl et al., 2015, p. 168).  
Scharpf describes this difference as a constitutional asymmetry between ‘policies 
promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality’ (Scharpf, 
2002, p. 645). Institutionalist political economy, then, argues that while the market is governed 
through compulsion, the progressive use of public authority is entirely voluntary.   
Implicit in this narrative of an asymmetry in European coordination is a particular 
understanding of budgeting. Fiscal policy is held on the economic side of the equation, but what 
is implied more broadly is a macroeconomic understanding of budgeting. Namely, the 
asymmetry of integration refers to how fiscal rules hold back the use of budgets for 
macroeconomic stabilisation, while the absence of ‘positive integration’ means there are few 
instruments for redistribution in the EU. As Stefan Collignon describes, in a context of deep 
market integration, the EU’s reliance on coordination rather coercion meant ‘a large new class 
of collective goods exist that cannot be efficiently provided by voluntary cooperation between 
autonomous governments’ (Collignon, 2004, p. 923). 
The institutionalist political economy literature explains the asymmetry of integration as 
a product of the challenges of collective action within a diverse EU. Fritz W. Scharpf contrasts 
how negative economic integration has largely taken place through the judicial activism of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), while efforts to develop social policy depends on collective 
agreement among the EU’s heterogenous national governments (Scharpf, 2010). This challenge 
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was earlier labelled by Scharpf as a ‘joint decision trap’ (Scharpf, 1988, 2006). Similarly, James 
Caporaso and Joerg Wittenbrinck describe how the relative weakness of an EU social policy has 
been a consequence of the different decision-rules through which it is decided. They write ‘the 
market has expanded according to a majority-decision logic… but regulating the market through 
adding a social dimension requires unanimity (Caporaso & Wittenbrinck, 2006, p. 477). 
Building on this collective action explanation of the asymmetry of integration, political 
economy explains how the ‘soft’ characteristics of a managerial social policy was a consequence 
of its development within the near-unanimity constraints of EU policy-making. Armin Schäfer 
offers a typical explanation that the rise of voluntary social policy coordination in the 1990s was 
a political consequence of a social-democratic attempt to build a European social policy without 
converging on collectively exercised policies (A. Schäfer, 2004).  
An institutionalist political economy approach is useful to understand both the 
asymmetric design of the EMU, as well as offering an explanation based on the clashing 
preferences and decision-rules in the EU’s heterogenous polity. These explanations, however, 
arguably mean the institutionalist political economy literature underplays the significance of 
governance as a paradigm transforming policy-making in the EU. The political economy 
literature is good at highlighting the institutional dilemma facing national governments in the 
1990s. But the turn to a managerial form of governance that uses elaborate techniques of 
information processing, indicators and benchmarks cannot be so easily read off from this 
dilemma as an obvious choice. By explaining EU policy coordination as a functional outcome 
of decision-rules and clashing preferences, the managerial form of rule that arose is given no 
history or social context in institutionalist accounts. Given the tough consensus requirements 
the literature highlights, it is surprising that any mechanisms were created at all.  
Identifying the institutional constraints of EU decision-rules poses the dilemma faced 
by governments but is not an explanation of the responses to this dilemma. More is therefore 
needed to historicise the format coordination took in its managerial remaking. Indeed, while 
institutionalist political economy has equated techniques information processing with a 
subordinate social policy, a managerial  approach to policy-making is not reducible to this. As 
part of a broader governance paradigm, managerial policy techniques had a profound impact 
beyond a constrained social policy in remaking policy-making in the EU. Indeed, Amandine 
Crespy and Georg Menz highlight a divide in the EU literature that while political economists 
have dismissed the significance of the governance turn, a field of policy analysis has enthused 
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over the extensive managerial transformation of the EU (Crespy & Menz, 2015, p. 183). 
Capturing this policy analysis perspective, Jonathan Zeitlin highlights the rise of ‘experimentalist 
governance’ in the EU and beyond (Zeitlin, 2015), building on work like Rainer Eising and Beate 
Kohler-Koch on governance in the 1990s (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999).  
 
The Hardening of Soft Social Governance 
 The diminishing of the governance paradigm’s significance by institutionalist political 
economy can be further seen in how the field has interpreted the 2010/2011 reforms of EU 
economic governance. Since the crisis, institutional political economy has observed how hard 
economic and soft social policy governance have been fused. Sonja Bekker, for example, 
observed how the EU governance had ‘introduced characteristics of hard law into soft law 
coordination cycles of employment and social policies’ (Bekker, 2013, p. 2). Likewise, Crespy 
and Menz observe that ‘the Commission has sought to increasingly tie together the monitoring 
of social policy indicators to economic objectives, thus including social policy issues in its 
recommendations to the member states’ (Crespy & Menz, 2015, p. 10). 
In many ways, political economy should have regarded this development as positive. 
The criticism of the asymmetry of integration was that whereas economic policy was governed 
through law and rules, market-protecting measures relied on voluntary coordination and 
benchmarking. Thus, the use of coercive policy instruments in the sphere of social policy could 
at first sight be regarded as a positive development. Indeed, for their part, policy studies has 
welcomed the shift. Jonathan Zeitlin and Bart Vanhercke prominently pointed to a ‘socialization 
of the European Semester’ in terms of the inclusion of social objectives, targets, and actors in 
the mainstream EU policy coordination (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018). 
Institutionalist political economy has, however, not welcomed the fusion of social and 
economic governance in the EU. Instead, political economy has considered the fusion to have 
reproduced the asymmetry between economic and social goals. Paul Copeland and Mary Daly 
argue that social policy has moved from an ‘add on’ to ‘dependence-upon’ economic objectives, 
principally of budgetary austerity and the ‘dominance of market-led integration’ (Paul Copeland 
& Daly, 2015, p. 140). In this regard, Copeland and Daly have seen the mainstreaming of social 
policy in EU governance as ‘dominated by measures and recommendations that support market 
functioning’, rather than social protection (Paul Copeland & Daly, 2018, p. 1014). Likewise, 
Sonja Bekker observes how there has been an ‘economic reading of social policy goals. Pension 
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schemes and labour costs are for instance issues of interest in discussing budgetary and economic 
problems at EU level’ (Bekker, 2013, p. 16). Similarly, Jamie Jordan, Vincenzo Maccarrone, and 
Roland Erne describe how despite social policy increasingly being governed according to 
‘vertical integration’, it continues to disappoint as a way to achieve a Social Europe (Jordan et 
al., 2020). 
Institutional political economy since the 1990s regarded social policy’s reliance on 
techniques of voluntary performance management as a testament to its marginalisation. But 
puzzlingly, the introduction of more coercive forms of regulation continues to disappoint this 
literature. It would seem, then, that the problem of asymmetry was never the level of compulsion 
built into governance mechanisms. It was instead related to the ends fiscal policy should serve. 
In particular, the literature builds on a particular conception of budgeting that takes as the 
benchmark of effective governance the performance of financial redistribution and stabilisation 
functions. Even as social policy becomes more coercive, the fact that it is not oriented to these 
ends is the source of disappointment for institutional political economy.  
The trouble with these perspectives is that the broader managerial transformation of 
EU policy coordination is misread. The EU’s double asymmetry is built on the prioritisation of 
a budgetary function of expenditure control and the neglect of stabilisation and redistribution 
functions. This is the complaint of institutional political economy. But by conflating 
managerialism in the EU with the diminishing of these two budgetary functions, we miss more 
broadly how managerial policy-making has built on an alternative form of budgeting as planning. 
As a result, institutional political economy misreads the governance paradigm as a lack of a 
particular set of budgetary functions, rather than developing conceptualisations of what is 
historically constructed through the development of managerial planning in the EU. The next 
chapter will develop such an approach, historicising the rise of supranational managerial 
governance through the history of state planning.  
 
 
1.2 Gramsci and Governance 
In contrast to the institutionalist literature that makes up the bulk of discussions over the EU, a 
literature arose at the turn of the millennium offering a historical materialist approach to 
European integration (Bieler & Morton, 2001; Cafruny & Ryner, 2003; van Apeldoorn, 2003). 
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This critical political economy of European integration argued that the turn to market-led 
integration could not easily be explained by inter-state preferences or supranational 
entrepreneurship, as liberal political economy and traditional integration theory had done. 
Instead, these predominantly neo-Gramscian approaches argued that European integration had 
to be understood in terms of the balance of class power in the global political economy of late 
capitalism. From this perspective, market-led integration reflected a historically specific balance 
of class power centred on a ‘transnational capitalist class’ (van Apeldoorn, 2000), in the global 
context of US financial hegemony (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007). 
The power of the neo-Gramscian intervention is to focus on the social purpose and 
content of integration to explain the institutional form the EU has taken. Critical political 
economy argued that European integration theory had a power problem. Bastiaan van 
Apeldoorn criticized that ‘conventional integration theories tend to focus largely on the 
institutional form of the integration process, thus ignoring the question of its socio-economic 
content, or the “social purpose” underlying European order’ (van Apeldoorn, 2000, p. 158). The 
call of the neo-Gramscian approach to integration was thus to ‘move beyond a merely formal 
analysis of levels of governance, and in particular beyond the institutionalist focus on the form 
of the integration process of established integration theories, to identify the socioeconomic 
content of the integration process’  (van Apeldoorn et al., 2003, p. 20). While recognizing that 
‘form and content are of course interrelated’ (van Apeldoorn, 2001, p. 71), it was always explicitly 
‘social content’ that took analytical precedence in explaining the forms integration took. By 
focusing on ‘social content’, in terms of the balance of societal class power, critical political 
economy added analytical depth to the institutional changes and trajectory of integration that 
traditional integration theory often took for granted (Ryner, 2012). 
This section will argue that the neo-Gramscian privileging of a macro understanding of 
‘content’ has meant that the institutional form of the governance paradigm has gone largely 
untheorized. By beginning with a Gramscian concept of hegemony, critical political economy 
analyses the governance paradigm in relation to a broad reading of the societal balance of class 
forces. The effect is that neo-Gramscians interpret the institutional forms integration has taken 
only as vectors for broader societal developments. What neo-Gramscians obscure through this 
is a more contextual analysis that derives conceptions of social power more instrumentally from 
particular institutional forms in terms of the agents particular policy techniques empower and 
the purpose techniques are deployed. 
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What I am suggesting through this critique is not to return to the descriptive and 
legalistic inter-institutional terms of the liberal theories neo-Gramscians criticise. Instead, I am 
proposing that a more contextual reading of the institutional forms of integration can reveal with 
greater clarity the forms of social power that are created through specific institutions. This 
proposed approach is not incompatible with a neo-Gramscian analysis. But I am proposing to 
lower the level of abstraction of historical materialist analysis from societal hegemony to 
institutionalised social power. In particular, as I will show in chapter two, this means to read the 
governance paradigm not in relation to macro-societal class struggle, but as the supranational 
institutionalisation of the class power of public management. The rest of this section will 
elaborate this critique of the neo-Gramscian approach to European integration and how it has 
interpreted the rise of the governance paradigm. 
 
The Competing Hegemonic Projects of Integration 
The historical materialist exploration of European integration’s ‘social content’ built 
on a neo-Gramscian ‘Amsterdam School’ (Jessop & Overbeek, 2018). This school consisted of 
scholars like Otto Holman (Holman, 1992, 2004), Henk Overbeek (Overbeek, 2005), Bastiaan 
van Apeldoorn (van Apeldoorn, 2003), and Kees van der Pijl (van der Pijl, 1998). This school 
developed a neo-Marxist approach that explored intra-capitalist competition between different 
‘fractions’ of capital. These fractions competed across the terrain of the state to turn their 
particular interests into a hegemonic ‘comprehensive concept of control’ governing society 
(Overbeek, 2004). 
In relation to the EU, it has been a frequent observation that the ‘neoliberal’ turn since 
the 1980s can be explained by the rise of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Robinson & Harris, 
2000). Most prominently making this case, van Apeldoorn studied the clashing hegemonic 
projects within the corporate planning body the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) 
to develop what has become a definitional framing of the neoliberal turn to European integration 
(van Apeldoorn, 2000). For van Apeldoorn, the neoliberal Single Market agenda premised on 
external tariff reduction and internal marketization was an historical outcome. A neoliberal 
project, built from a transnational class fraction integrated into global capital, was successful 
compared to two rival hegemonic projects for either an inwardly-oriented mercantilist project 
of productive capital or a social democratic project for a federalized European welfare state. This 
neoliberal project successfully won out both within the ERT and across supranational and 
30 
 
national state institutions to set the terms of the 1980s relaunch of integration along neoliberal 
lines. This understanding of a globalizing, marketizing and financialising form of neoliberal 
integration was seen to similarly manifest in the realm of corporate governance (Buch-Hansen 
& Wigger, 2011; van Apeldoorn & Horn, 2007) and labour relations (Bieler, 2005). While not 
disputing this neoliberal trajectory of integration, Alan Cafruny and Magnus Ryner pointed to 
the enduring importance of inter-state capitalist rivalries in explaining the uneven development 
of European integration - notably the importance of reluctant German dominance and the 
structural power of Wall Street financial capital (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007; Ryner & Cafruny, 2017). 
While van Apeldoorn’s analysis focused on the rise of the Single Market, the turn to a 
form of EMU built on fiscal disempowerment was seen in this neo-Gramscian literature as not 
reducible to the neoliberal agenda of a transnationalising capital fraction. For van Apeldoorn, 
divisions within the ERT meant their ‘direct involvement in the Maastricht process was limited’ 
(van Apeldoorn, 2003, p. 154). Instead, Maastricht was seen as a compromise between the three 
competing projects (van Apeldoorn, 2001, p. 81). While the institutional form of the EMU was 
not necessarily neoliberal in its origins in the terms van Apeldoorn defines it, critical political 
economy was quick to highlight that the institutional form the EMU took nevertheless reflected 
the structural power of transnational capitalism. The singular monetary objective of containing 
inflation, and fiscal coordination built on tight rules restricting public expenditure and state 
intervention, reflected how the EMU was an ‘institutional fulcrum of the neoliberal integrationist 
project’ (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007, p. 6). Indeed, for van Apeldoorn and Sandy Hager, the 
development of the EU since Maastricht was when integration went decisively neoliberal with 
the rise of competitiveness and austerity agendas (van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010). 
 
Governance as the Hedging of Hegemony 
In making sense of the EMU as an ‘institutional fulcrum’ for neoliberal reform, critical 
approaches make use of the same institutionalist binary between negative economic integration 
through law and soft social governance through performance management. Rather than 
troubling this binary, critical political economy adds class content to it. Rules-based 
fiscal/economic governance is predominantly understood through Stephen Gill’s concept of 
‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill, 1995, 1998, 2008).9 New constitutionalism refers to the reliance on 
 
9 A more recent version of this framing is Quinn Slobodian’s concept of market ‘encasement’ (Slobodian, 2018). This perspective will be analysed 
in the next section on ordoliberalism. 
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law and constitution to ‘lock-in’ ‘disciplinary neoliberal’ reforms that structurally advantage 
global capital. The effect of new constitutionalism is to ‘separate economic policies from broad 
political accountability in order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of 
market forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes’ 
(Gill, 1998, p. 5). In doing so, a neoliberal agenda for liberalization and marketization becomes 
both legally obligatory and rendered as common sense.  The new constitutionalism uses rules 
and international treaties, such as in the SGP, constrain the market interventions of national 
governments. Most notably, the concern for Gill is how new constitutionalism prevents states 
from using fiscal policy for counter-cyclical macroeconomic stabilization. By legally enshrining 
a narrow preference for sound money and limited government, the SGP removes fiscal policy 
out of public democratic hands, legally mandates austerity, and normalizes the idea that debts 
and deficits are a deviance to be corrected. 
Corresponding to a ‘new constitutionalist’ enshrining of neoliberal marketization, 
critical scholars have likewise mirrored institutionalist perspectives regarding social policy. 
Compared to the compulsion of marketization in law, rule, and treaty; social protection is 
understood to take place through the managerial techniques of the governance paradigm. Critical 
political economy adds to institutionalist perspectives by addressing the social purpose of the 
EU’s managerial social policy in relation to the structural power of a transnational capitalist class. 
For van Apeldoorn et al., the rise of the governance paradigm was an ‘embedded neoliberalism’ 
‘reaching its zenith’ (van Apeldoorn et al., 2009, p. 4).  
On this basis, neo-Gramscian approaches follow institutionalist political economy in 
conflating the governance paradigm with the EU’s fraught pursuit of social policy. Against the 
backdrop of recession and rising unemployment in the 1990s and early 2000s, neo-Gramscians 
identify the introduction of managerial techniques of policy-making as significant insofar as they 
hedged neoliberal hegemony. Holman and van Apeldoorn identify the hand of transnational 
capital in the ERT in proposing corporate policy techniques like benchmarking (Holman, 2012; 
van Apeldoorn, 2001). Van Apeldoorn and Hager theorise the ‘social purpose’ of the governance 
paradigm as conceding symbolic ground to labour through quantitative targets on employment 
or poverty reduction, but taking a corporate form through benchmarking that was untroubling 
to the marketizing core of integration (van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010). Thus, while ostensibly 
developing an EU social policy, the governance paradigm’s voluntary and corporate form 
through techniques like benchmarking represented the structural power of transnational capital 
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securing its flanks. Gill and Cutler capture this point by describing the managerial techniques of 
the governance paradigm as ‘safety valves for capitalism’ – conceding symbolic ground without 
challenging market rule (Gill & Cutler, 2014, pp. 16–17).  
The significance of the governance paradigm for neo-Gramscian scholars is therefore 
found at the symbolic or discursive level of mediating macro-class relations. Van Apeldoorn 
cites the ERT as saying benchmarking’s significance is “not just an analytical device” but also 
“carries a symbolic message”’ (van Apeldoorn, 2003, p. 176). Equally, Holman points to the 
significance of quantitative policy instruments in the EU as ‘about the role of symbols or, to put 
it differently, about discourse production at the European level’ (Holman, 2006, p. 105). Angela 
Wigger likewise argues that "scoreboards of unit labour costs, alongside other competitiveness 
performance indexes and benchmarks of best practices, are disciplinary policy tools that 
constitute the apex of the neoliberal organization of capitalism" that reproduce a common sense 
of market rule (Wigger, 2019, p. 357).  
The registering of the governance paradigm as significant mostly in symbolic terms 
reflects the privileging neo-Gramscians give to social content in interpreting institutional forms. 
The consequence of this though is that neo-Gramscians miss out on both the broader 
significance and concrete political stakes of the governance paradigm. While the structural power 
of transnational capital is palpable, reducing specific institutional shifts to a macro-analysis of 
this structural power means we lose sight of the specific power relations of practices like 
benchmarking. In contrast, I propose building a critical political economy of the governance 
paradigm. This means addressing the historical lineages of the managerial transformation of EU 
policy-making. In doing so, this critical political economy of governance will address both the 
rise of a managerial class within the EU’s political institutions, as well as the building of the EU’s 
supranational political capacity through the adoption of the force and format of public 
management. This move will show that managerialism in the EU has implied a totally different 
format of governance than is commonly interpreted through the framing of neoliberalism. As 
the next section will show, whereas theories of the neoliberalisation of European integration 
have mobilised a lineage of rule and principle-based ordoliberalism, public management  as a 





1.3 Ordoliberalism Rules Europe? 
The onset of the Eurozone crisis brought a recommitment to the austerity rules of the Eurozone 
that Gill had highlighted as a ‘new constitutionalism’. In the EU, the morphing of a global 
financial crisis into a series of sovereign debt crises led Europe’s notable creditor states like the 
Netherlands and Germany to demand fiscal retribution to a perceived Southern European 
transgression of the EU’s budgetary rules. In attempting to make the Euro’s fiscal rules count, 
Europe’s crisis responses were notable for their punitiveness and sidestepping of democratic 
norms. Since the crisis, scholars have attempted to make sense of this strident use of executive 
state power to impose austerity.  
One popular perspective has been to explore the influence of an ordoliberal lineage 
over European integration (Beck & Kotz, 2017; Biebricher & Vogelmann, 2017; Bonefeld, 2019; 
Cafruny & Talani, 2019; Dullien & Guérot, 2012; Feld et al., 2015; Nedergaard, 2020; D. Schäfer, 
2016; Storey, 2019; Warlouzet, 2018; Young, 2014). Ordoliberalism is a variant of neoliberalism 
developed since the 1930s in Germany. It can be loosely divided between a ‘Freiburg School’ of 
lawyers and economists, such as Franz Böhm and Walter Eucken, a ‘Geneva School’ of 
‘ordoglobalist’ economists such as Wilhelm Röpke, Ludwig von Mises, and Michael Heilperin 
(Slobodian, 2018, p. 8), and German politicians like Alfred Müller-Armack and Ludwig Erhard 
who morphed ordoliberal ideas into the post-war German ‘social market economy’ (Hook, 
2004). 
Ordoliberalism proposed a ‘third way’ for capitalism between laissez-faire liberalism 
and the interwar spectre of socialist planning. Its proponents rejected classical liberalism on the 
basis that an unrestrained market mechanism would ultimately erode the foundations of 
capitalism through the tendency of free markets towards cartelization and monopoly (Sally, 1996, 
p. 237). Instead, ordoliberals argued that a strong state was vital to achieve a market society. 
What distinguished the ordoliberal state was not the size of its interventions, but the form they 
would take. Michel Foucault paraphrases the ordoliberal Leonhard Miksch as saying: ‘there may 
be as many economic interventions as in a policy of planning, but their nature is different’ 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 133). Specifically, the purpose of the ordoliberal state was to set a 
constitutional and regulatory framework for market freedom. The ordoliberal state could not 
legitimately intervene directly into the functioning of competitive markets. Instead, it was 
responsible for constructing the system under which market competition would be possible. The 
ordoliberal state would therefore act according to principles and not whim. It would govern 
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through law, and regulation, not discretion and political direction. Walter Böhm, for example, 
argued that an ordoliberal system would ‘relieve the state of the task of central economic control 
and would restrict it to the task of defining the structural framework which would preserve and 
enforce observance of the control laws’ (W. Böhm, 1989, p. 63). 
The lineage of ordoliberalism has been invoked in diverse ways as a political project, 
rationality, or set of ideas to make sense of the historical trajectory or features of European 
governance and the behaviour of the politically central role of the German state. What unites 
these perspectives is the view that rules matter in the EU. This section will argue that, while a 
lineage of ordoliberalism has an important place in the history of European integration, it is not 
the one we typically understand it to be. Ordoliberal ideas and actors have been extremely 
prominent at key moments of European integration, such as the creation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) or setting the terms of the EMU. The actual conduct of 
governance in the EU has, however, always departed significantly from ordoliberal blueprints. 
The emergence of the governance paradigm is, I argue, exemplary of this fact. The literature on 
ordoliberalism does not dispute that ordoliberal ideas misfire. But it treats this misfiring as the 
inevitable slippage of theory into practice. As a result, EU governance continues to be read in 
terms of ordoliberalism, even when we recognise the contradictory relationship between the two.  
Ordoliberalism has been a popular explanatory variable in making sense of both a 
puzzling German-led pursuit of self-defeating austerity through the Eurozone crisis and the 
lopsided design of the EMU that is seen to have caused the crisis in the first place. There are a 
multitude of ways in which this has been expressed. Some have argued that the ordoliberal ideas 
faithfully held by Germany’s state elite offers a reasoning for the country’s paradoxical advocacy 
of austerity at all costs (Beck & Kotz, 2017; Blyth, 2013; Bulmer, 2014; Dullien & Guérot, 2012; 
Matthijs, 2016; Nedergaard & Snaith, 2015; D. Schäfer, 2016). The principled belief that rules 
must be respected, that fiscal rectitude must be the paramount objective of responsible 
governments, and loose monetary interventions cause more damage than they seek to fix, has 
been seen to guide German-led EU responses to the crisis, regardless of the immediate social 
and economic costs. 
Others put less emphasis on ordoliberal ideas in crisis responses, but instead on 
ordoliberalism as a lineage offering theoretical insight into the design of the Euro and the nature 
of governance within it. Holly Snaith and Paul Cardwell’s legalistic orientation leads them to 
‘suggest that ordoliberalism serves as a convenient meta-theory to describe conventional 
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integration’ (Cardwell & Snaith, 2018, p. 1065). Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval’s Foucauldian 
reading of ordoliberalism leads them to suggest ordoliberalism’s relevance is not as a set of policy 
prescriptions or institutional designs, but as a ‘rationality of contemporary capitalism’ in terms 
of ‘the generalization of competition as a behavioural norm and of enterprise as a model of 
subjectivation’ (Dardot & Laval, 2013, p. 4). For Walter Bonefeld, ordoliberalism is a lineage 
that can be used to theorise the importance of political authority under capitalism (Bonefeld, 
2017, p. 755). In applying this to understand European economic governance, Bonefeld argues 
that the Euro represents a ‘supranational structure of economic freedom, tying the democracies 
of member states to a market-liberal foundation’ (Bonefeld, 2015).  
Others use ordoliberalism’s as a historical project to interpret the evolution of the EU. 
Slobodian argues that by occupying key positions within the EEC, ordoliberals directed 
integration ‘as a realization of Hayek’s vision of a nomocratic society protecting the division 
between private law beyond the interference of democratic governments alongside the public 
law of states’ (Slobodian, 2018, p. 214). Offering a similar historical perspective Dyson et al. 
highlight the weight of the ordoliberal Bundesbank in designing the EMU according to key 
principles of price stability and strict budgetary rules (Dyson & Featherstone, 1999). Likewise, 
Biebricher and Vogelmann argue that the institutional design of the EU’s various coordination 
mechanisms according to a ‘rules plus sanctions’ logic is testament to ‘what the ordoliberals 
would have called the economic constitution of Europe’ (Biebricher & Vogelmann, 2017, p. 17). 
Others place German ordoliberalism in a comparative context with France to understand the 
EMU as a clash of traditions and state priorities. Warlouzet describes the EMU as an ‘evolving 
compromise’ between German ordoliberalism and French dirigisme (Warlouzet, 2019). While 
Ben Clift and Magnus Ryner describe ordoliberalism as setting the ‘ideational parameters within 
which macroeconomic policy makers have to operate’ in the EMU (Clift & Ryner, 2014, p. 140). 
The lineage of ordoliberalism has thus had a major role in our theorisations of 
European integration. But this is not such a settled story. Many others have raised objections to 
the idea that Eurozone crisis responses can interpreted as ordoliberal. Siems and Schnyder, for 
example, have argued that actions like bank bailouts, ‘extensive funding of loans via the various 
stability mechanisms’, and ECB bond purchases ‘are not in line with ordoliberal principles’ 
(Siems & Schnyder, 2014, p. 389). Instead, Brigitte Young, Josef Hien, and Christian Joerges 
have highlighted that Eurozone crisis responses were largely in line with mainstream US public 
choice and New Institutional Economics taught in economics departments and business schools 
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across the world, rather than any German peculiarity inspired by ordoliberalism (Hien & Joerges, 
2018, p. 143; Young, 2017, p. 140). Indeed, in an EU push for austerity, Economic and Monetary 
Commissioner Olli Rehn did not turn to the principles of ordoliberalism, but to the infamous 
work on ‘growth in a time of debt’ of American macroeconomists Reinhart and Rogoff (Rehn, 
2011). Indeed, Hien and Joerges have described how ordoliberals ‘von Hayek, but also Walter 
Eucken would be horrified’ at the types of monetary and competitiveness-inducing policy 
instruments developed as a response to the Eurozone crisis (Hien & Joerges, 2018, p. 157). 
In addition to doubts being raised over the idea that ordoliberalism influenced crisis 
responses, the idea that German-led austerity was somehow self-sabotaging, requiring an 
explanation emphasising an ordoliberal ideological dogma, has been challenged. For Julian 
Germann, Alan Cafruny and Leila Talani, the structural adjustment imposed on the eurozone in 
crisis responses can be well understood as a product of German state economic strategy (Cafruny 
& Talani, 2019; Germann, 2018). For these authors, the German economy’s dependence on 
exports to regions outside the eurozone, and the fragile class compromise that this domestic 
export-strategy relies upon, explains the decisions of German policymakers. Here, the crisis was 
used as an opportunity to lower labour costs across German value chains in Europe, while 
constraining the possibility of an expansionary European fiscal policy that would threaten the 
privileged undervaluing of the euro Germany’s export strategy relies upon. 
In relation to European integration more broadly, ordoliberalism has a similarly 
complicated historical relationship. Ordoliberals have been seen as both integration’s principal 
architects and sharpest critics (Slobodian, 2018, p. 182). Initially, ordoliberals were not convinced 
by European integration (Joerges & Hien, 2017, p. 7). This has led many to dispute the historical 
influence of ordoliberalism over the design and trajectory of the EEC/EU/EMU. This is most 
clear in the field of EU competition policy – often taken as the hallmark of an ordoliberal 
Europe. Whereas ordoliberal competition policy called for the distribution of market power as 
a moral principle, Pinar Akman, Hussein Kassim, and Angela Wigger highlight that the relevant 
Article 82 of the European treaties does not oppose monopoly as such but merely its abuse 
(Akman & Kassim, 2010, p. 127; Wigger, 2017, p. 175). To this extent, Wigger argues that a 
‘diligent translation of ordoliberal templates into regulatory arrangements never happened’ in 
constructing the EU and can be better explained with reference to Chicago neoliberalism 
(Wigger, 2017, p. 163).  
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Likewise to competition policy, scholars have disputed whether the managerial policy-
making machinery of the governance paradigm can usefully be understood through a history of 
ordoliberalism. Christian Joerges has argued that the Maastricht Treaty marked ‘the erosion, 
rather than a consummation, of the ordoliberal project’ (Joerges, 2017, p. 181). Rather than 
building market power through law, Joerges argued that Maastricht was a ‘de-legalisation’ of 
integration which to ‘characterise… as “ordoliberal” is to disregard the legal legacy of this 
tradition completely’ (Joerges, 2017, p. 195).  Whereas ordoliberalism preached the fundamental 
primacy of the rule-of-law, the growth of what Joerges calls a ‘transnational executive machinery’ 
through the transformations of the governance paradigm since the 1990s makes it difficult to 
characterise the post-Maastricht EU as ordoliberal (Joerges, 2014). 
Ordoliberalism has, then, had a complicated and turbulent relationship with European 
integration. Scholars of the ordoliberal lineage are the first to admit this. Slobodian, for example, 
writes how ‘neoliberal thought has not mapped directly onto reality’ (Slobodian, 2018, p. 19). 
Bonefeld also argues that ‘illusion dominates reality’ in arguments that ordoliberalism is a faithful 
political project pursued by German elites in Europe (Bonefeld, 2019). And yet, I argue that the 
troubled history of ordoliberalism has been only partially taken up as a way to theorise neoliberal 
integration and the governance paradigm. Despite Slobodian agreeing ordoliberalism’s turbulent 
relationship with European integration, he nevertheless makes it central to a theorisation of 
market ‘encasement’ that takes ordoliberals at their word in conceptualising state practice.  
Ordoliberal tenets like rules do exist extremely prominently in the Eurozone, moral 
hazard is preached as a religion, competition is held sacred. And yet, in terms of the day-to-day 
infrastructure of policy making in the EU, a very different kind of project has been created - a 
world of numbers, information processing, and governing in terms of the exception rather than 
enforcement of rules. The managerialism of EU governance cannot be reduced to ordoliberalism 
because they practice very different forms of policy-making. As chapter two will elaborate, 
ordoliberalism preaches principle-based stability, managerialism practices cybernetic 
information-driven discretion. This managerial form of governance has increasingly become a 
systemic feature of EU governance as Joerges notes as an ‘transnational executive machinery’ or 
Bonefeld as an ‘executive managerialism’ (Bonefeld, 2017, p. 756; Joerges, 2014). 
The fact that the managerialism of the EU is recognised but not theorised outside of 
neo/ordoliberalism is arguably a problem of methodology. Slobodian, Bonefeld, and Dardot 
and Laval would not argue that the purpose of excavating an ordoliberal tradition is to 
38 
 
instrumentally demonstrate how ordoliberal ideas impacted policy practice. Nevertheless, by 
leading their analysis with ordoliberal thought, this body of theory inevitably constrains the 
horizon of analysis. In contrast, this thesis argues that to make sense of policy coordination, we 
must historicise the concrete institutional practices that are used to govern in the EU. What this 
means is that rather than theorising the nature of a misapplied rules-based economic 
constitution, this thesis will begin from the premise that rules have been largely ignored and 
partially mobilised in the EU. Instead, I ask what has been constructed to govern the EU once 
we accept ordoliberal rules have little practical significance. To do so, I argue the history of 
public budgeting and state planning is an important avenue to explore. 
 
 
1.4 Governance as Governmentality? 
My critique of ordoliberalism has been that it leads its analysis with a body of theory that is 
contradictory to the conduct of European governance. A literature that has, in contrast, engaged 
directly with the practices of managerialism in the governance paradigm is a Foucauldian 
literature on governmentality. The neo-Gramscian approach discussed earlier often deferred to 
a Foucauldian concept of governmentality to elaborate the discursive work of techniques like 
benchmarking that arose in the 1990s. The work of Stephen Gill and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn 
never probed too deeply what exactly this governmentality meant. Instead, the discursive work 
of policy surveillance was hedged as ‘something akin to a Foucauldian condition’ or ‘in a 
Foucauldian sense’ (Gill, 1998, p. 17; van Apeldoorn et al., 2003, p. 38).  
Beyond this neo-Gramscian dabbling with Foucault, governmentality is a concept 
widely mobilised to make sense of the governance paradigm in the EU (Bailey, 2006; Bruno, 
2009; Bruno et al., 2006; Haahr & Walters, 2004; İşleyen, 2015; Mitchell, 2006; Shore, 2011; 
Vifell & Sjögren, 2014). This is part of a wider Foucauldian literature on (global) governance and 
governmentality (Bailey, 2006; Bevir & Gains, 2011; Joseph, 2010; Sending & Neumann, 2006; 
Shore, 2011, 2011). In many ways, a Foucauldian approach is perfectly suited to interpret the 
governance paradigm. The governance paradigm has been about the diffusion of social 
organisation into networks that do not rely on direct or hierarchical coercion but instead on 
steering at a distance. As such, a concept of governmentality that emphasises diffuse capillary 
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power and ‘governing at a distance’ through the ‘conduct of conduct’ is highly attractive and has 
been incredibly popular.  
 Nevertheless, I will argue that the Foucauldian literature offers a similar challenge to 
the neo-Gramscian and ordoliberal literature. Namely, both approach the managerial practices 
of the governance paradigm as a vector of neo/ordoliberalism rather than something to explain 
itself . The neo-Gramscian’s interest in social purpose abstracted the governance paradigm into 
a macro-political economy of transnational capitalism. In contrast, while a Foucauldian approach 
analyses the concrete practices of governance, the theoretical significance it draws from 
managerial policy practices is of political rationalities exercised through them or the identities 
presumed to be constructions through them. As a result, a concept of governmentality is overrun 
by the analytical weight of neoliberalism that diminishes the significance of managerialism as a 
distinctive phenomenon (Knafo et al., 2018, p. 240). By leading their analysis with a political 
rationality of neo/ordoliberalism, Foucauldian approaches lose historical perspective on 
managerial policy techniques, their social relations, and thus their politics. Indeed, as chapter two 
will show, a historicist approach to the managerialism of the governance paradigm reveals its 
considerable difference from neoliberalism as a form of social organisation. This section will 
review two emblematic approaches of governance and governmentality in the EU from Isabelle 
Bruno (Bruno, 2009; Bruno et al., 2006; Bruno & Didier, 2015), and Jens Henrik Haahr (Haahr, 
2004; Haahr & Walters, 2004). These approaches have directly addressed the rise of the 
governance paradigm in Europe and, in particular, the development of the Open Method of 
Coordination as ‘advanced liberal government’. 
More than any other literature, governmentality approaches do the most to critically 
analyse the distinctive ‘form’ neoliberal integration has taken. Neo-Gramscians share a proclivity 
for the micropower of governmentality in reproducing neoliberalism in the EU. But they tend 
to underspecify this political work. From a Foucauldian perspective, practices like benchmarking 
do much more than symbolic work mediating hegemony. They have an ordering role. The 
governance paradigm from this perspective is not simply ideological claptrap doing the 
hegemonic work of embedding neoliberal marketization. Rather, Haahr and William Walters 
argue that governance ‘represents a very ambitious and far-reaching programme of government’ 
(Haahr & Walters, 2004, p. 133). Bruno, together with Sophie Jacquot and Lou Mandin, 
elaborate this point. Writing about Europeanization, the scholars argue the process is not a 
straightforward pattern of policy convergence or divergence. Rather, it is a process only made 
40 
 
manifest in the policy techniques through which it is implemented. In particular, Bruno et al. 
highlight the importance of benchmarking as a policy technique that constitutes the very process 
of Europeanization it seeks to merely represent (Bruno et al., 2006, p. 521).  
In taking the techniques of governance seriously, Foucauldian approaches attach a 
specific lineage to them. This is distinct from neo-Gramscians that mostly interpret EU 
governance as the operationalised structural power of transnational capital. Rather, for 
Foucauldians the governance paradigm has managerial origins. Haahr and Walters, for example, 
point out that governance ‘is being rethought in part in terms of the idioms and practices of 
management theory’ (Haahr & Walters, 2004, p. 20). While registering this managerial lineage 
though, the Foucauldian literature rarely engages substantially with it as a way to rethink the 
social relations and politics of the managerialism of the governance paradigm. Instead, the 
theoretical significance drawn from managerial policy-making is placed in relation to a political 
rationality of neoliberalism. 
Examining the governance paradigm, Foucauldian scholars identify it as a new form 
of liberal governmentality premised on governing at a distance. The limits to the legal, directive 
authority of EU institutions meant the OMC represented a ‘cognitive form of 
intervention…[that] brings to the fore the key instruments needed for elaborating, selecting and 
channelling substantive ideas of Europeanization’ (Bruno et al., 2006, p. 521). Thus for Bruno, 
‘benchmarking subjects policy-makers to a disciplinary technology that operates without law 
enforcement but with peer pressure and reputational incentives’ (Bruno, 2009, p. 276). Likewise, 
Haahr and Walters identify in the OMC a form of governmentality that does not seek to rule 
directly, but is interested in crafting subjects in line with particular objectives. They write that 
‘instead of ‘pulling the levers’ of macro-economic policy, economic governance increasingly 
becomes concerned to reform the conduct of individuals and institutions in all sectors to make 
them more competitive and efficient’ (Haahr & Walters, 2004, p. 134). 
The significance for Foucauldian scholars of the work of governing at a distance is not 
the social relations of what is constructed as an infrastructure of supranational governance. 
Instead, when Foucauldians theorise the governance paradigm they focus on the forms of 
discipline placed on governed subjects and the kinds of identities created ‘from a distance’. For 
Haahr, the significance of the OMC lies how it conditions the national governments that 
populate scoreboards of policy performance. Haahr writes how the OMC ‘enables and opens 
up new possibilities for its subjects, and restrains these subjects as they are made subjects of a 
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certain calculative and disciplinary regime” (Haahr, 2004, p. 209). For Haahr, the managerial 
techniques of EU coordination that govern at a distance are about conditioning free liberal 
subjects on the premise that ‘in order to act freely the subject must first be shaped, guided and 
moulded into one capable of responsibility exercising that freedom’ (Haahr, 2004, pp. 215–216). 
Managerial coordination is thus about crafting particular identities of governed subjects, rather 
than the instrumental empowerment of those wielding the benchmarks.  
This moulding of subjects is seen as a selective political process exercised through 
uneven ‘practices of visibility’ (Haahr & Walters, 2004, p. 126). Visibility practices refer to ‘what 
kind of light… a field illuminates and defines certain objects and with what shadows and 
darkness it obscures and hides others’ (Haahr, 2004, p. 213). Likewise, Bruno, Jacquot, and 
Mandin write how ‘through the OMC, the EU delimits what should be done, and defines what should 
be a good pension reform policy’ (Bruno et al., 2006, p. 523). Rather than being a neutral tool of 
Europeanization, Bruno et al.’s point is that intrinsically built into benchmarking as a practice of 
liberal governmentality is a specific political commitment for a neoliberal ethos of competition. 
A Foucauldian perspective emphasises how benchmarking is significant insofar as it practically 
constitutes the competitive world of a neoliberal utopia. Bruno writes how the OMC ‘renders 
completely disparate public services, territories and populations commensurable, which makes 
it possible to subject them to the same competitive regime’ (Bruno, 2009, p. 263). 
The trouble with a governmentality approach is that it ultimately ends up 
instrumentalising managerial policy techniques as a vector of neoliberalism in a similar fashion 
to neo-Gramscians. In doing so, we lose perspective on the specific form of power created with 
the rise of managerialism in terms of its history, the agents it empowers, and the logic of social 
organisation it implies. By focusing on the kinds of subjects and visibilities that are created 
through benchmarking competitiveness, the OMC as a practice becomes analytically inseparable 
from the neoliberal rationality of competitiveness that is said to be exercised through it. Bruno, 
Jacquot, and Mandin write that the instilling of a principle of competitiveness in subjects is 
inseparable from the benchmarking technique that is its vector. They write that ‘policy 
instrumentation stems from political strategy’ (Bruno et al., 2006, pp. 523, 530). To this extent, 
framed by governmentality, the significance of benchmarking competitiveness is how it creates 
the competitive subjects imagined by neoliberals. Bruno elsewhere describes how ‘this 
technology of government actually constructs a ‘competitive Europe’ by creating union through 
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competition’ whereby ‘the norm of competitiveness is endogenous to the endless competition 
in which benchmarking engages its users’ (Bruno, 2009, pp. 271, 277).  
The governance technique of benchmarking competitiveness, however, has none of 
this omnipotence to craft subjects – neoliberal or otherwise. Reporting against the benchmarks 
for social policy or deficit limits are more prone to gaming or outright rejection by member 
states through fudged accounting or political disengagement rather than creating competitive, 
neoliberal subjects seeking to climb rankings. While Foucauldian scholars would not subscribe 
to the idea of omnipotence in crafting competitive subjects, the conceptual framing of 
governmentality is ultimately limited in separating out the significance of governance besides its 
contribution to creating a particular kind of subject. As a result, the governance paradigm is 
more relevant for Foucauldians only in terms of what is presumed to be done to the subjects 
over which benchmarking practices are wielded, rather than what they do to empower those 
wielding benchmarks.  
Governmentality offers an important perspective on the governance paradigm and has 
been widely adopted as a consequence. The governance paradigm has brought the rise of 
techniques like policy surveillance and benchmarking that govern at a distance, as well as the 
proliferation of numbers in global governance that seemingly present an objective representation 
of social life. A Foucauldian concept of governmentality seemingly fits this age of governance, 
pointing to how liberal techniques condition our freedom rather than control our behaviour. 
But governmentality offers little when the objective turns to gaining a historical perspective on 
the social relations of managerial policy-making. While registering the managerial roots of 
contemporary governance, Foucauldian studies do not mobilise this history as a way to explain 
the dynamics of managerial policy-making. Instead, it remains theoretically burdened, much like 
the neo-Gramscian and ordoliberalism literature, by the analytical weight of neoliberalism. 
Instead, I propose addressing more directly the practices of the governance paradigm not in 
terms of the political rationalities they propel, but as a social relation contextualised within a 
history of managerialism. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how four literatures – institutional political economy, critical 
political economy, a literature on ordoliberalism, and Foucauldian studies – analyse the 
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significance of the governance paradigm in relation to the EU. The chapter has argued that 
governance has been conflated with the political subordination of a progressive use of public 
finance for macroeconomic stabilisation and political redistribution purposes, compared to an 
ordoliberal rules-based framework of expenditure control. As a result, we have not considered 
the governance paradigm’s broader significance in transforming the nature of political 
intervention in the EU from rules to performance management. The consequence of this is 
that our politics of ‘governance’ is often misplaced. For much critical literature, the governance 
turn is of secondary concern. Benchmarking is only seen as relevant in a battle over symbols 
or the distilling of a neoliberal ethos, while the real politics is related to ordoliberal rules 
constraining progressive policy-making at the behest of the structural power of capital. Instead, 
this thesis argues that the governance paradigm represents a more profound transformation in 
the format of policy-making in the EU along managerial lines. 
To develop this point, I argue that we must place the governance turn in the history 
of budgeting. The budget is the principle instrument of public policy. The fact that the 
supranational institutions of the EU lack financial autonomy through a means to tax-and-spend 
is the main complaint of critical literature which they explain by the triumph of neoliberalism. 
The managerial techniques of policy coordination are subsequently read as a poor 
approximation of a strong fiscal capacity in terms of a budget that can fulfil redistribution and 
stabilisation functions. In contrast, by placing the governance turn more precisely in the history 
of budgeting, the next chapter will demonstrate how the governance paradigm spoke to an 
alternative form of budgeting, rather than the absence of it. While the EU lacked financial 
resources, they built on a legacy of budgetary planning. The significance of this was how 
supranational institutions gained a stake in policy-making by reformatting it in managerial terms 
of strategy and information processing. While the EU may not be a federal welfare state, neither 
is it an ordoliberal economic constitution. Instead, I argue the EU increasingly resembles a 





Chapter 2: Revisiting Governance through Budgeting 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter unravelled how the governance turn of the EU has been under theorised 
outside of the lineage of neo/ordoliberalism, despite differing in important ways from a 
neoliberal approach to social and political organisation. Whereas the previous chapter reviewed 
the literature on governance, this chapter will provide a new historically-driven theoretical 
perspective on the governance paradigm through the history of budgeting. 
Governance is the ‘notoriously slippery term’ of social science (Torfing, 2010, p. 
563). The word has infected the discourse of social science to the point of banality. It rolls off 
the page to capture questions of social organisation in ways more flexible and general than 
most other concepts can. The generality of governance has made efforts to formalise and 
theorise it difficult. Indeed, governance is a concept defined only by its promiscuity. In Rhodes’ 
seminal 1996 article on governance, he had already identified six contrasting ways in which the 
concept was being used (Rhodes, 1996, p. 653). Likewise, in 1995 Finkelstein highlighted global 
governance’s elusive usage, arguing that it ‘appears to be virtually anything’ (Finkelstein, 1995). 
Of course, the concept’s promiscuity and generality has not stopped its growth in the social 
sciences. If anything, it has facilitated it. The more you tried to stem the conceptual tide of 
governance, the faster it rose.  
When governance arose as a concept in the 1990s, social organisation was perceived 
to be undergoing a radical change (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; 
Stoker, 1999). The singular public authority of the state seemed to be giving away to new kinds 
of private self-regulation and public-private-partnerships. The rule-driven hierarchy of 
bureaucracy seemed to be melting into more diffuse, flexible, and dialogic ‘steering’ of 
‘networks’ made up of complicated patchworks of contracts, audit, and benchmarking 
exercises. The centred authority of the nation-state seemed to be diffusing upwards to 
supranational organisations and downwards to local and regional administrations.  
Governance’s conceptual rise had a normative edge. Bound up with the modernising 
zeal of Third Way social democracy, governance was a concept invoked to recapture a sense 
of public purpose and political direction to a state ravaged by neoliberalism. Whereas 
neoliberalism had undone the consensus of postwar welfarist planning, governance was a 
45 
 
concept that implied planning’s return as a networked, partnered, entrepreneurial, and strategic 
process. 
Given the governance paradigm’s re-ascription of a sense of planning to the state, it 
is surprising that the major instrument of public policy – the budget – features minimally in 
theorisations of governance. As the mechanism for the allocation of resources, state budgeting 
is the principal means a society’s priorities are negotiated and implemented. Given the centrality 
of budgeting to setting and delivering political direction, it is surprising that as governance 
burst conceptually onto the scene, heralding a new age of state activism, the financial aspects 
of this were often lacking. Governance has been organisational in its orientation, not financial. 
Governance theorists look at the new modes of policy delivery via networks and partnerships 
(Börzel, 1997). Or they look at the spatalities of power in ‘multilevel governance’ arrangements 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001). A recent handbook on governance includes only a single chapter on 
‘budgeting and finance’, which hardly connects with broader themes of governance at all (Bevir, 
2013). If governance has been about the active use of public authority, it seems to have left the 
budget behind. 
Governance is not a concept that has always been so removed from budgeting. The 
British planner and prominent systems analysis Sir Geoffrey Vickers pointed in 1981 to a 
growing field of ‘human governance’ tied to experiments in new budgeting practices as part of 
state planning. He said ‘”Governance” is the newest professional field to ‘“go academic” under 
many names (policy science, management, planning, administration)’ (Vickers, 1981, p. 24). 
Likewise, a 1973 text from two Californian professors of planning Horst Rittel and Melvin 
Webber, disparagingly connected governance with pretensions of scientific, rational budgetary 
planning. They wrote that ‘many now have an image of how an idealized planning system 
would function. It is being seen as an on-going, cybernetic process of governance’ (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973, p. 159).  
These early mentions of governance spoke to an innovation taking place in the 
budgetary process in the mid-twentieth century. Budgeting was traditionally conceived as a 
means of resource allocation or expenditure control. In contrast, the trial of PPBS in OECD 
countries in the 1960s involved a new form of budgeting that emphasised planning. PPBS 
attempted to turn the appropriation system into a strategic planning process that aligned the 
allocation of resources with quantified policy objectives and rigorously monitored policy 
performance against them. In this way, PPBS anticipated in the field of public finance the 
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managerial form of rule that arose more broadly in the 1990s as the governance paradigm. 
Given the importance of budgeting to public policy, and the fact that the managerial techniques 
of the governance paradigm were once invoked to describe a new form of budgeting, it is all 
the more surprising that depictions of the shift from government to governance in the 1990s 
seemed to leave public finance behind. 
This chapter argues that the governance paradigm should be understood in light of 
this major transformation to the nature of budgeting, namely the rise of what Schick calls 
‘budgetary planning’ (Schick, 1966) and is elsewhere described as part of a broader ‘managerial 
governance’ (Knafo et al., 2018). The chapter argues that the heralded shift from government 
to governance in the 1990s was a function of an innovation in managerial governance. I argue 
that the governance paradigm referred to a moment when post-war techniques of quantified, 
strategic planning was resurrected as a way to build supranational authority.  
Whereas budgetary planning tied objectives to their financial implications within 
appropriation cycles, the managerial techniques of the governance paradigm practiced a form 
of planning that worked outside of appropriations. This detaching of planning from budgeting 
was as a response to two obstacles. First, the information processing requirements of PPBS 
proved too onerous for the bureaucracies of the 1960s which were predisposed to think of 
policy in terms of procedure or principle and not strategy or objectives. Second, the political 
entrenchment of budgetary appropriations meant the redeployment of public finance proved 
unresponsive to analytically-determined decisions. The governance turn in the 1990s spoke to 
a moment where the strategic policy orientation of budgetary planning was resurrected but 
pursued outside of appropriation systems. Budgeting was embraced as a process of strategic 
decision-making rather than resource allocation or control.  
The rise of such managerial planning had important implications for the EU and other 
IOs. IOs face the unique challenge that their supranational authority is constrained by their 
lack of financial autonomy and an infrastructure to enforce their agendas. The techniques of 
planning without financial resources thus proved highly attractive to IOs. By reformatting their 
work in the managerial framing of planning - thinking about policy-making in terms of 
strategising and information processing - IOs could gain a stake in national-policy making 
beyond what their financial means would imply. As the later chapters will show, the managerial 
framing of ‘governance’ was enthusiastically embraced by the EU in the 1990s and 2000s as it 
struggled to build its supranational authority.  
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 The chapter will historicise the emergence of the governance paradigm through the 
history of budgeting in OECD countries. First, the chapter historicises the rise of budgetary 
planning in the 1960s US defence establishment’s experiments with PPBS and its transatlantic 
translation into the bureaucracies of Western Europe. Second, the chapter analyses the crisis 
of budgetary planning in both the US and Western Europe in the 1970s amidst growing 
political anxieties about ‘ungovernability’. I show how PPBS’s failure nevertheless set in motion 
the development of a new social forces of public management. Special attention here is given 
to the institutionalisation of the social forces of public management in Europe’s two major 
countries France and West Germany. This will set up later chapters on the role of European 
public management in remaking the EU. Third, I show how the changes of the governance 
paradigm were led by public management and recreated many of the techniques of budgetary 
planning. Finally, I engage with a literature on IOs to show how the resurrection of planning 
found special favour among supranational institutions in the 1990s. 
 
2.1 The Rise of Budgetary Planning in an Age of Incrementalism 
 
Modern Budgeting as Management and Control 
In the US, modern budgeting as a purposeful task of government emerged only in the early 20th 
century as part of Progressive era reforms. Capturing this rise, Frederick A. Cleveland described 
in 1915 the emergence of a ‘budget idea’ in the US. Cleveland pitched a novel perspective that 
the public budget was a plan for financing government ‘submitted by a responsible executive to 
a representative body’ (Cleveland, 1915). That budgeting was proposed as an executive process 
was a radical shift. The legislature is traditionally figured as possessing the means of financing 
government. In contrast, Cleveland pushed budgeting into the hands of the growing US federal 
government. His effort was more than just theoretical. Cleveland was director of the Bureau of 
Municipal Research in New York, from where major Progressive Era innovations of public 
administration, municipal statistics, and the application of scientific management to government 
were born (West, 2011; Williams, 2003). Through the Bureau, New York had pioneered efforts 
to develop a unitary municipal city budget that Cleveland’s executive proposal captured (Lee, 
2013). Via the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency between 1910-1913, Cleveland had 
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subsequently been instrumental in proposing the creation of the federal executive budget, 
eventually adopted with the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act. 
Progressive Era budget reforms stemmed from efforts to tackle the corruption of a 
diffuse government apparatus organised around tribal public offices and political machines. 
Cleveland described the ‘budget idea’ as ‘a reaction against the results of irresponsible 
government, the political boss, log-rolling methods, pork barrel legislation’ (Cleveland, 1915). 
By centralising budgeting functions within the executive, specifying in detail what expenditure 
was to be used for, and providing a set of tight controls over the use and allocation of funds, 
budgeting in the Progressive Era was reimagined as the means to efficient, accountable (and 
therefore democratic) government (Kahn, 1997).  
For Schick, this was an era of budgetary ‘control’ built on the authority of the 
accountant as a guardian of expenditure. As a response to corruption and fragmented public 
expenditure, the focus of budgetary reform was ‘developing an adequate system of expenditure 
control’ (Schick, 1966, p. 245). Progressive reforms at the Bureau in New York had toyed with 
organising budgetary allocations along the lines of policy ‘functions’ as a means to better plan 
spending (ibid.). In the end, however, the overriding objective of seeking an ‘assurance against 
corruption’ meant the first executive budgets at the beginning of the twentieth century were 
organised around meticulous line itemizations of expenditure and detailed procedures of control 
(West, 2011, p. 11). 
While a control function dominated budgeting at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the New Deal transformed the federal government – and budgeting with it. As the 
government grew in size and scope, a greater sense of public purpose began to be ascribed to 
government work to tackle unemployment, provide social services, or stabilise the economy. As 
the government’s public purpose grew, so did the national budget. For Schick, the New Deal led 
to a shift in budgeting from ‘control’ to ‘management’ whereby the ‘task of budgeting was 
redefined as the effective marshalling of fiscal and organizational resources for the attainment 
of benefits’ (Schick, 1966, p. 249). For Naomi Caiden, budgeting was refocused from controlling 
expenditure to facilitating spending money. She writes how ‘traditional external controls were 
changed to internal controls, detailed line items were consolidated into block appropriations, 
pre-audits became post-audits’ (Caiden, 2010, p. 204).   
The management orientation of budgetary reform was most visible in the rise of the 
performance movement of the 1930s and 1940s (West, 2011). While the Progressive era of 
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reform may have waned, the objective of extending scientific management to government 
reached its apogee in the management era of budgetary reform. The characteristic example of 
this was perhaps Clarence Ridley and Herbert Simon’s project ‘Measuring Municipal Activities’, 
which pioneered the statistical measurement of the efficient use of public resources (Ridley & 
Simon, 1943). The 1949 Hoover Commission introduced the idea of a performance budget 
(what had previously been called functional budgeting) into the federal government (Schick, 
1966, p. 250). This reorganised the budget from line items into functions (e.g. security, not rifles; 
education, not pencils) and encouraged the meticulous measurements of outputs in order to 
monitor cost efficiency. This budgetary focus on functions, rather than financial control led to 
public administrators displacing the accountants of the control era within bureaucracies (Schick, 
1966, p. 245). Most significantly in this respect, the 1937 Brownlow Committee transferred the 
US Bureau of Budget out of the control oriented Treasury Department and into the new 
Executive Office of the President.  
 
Systems Analysis and the Military Origins of Budgetary Planning 
Following WW2, public expenditure increased dramatically. The post-war expansion 
of welfare and complicated weapons systems of the nuclear age led to spiralling costs. Alongside 
this, many OECD countries were embracing Keynesian demand management strategies that 
actively used fiscal policy as a tool of statecraft. Building on earlier management reforms, the 
budget was increasingly used as a means to pursue policy objectives - notably full employment 
and economic growth. It was from this context that budgetary planning arose. Schick’s seminal 
article on budgetary reform highlighted this shift in the rise of the Planning Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) (Schick, 1966). While relatively short lived, PPBS was revolutionary 
in its intents to rethink the very nature of budgeting. PPBS failed to remake the appropriation 
process as it had hoped. Nevertheless, as the final section of the chapter will argue, it was the 
lessons and responses to the challenges of budgetary planning from which the developments 
labelled as the governance paradigm arose. 
Budgetary planning had military origins. PPBS emerged from the development of 
systems analysis at RAND in the 1950s and 1960s, which in turn built on the development of 
Operations Research (OR) during WW2 (Digby, 1989). OR involved using statistical and 
mathematical techniques for optimising military operations (Gass & Assad, 2005). No single 
technique or method defined OR. The complexities of war, where data was unreliable, decisions 
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rapid, and circumstances dynamic, meant the analytical tools of OR were frequently adapted and 
manipulated in connection with the shifting requirements of military operations (Thomas & 
Buchwald, 2015, p. 98). The specifics of wartime OR ranged from the haphazard use of numbers 
to guide decision-making, to more elaborate statistical analysis of operational processes. The 
emphasis placed on systems, the interface of humans and machinery, and the relationship 
between inputs and outputs meant OR was important to the development of cybernetics 
(Pickering, 2010). 
The impact of OR, according to Philip Mirowski, was to act as ‘the workshop where 
the postwar relationship between natural scientists and the state was reconfigured’ (Mirowski, 
1999, p. 690). At the end of the war, OR had become closely integrated into military operations. 
Rather than disassembling a huge scientific-military infrastructure that had been established, the 
continued strategic compulsion of the Cold War led to its consolidation (Mirowski, 2008, p. 
159). Consequently, post-war science and knowledge production increasingly fell under military 
patronage. 
Of special importance in this respect was RAND, the ‘Research and Development 
Corporation’ and self-described first modern think tank. RAND was established in 1945 as part 
of the Douglas Aircraft Company as a think tank providing research and analysis for the US Air 
Force in Santa Monica, USA. By 1948, RAND had been spun off as an independent 
organisation. A number of the most significant conceptual, methodological, and practical 
techniques of the twentieth century came out of RAND. This included modern neoclassical 
economics (Mirowski, 2008), computing (Ceruzzi, 2003), game theory (Erickson, 2015), systems 
analysis (Majone, 1985), rational choice (Amadae, 2003), business studies (Khurana, 2010), and 
forecasting (Andersson, 2018). Of special importance here is how RAND contributed to 
rethinking budgeting. 
At RAND, there were originally hopes in the 1940s/1950s that the application of 
advanced mathematical techniques, powered by new digital computers, could produce a ‘science 
of warfare’ fit for the nuclear age. Mirowski highlighted how such was the reliance on the 
computer as an organisational tool at RAND that ‘problems of rationality and organizational 
efficiency became conflated with problems of computer design and programming’ (Mirowski, 
2008, p. 188). For Heyck, the systems thinking underpinning this was characteristic of a ‘high 
modernism,’ an instrumentalist faith in the capacity for technical control over nature and society 
(Heyck, 2015).   
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While adding rigour to defence thinking, the incorporation of advanced mathematical 
techniques into strategic planning failed to provide a definitive solution to military problems 
(Mirowski, 2008, p. 330). Game theory was initially thought to provide an innovative language 
for expressing social interaction in seemingly rigorous mathematical vocabulary and render 
decision-making subject to algorithmic programming. But the inability to arrive at single 
solutions to many games ultimately meant it was limited in achieving an ambitious ‘science of 
war’. The debates surrounding the notorious prisoner’s dilemma game, for example, revealed 
that it contained no ‘right’ answer and that game theory could be used to justify multiple courses 
of action (Abella, 2009, p. 57).  
In the place of a ‘science of war’, RAND developed a more modest, but no less 
transformative, methodology of decision-making - systems analysis. This was ‘a collection of 
methods for problem solving ranging from complex quantitative analysis to common sense logic’ 
(Amadae, 2003, p. 44). As a technique, systems analysis was about aiding decision-making by 
emphasising the importance of clarifying problems, setting objectives and alternative ways to 
achieve them, and comparing these alternatives in terms of their costs and benefits (Quade & 
Boucher, 1968, p. 2). Systems analysis was originally used to make decisions over expensive 
defence investments. Where massive amounts of money were required to wage nuclear war, and 
the consequences of a poor use of funds meant annihilation, systems analysis provided a set of 
techniques through which decisions could be apparently put on a rigorous basis. Systems analysis 
in the world of defence became a powerful tool to intervene in policy debates, less by resolving 
strategic decisions, than grounding battles for additional funding on the seemingly rigorous 
analytical footing of costs and benefits (Abella, 2009, p. 63). 
It was this technique of systems analysis that has transformed policy-making in the 
twentieth century and the premise of the rise of ‘managerial governance’ (Knafo et al., 2018). Of 
particular concern here is how systems analysis attempted to transform budgeting. This was tied 
to the arrival of Robert McNamara at US Secretary of Defence in 1961. McNamara had previous 
experience with OR, serving with the Office of Statistical Control (OSC) on issues of bomb 
accuracy and transport logistics during the war. Following the end of the war, McNamara was 
part of the ‘Whiz Kids’, a team of OR practitioners marketed for post-war civilian use and 
parachuted into the Ford Company. Here, McNamara would apply the statistical and 
management techniques developed at the OSC, rising to be the first president of Ford outside 
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the family in 1960. This presidency did not last long, however. Following the election of John F. 
Kennedy in 1960, McNamara reluctantly accepted the position of Secretary of Defense. 
Arriving into office, McNamara was concerned with waging the Defence Secretary’s 
perennial conflict of establishing civilian control over a defence sector dominated by the military 
establishment. Within the US’s growing military-industrial complex, the defence department 
spent vast amounts of resources on complex and costly weaponry and staff. The budgeting 
process was organised around negotiations between rival fiefdoms in the army, navy, and air 
force, all putting forward their claims for larger appropriations. Reflecting on his plans to 
rationalise this process upon taking office, McNamara said it:  
‘Reflected an approach to organizing human activities that I had developed at Harvard 
and applied in the army during the war and later at Ford… it was to define a clear 
objective for whatever organization I was associated with, develop a plan to achieve that 
objective, and systematically monitor progress against the plan’ (McNamara, 1996, p. 
24). 
Such thinking significantly paralleled systems analysis which, according to Abella, 
McNamara was doing ‘even before he knew the existence of the term, much less the discipline’ 
through his work at Ford and the OSC (Abella, 2009, p. 136).  It was an encounter, however, 
with RAND’s Charles J. Hitch that McNamara found the specific techniques through which to 
restructure the Defense Department in line with his ambition. Charles Hitch and Roland 
McKean’s 1960 book The Economics of Defense Spending in the Nuclear Age offered a practical guide 
for rationalizing defence spending through systems analysis (Hitch & McKean, 1960). 
McNamara appointed Hitch the Defense Department’s Comptroller, responsible for directing 
the transformation of military budgeting. The outcome of this was the introduction of the PPBS 
into the US defence department. 
 
Budgeting as Strategising 
PPBS attempted to apply systems analysis to the process of budgeting. This meant to 
establish a stronger link between the objectives of public policy and their financial implications. 
In doing so, it proposed a way to think about budgeting as means of strategic decision-making 
rather than simply resource allocation or expenditure control. Hitch and McKean described how 
‘strategy and cost are as interdependent as the front and rear sights on a rifle’ (Hitch & McKean, 
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1960). For systems analysts, independently deciding on either how much to spend, or what 
strategy to pursue, was a flawed approach to budgeting. At the time, Virginia Held argued that 
‘starting out with an immovable sum, and deciding how to spend it makes little sense for an 
entity such as the U.S Government’ (Held, 1966, p. 106). Instead, budgeting had to be 
reorganised to reflect that, as Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith put it,  ‘ends and means 
interact. What is worth trying to do depends in large part on how much it costs’ (Enthoven & 
Smith, 2005, p. 35).  
The shift from both the control and management era of budgeting was massive. 
Performance budgeting of the Progressive era in the 1930s to 1950s had attempted to reorganise 
budgets into ‘functions’ of work. The difference from PPBS was that performance budgeting 
did not reflect on the strategic purpose of those functions. As Schick described, ‘from the 
planning perspective, the all-important thing surely is not the work or service to be accomplished 
but the objectives or purposes to be fulfilled by the investment of public funds’ (Schick, 1966, 
p. 251). As a budgeting system, PPBS involved requiring budget holders to apply systems analysis 
to their activities in order to determine how budgets should be allocated in the first place and 
not just measure whether budgets were used efficiently after money had been spent. This meant 
to specify in quantitative terms the range of possible policy objectives, their cost implications, 
and the indicators to monitor performance.  
The parallels here to modern performance management techniques of the governance 
paradigm are clear.  The interest of this work was not the efficiency of spending in terms of the 
amount of output that could be produced by dollar spent, as had been the concern of the 
management budget orientation previously. It was about determining the effectiveness of each 
possible dollar spent in terms of the alternative uses to which it could be put, as measured in the 
quantified indicators set by the organisation - e.g. the body count, percentage of desired 
education test scores, number of positive health outcomes, etc. As a planning process, budgeting 
therefore became about not allocating resources per se, but rationally determining how resources 
should be allocated. Budgeting became a process of strategic planning and not resource 
administering. 
 
PPBS Across the Pond 
PPBS did not stay in the defence sector long. Seizing on the prospect of applying 
scientific rigour to welfare programmes, it was applied across the federal administration as part 
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of President Johnson’s ‘war on poverty’ (Jardini, 2000; Light, 2003). Systems analysis and PPBS 
also found favour across other OECD countries in the 1960s and 1970s, including in France 
and West Germany.  
In France, PPBS was launched in 1968 as ‘la rationalisation des choix budgétaires’ (The 
rationalisation of budgetary choice - RCB). It emerged from a rivalry between the French 
Finance Ministry and the Commissariat général du Plan (General Planning Commission - CGP). 
The CGP was the centre of post-war French planning set up by Jean Monnet to devise France’s 
five year plans. Planning had always caused frictions within the French state. The Finance 
Ministry was uncomfortable with the authority given to the CGP to steer economic development 
and the leverage the CGP possessed over the supply of macroeconomic data (Green, 1980, p. 
104; P. Hall, 1986, p. 172). The Finance Ministry adopted RCB as part of an attempt to rationalise 
the budgetary leverage it held over the economy in order to displace the CGP as a centre of 
planning (Saint-Martin, 2000, p. 346).  
Alongside inter-ministerial battles, RCB was a management tool to empower the 
hierarchy of the French state in the use of resources. Rouban described how RCB’s purpose was 
to ‘equip the top echelons of general and personnel administration with improved means of 
budgetary control and personnel management’ (Rouban, 1989, p. 449). The  desire to empower 
top managers was built from an anxiety that the central state was losing its grip on the expanding 
costs of welfare. Philippe Huet, director general of the French Finance Ministry, observed in 
1970 a ‘serious maladjustment, between the growing and manifold needs of a rapidly evolving 
society and the limited and traditional means and methods of the administrative machine’ (Huet, 
1970, p. 274). Targeting a perceived self-referential and self-serving bureaucratic apparatus in 
general, Huet declared that the decision-making rigour and organisational reach of RCB would 
‘restore these [administrative] institutions to their role as an instrument, and to relate their actions 
to the ends which they are deemed to pursue’ (Huet, 1970, p. 279).  
A notable figure in the implementation of RCB was Michel Crozier. Crozier was 
introduced to US managerialism after spending a year in 1959 at the Palo Alto Centre for 
Advanced Studies in the Behavioural Sciences. Crozier was deeply influenced by the latest in US 
organisational sociology from Johan Olsen, James March, Herbert Simon, Philip Selznik and 
Alvin Gouldner (Muller, 2015, p. 289). Alongside the macroeconomic modelling techniques of 
the CGP, French planners turned to sociologists in the 1950s to address behavioural aspects of 
public policy (Hamelin, 2018, p. 53). Crozier was at the core of this, launching the Centre de 
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Sociologie des Organisations (Centre of Organisational Sociology - CSO) in 1961 to apply the 
methodological and theoretical insights of US decision sciences to the study of French 
administration (Harguindéguy & Canton, 2009, p. 91). Crozier was later the only academic 
invited to the committee overseeing the implementation RCB and enjoyed a close working 
relationship with French planners (Saint-Martin, 1998, p. 346).  
PPBS also had an important impact in West Germany. Rather than inter-ministerial 
rivalries, planning as a national project emerged when the first Social Democratic government 
of Willy Brandt took office at the end of the 1960s. PPBS here was part of a broader turn to a 
Keynesian fiscal policy in West Germany that broke with the orthodoxy of the post-war social 
market economy. In a radio address in January 1967, amidst an economic slowdown that had 
only a month previously led to the downfall of Chancellor Erhard, new economic and finance 
minister Karl Schiller declared the government would ‘lead the way with powerful economic and 
financial policies’ (Schiller, 1967). The proposed ‘Concerted Action’ (Die Konzertierte Aktion) 
promised to make full use of budgetary power to re-inflate the economy. This was followed up 
in June 1967 with the, ironically named in the context of future European developments, the 
Law for Promoting Stability and Growth in the Economy (Dyson, 2010).  
The Law empowered the federal state with unprecedented tools of fiscal management, 
‘referred to as the “Magna Charta” of modern medium-term management of the economy’ in 
Germany (Hardach, 1980, p. 201). It centralized fiscal powers of a sprawling federal system into 
a single system of multi-year planning. A reserve fund was created at the Bundesbank for 
counter-cyclical spending. Economic objectives were broadened from the ordoliberal dictum of 
stability to include specific targets on unemployment, growth, and trade balance. 
It was in this context of West German’s adoption of Keynesian macro-fiscal tools of 
financial planning that the micro-technique of PPBS was experimented with. The centre of the 
experiment with PPBS was the Projektgruppe Regierungs- und Verwaltungsreform (Project Group for 
Governmental and Administrative Reform, or PRV) (Wollmann, 1984, p. 30). The PRV was 
appointed already in 1967, but with the election of Brandt it was invigorated as a ‘nucleus of 
modern German public administration and policy analysis’ drawing in the earliest wave of 
German public managers through a series of research contracts (Jann & Jantz, 2013, p. 30). The 
task of the PRV was to overhaul the German state’s planning and decision-making capacities as 
a way of realizing an ambitious programme of social reform and fiscal planning (Saretzki, 2007, 
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p. 588). Rejecting the restrictions of ordoliberalism, the group embraced a language of Planung 
(planning) (Jann & Jantz, 2013, p. 31).  
The proposals coming from the PRV were for an aktive Politik (active policy-making). 
Prominent in making this case were two members of the PRV who would later be major figures 
in debates on European governance: Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf (Mayntz & Scharpf, 
1973). The two protested the ‘lip-service’ that was paid to the ordoliberal social market economy 
as approaching public policies ‘not first judged by their effectiveness but by the criterion of their 
“market conformity”’ (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975, p. 15). In contrast, Scharpf and Mayntz saw in 
PPBS a form of active policy-making, drawing on ‘macroeconomic theory and American policy 
science, with their strong rationalistic underpinnings’ (Blum & Schubert, 2013, p. 30). In a 
manner echoing Huet in France, Mayntz and Scharpf pointed to growing societal problems that 
meant the state had ‘lost the option of “benign neglect”’ implicit in macro-budgetary techniques 
of redistributive welfarism and instead needed tools that could improve the ‘problem solving 
capacities’ of West Germany (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975, p. 3). In implementing this into the 
German federal bureaucracy, the PRV’s work was predominantly focused on resolving the state’s 
perceived ‘knowledge problem’ (Mayntz, 1993, p. 13). The focus of the PRV’s work was 
therefore on constructing a new information generating apparatus for the German state 
bureaucracy to guide the decision-making and planning system of PPBS.  
 
 
2.2 'Ungovernability' and the Crisis of Budgetary Planning 
In the end, PPBS collapsed under its own weight of ambition and paperwork. Despite promising 
at the beginning of the 1960s to revolutionise budgeting as a rational process, Wildavsky 
highlighted how ‘everywhere PPBS was praise; everywhere it ran into serious difficulties’ 
(Wildavsky, 1974, p. 182). It was discontinued in the US federal administration at the turn of the 
1970s and dropped in other OECD countries at a similar time.  There were two major problems 
PPBS faced. First, the analytical task of setting quantified and costed objectives was too onerous 
for agency staff trained in their vocation rather than the decision sciences. PPBS required an 
informational architecture to set objectives and measure outputs that did not exist in the 1960s. 
Most bureaucracies lacked the data processing machinery and trained analysts that PPBS 
required. Second, PPBS overlooked how budgeting worked as an ‘incremental’ political process 
57 
 
(Wildavsky, 1975). Once a budget line was set, it was politically very hard to adjust. The result 
of this was that while PPBS required financial flexibility to reallocate resources according to 
changing objectives or performance levels, appropriations were less than responsive. At a time 
of budgetary growth, in the post-war years of expansion, this was less of a problem - a growing 
pie has more scope to chase new priorities. The onset of fiscal crisis in the 1970s, however, 
meant budgetary planning slipped as a priority as attention switched to spending less rather than 
spending better. Nevertheless, while state budgets fell into disarray in the 1970s, planners were 
just beginning their managerial remaking of public policy by detaching the work of systems 
analysis from the budgetary process that had constrained it. 
 
Failures of Budgetary Planning 
A major problem of PPBS was, as Aaron Wildavsky described, ‘no one knows how to 
do program budgeting’ (Wildavsky, 1969, p. 193). Virginia Held commented at the time how 
‘program budgeting is forcing some agencies to consider, virtually for the first time, just what 
their objectives are’ (Held, 1966, p. 106). This was not as straightforward as it might seem. The 
demand of PPBS for agencies to set down in precise terms what the objectives of public 
expenditure were proved impossible. Many agencies had never considered what they were 
achieving in terms of strategy. In the spirit of Progressive reform, spending on education, forest 
protection or national security were simply public goods; unquantifiable, but unquestionably 
worthwhile. As such, asking agencies to set objectives felt arbitrary (West, 2011, p. 22). As  
Robert Millward described, agencies attempting to implement PPBS struggled with the fact that 
‘concrete meaningful goals do not always exist, sometimes cannot be articulated, and seldom are 
agreed upon even within the confines of a specific agency’ (Millward, 1968, p. 91).  
In large part, this was tied to the kind of quantification PPBS required. Systems analysis 
itself was not reducible to quantification. Hitch explained that ‘economic choice is a way of 
looking at problems and does not necessarily depend upon the use of analytic aids’ (Hitch & 
McKean, 1960). Nevertheless, PPBS in practice required a vast informational architecture to 
make it work. While Progressive reforms and scientific management had produced vast amounts 
of data, the kinds of quantification required for PPBS was considerably different. Less relevant 
was the scale of inputs or outputs that scientific management used to measure work efficiency. 
As Schick described, these statistics of scientific management were the ‘most used, but least 
useful’ in government (Schick, 1966, p. 255). Instead, the focus on costs and benefits within 
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systems analysis required a quantification of value. West explains how ‘the effects of many 
government programs were difficult to quantify. What is the value of a human life or a more 
scenic environment?’ (West, 2011, p. 22). These were the questions budgetary planning and 
systems analysis asked. There was, however, a total lack of such an analytical community that 
could answer these questions in the 1960s. 
Alongside the technical challenges of PPBS, it collapsed because it failed to take the 
budgetary process as it was and, instead, attempted to rationalise it as it imagined it could be. In 
1940, V.O. Key had highlighted budgetary theory’s failure to answer a fundamental question: 
‘On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?’ (Key, 
1940). In large part, PPBS had attempted to answer this through the rational technique of 
systems analysis. For Enthoven, ‘the fundamental idea behind PPBS was decision making based 
on explicit criteria of the national interest in defence programs, as opposed to decision making 
by compromise’ (Enthoven & Smith, 2005, p. 33). Wildavsky, however, argued PPBS and Key 
had missed the point. Budgetary reform could not start from imagining an ideal form of 
budgeting. It had to start from the existing budgetary system. As such, for Wildavsky, the most 
pressing question for budgetary reform was to ask ‘how is it decided to allocate X funds to activity 
A and not Activity B’ (Wildavsky, 1974). Wildavsky’s answer revealed to him why PPBS had 
failed - once set, budget allocations were very hard to move, no matter how rational the decision 
process was.  
For Wildavsky, budgeting was incremental. It was rare for a budget to be rethought 
entirely, ‘instead, this year’s budget is based on last year’s budget, with special attention given to 
a narrow range of increases and decreases’ (Wildavsky, 1975, p. 10). This incrementalism was 
precisely what PPBS had tried to address, forcing government agencies to account for the 
strategic purposes to which money was spent. The point Wildavsky was making was that such 
an ambition ignored the political realities of the budgeting process. Budgeting was for Wildavsky 
a battle between agencies seeking to gain slice of a growing pie. It was a zero sum game where 
‘every agency wants more money; the urge to survive and expand is built in’ (Wildavsky, 1975, 
pp. 12–13). Wildavsky’s approach was more institutionalist than crudely public choice 
(Wildavsky, 2016). Self-interest for budgetary expansion for Wildavsky was not so much born 
from an innate drive to expand. It was the product of the budgetary system’s institutional setup 
geared for expansion in a time of economic growth.  
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As an incremental process, there were major political and institutional obstacles to the 
rationalisation of budgeting as PPBS had attempted. Once a budget was set, it was very hard to 
reallocate it. In the centralised defence department, rational budgeting was relatively 
straightforward. The defence secretary broadly had the authority and mechanisms to make 
wholesale appropriation adjustments (Wildavsky, 1969, p. 190). In other sectors, however, the 
budgetary process was far more diffuse. Millward identified that ‘activities are currently scattered 
through several government agencies, bureaus, and divisions, not to mention levels of 
government. To try to rearrange these into a “meaningful” framework will certainly encounter 
strong institutional resistance’ (Millward, 1968, p. 91). 
The political obstacles of PPBS were more than just the government bureaucracy. 
They extended across society. Schick pointed out that rather than government agency spending 
driving the growth of the federal budget, as Wildavsky had highlight, it was the explosion of 
entitlements and benefits that had driven budgetary growth (Schick, 1983). The rise of welfare 
in the twentieth century had transformed budgeting. Not only did government fund its own 
activities, most government expenditure went directly to citizens as welfare. Payments on things 
like healthcare, disability, or unemployment support were largely immovable and open ended, 
subject to economic conditions rather than any strategic plans, and often indexed to inflation 
(Schick, 1983). More than just being immovable institutionally, the growth of entitlements within 
the budget had transformed the political stakes of budgeting. As more people became party to 
national budgets, ‘they make it their business to be involved in the process’ (Schick, 1983, p. 12). 
In attempting to rationalise the budgetary process, PPBS had to not only contend with 
government departments, but with the voting public too.  
In the end, Schick described how the immovability of budgeting could not be made 
to fit with the dynamism of planning. He wrote that ‘budgeting and planning, moreover, invite 
disparate perspectives: the one is conservative and negativistic; the other, innovative and 
expansionist’ (Schick, 1966, p. 256). While budgetary appropriations for entitlements and agency 
spending would plod onwards as an incremental and protracted process, planning as a strategic 
and analytically-driven process of decision-making would have to go elsewhere.  
 
‘Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS’ and the Consolidation of Public Management 
The failure of PPBS did not mean the abandonment of managerial planning. In many 
ways, it was just its beginning. In response to the crisis of PPBS, an embryonic public 
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management community began searching for ways to distance themselves from PPBS while 
consolidating the field of planning. It was no less than budgetary expert Wildavsky that set out 
a call to ‘rescue policy analysis from PPBS’ (Wildavsky, 1969). This was no simple task. Schick 
wrote how the analysis of policy alternatives could not be thought of on its own terms, ‘analysis 
was to be a change agent… analysis was not valued for its own sake or structured to operate 
independently of the budget process’ (Schick, 1973, p. 146).  
But for Wildavsky the value of systems analysis as a technique to rigorously lay out 
policy alternatives meant the separation from a stifling appropriation system was imperative. 
Given system analysis’ failed meandering into a budgetary process it did not understand, 
Wildavsky ‘discovered that PPBS, by failing to meet its own requirements, was giving the 
analytical enterprise a bad name’ (Wildavsky, 1974, p. 183). For Wildavsky, ‘PPBS discredits 
policy analysis… [and so] the shotgun wedding between policy analysis and budgeting should be 
annulled’ ((Wildavsky, 1969, p. 196). The failure to understand the context of the institutional 
dynamics of the budgeting process had meant that the attempt to rationalise it through systems 
analysis had fallen short. In making a call to establish a distinctive policy analysis, Wildavsky was 
arguing that the field should combine the ‘technical training’ of mathematical and economic 
rigour he valued in analysis with the ‘broader views of the social context of public policy’ that 
the first generation of systems analysis had neglected (Wildavsky, 1969, p. 199). 
Wildavsky’s call to disentangle PPBS from policy analysis corresponded with an 
explosion of public policy graduate schools and research institutes training a generation of policy 
analysts. A prominent school was Heinz College of Information Systems and Public Policy at 
Herbert Simon’s Carnegie-Mellon University. Policy analysts coming out of these schools were 
trained in many of the techniques that would later drive theorisations of governance - 
organisational sociology, game-theoretic institutionalism, policy effectiveness, and policy 
evaluation. Alongside graduate training, new research institutions cast in the image of RAND 
arose over the 1970s developing an industry of social policy analysis  (Jardini, 2000; Knafo, 2020; 
Light, 2003; J. A. Smith, 1993). In the US, notable institutions included the Institute for Research 
on Poverty and the Urban Institute. A key problem of PPBS had been that there were too few 
policy officials trained in the technique of systems analysis. The proliferation of graduate schools 
and research institutions focused on an economic approach to public policy meant, by the end 




In Europe too, the failure of PPBS nevertheless set in motion a new field of policy 
analysis and public management. In France, the centre of this was Michel Crozier’s Centre de 
Sociologie des Organisations (CSO). With much research commissioned by the French state, work at 
the CSO represented a new front of social scientific research in France that investigated the 
dynamic processes that unfold in the implementation of public policy in game-theoretic terms. 
Starting with Crozier’s own investigation of the postal service (Crozier, 1955), a number of major 
studies came out of the CSO including Erhard Friedberg and Dominique Desjeux’s study of the 
ministry of industry (Desjeux & Friedberg, 1973), Jean-Claude Thoenig and Friedberg’s study of 
the ministry of public works (Thoenig & Friedberg, 1976), Pierre Grémion’s work on local 
government (Grémion, 1976), and Jean-Pierre Worms’ study of the French prefecture system 
(Worms, 1966). The CSO’s major statement of theoretical and methodological intent was 
Crozier and Friedberg The Actor and the System (l’acteur et le systeme) (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). 
The text ‘greatly influenced the emergence of public policy analysis in France’ (A. Smith, 1999, 
p. 116). A major innovation at the time, Crozier and Friedberg ‘introduce[d] the notion of the 
strategic actor’ into French sociology and public policy (Fontaine, 1996, p. 491). 
Alongside the CSO, another branch of French public policy analysis was the Grenoble 
Centre de Recherche sur le Politique, l’Administration et le Territoire (Centre for the Study of Politics, 
Administration, and Territory - CERAT). CERAT emerged out of Lucien Nizard’s analysis of 
French planning in the 1970s (Nizard, 1972). The CSO and CERAT were fierce competitors 
(Hamelin, 2018, p. 54; A. Smith, 1999, p. 118). Emerging from the conflict between the two 
centres in the 1980s was a third group, launched by former CSO scholar Jean-Claude Thoenig. 
Thoenig’s Groupe d’analyse des politiques publiques (Public Policy Analysis Group GAPP) opened in 
1983/1984 and thrust the relatively niche organisational sociology of the CSO into the 
mainstream of French political science (Smith, 1999, p. 119). Thoenig’s contribution was to 
cement policy analysis as a distinct and respectable field of French social sciences that was more 
familiar to the US-centred transnational public management community. Theonig and Yves 
Mény’s 1989 public policy textbook was for many years the only available in French (Mény & 
Thoenig, 1989), contributing to Theonig and the GAPP’s dominant position in defining French 
policy analysis (Muller, 2015, p. 291). 
In Germany, the policy sciences came out of the PRV. Fritz W. Scharpf was a notable 
figure in this. Akin to legalistic German public administration, Scharpf originally trained as a 
lawyer. After postgraduate education and briefly teaching law in the US, Scharpf shifted towards 
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the policy sciences. Returning to Germany, he initially served as professor of political science at 
Konstanz University. Formed as part of a wave of ‘reform’ universities in the late 1960s, 
Konstanz offered a specific public policy programme that was directly modelled on similar US 
curriculums (Saretzki, 2007, p. 594; Wollmann, 1984, p. 37). Scharpf later moved across the two 
institutions most significant to ‘a German view on policy analysis’ (Blum & Schubert, 2013, p. 
2). 1973-1984, he was director at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB Berlin 
Social Science Centre). The WZB was established in Berlin in 1969 as think tank modelled on 
the US Brooking Institute (Thunert, 2006, p. 190). Described as ‘one of the most influential 
think tanks in Germany’, the WZB undertakes policy research on a range of social, economic 
and environmental issues (Jochem, 2013, p. 237). From the beginning, systems thinking figured 
prominently within its work. The prominent cybernetician Karl W. Deutsch, for example, was 
previously director. After the WZB, Scharpf helped establish the Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIfG, Institute for the Study of Societies). The MPIfG was established in 
1985 under the directorship of Renate Mayntz (until 1986) and then Fritz W. Scharpf (1986-
2003). Mayntz had similarly been a prominent figure in the PRV (from where West Germany 
trialled PPBS).  
From these institutions, policy sciences in Germany was incubated through a series of 
public research contracts in the mid-1970s investigating the implementation of federal public 
policy (Wollmann, 1984, p. 33). Mayntz undertook a major study on environmental policies 
(Mayntz, 1978), while Franz-Xaver Kaufmann did a similar project evaluating social policy 
(Kaufmann, 1979). Kaufmann was also responsible for a major international project on systems 
analysis at another reform university at Bielefeld (Kaufmann & Majone, 1986). Bielefeld was also 
home to the systems theorist Niklas Luhmann.  The culminating major statement of policy 
analysis in West Germany was the widely adopted methodology of ‘actor centred 
institutionalism’, which adopted a game-theoretic approach to policy making (Scharpf, 1994). 
 
Fiscal Overload, ‘Ungovernability’ and Public Managers Against Bureaucracy 
While public managers over the 1970s and 1980s were consolidating themselves as a 
set of social forces in graduate schools, research institutes, and think tanks, government reform 
was entering a ‘neoliberal’ age. The failure of PPBS coincided with the long downturn from the 
1970s. Balance of trade crises, stagnant revenues, tax revolts, and ballooning welfare expenditure 
put a severe squeeze on national and local budgets. As a result, the 1970s saw the emergence of 
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a concern with government’s ‘fiscal overload’ as the state appeared to be spending beyond its 
means (King, 1975). Alongside these fiscal concerns, the rise of the counter-cultural movement, 
the civil rights movement, and other revolutionary movements provoked a moral panic over the 
growing ‘ungovernability’ of society.  
Birch (1984) identifies three trends to the ungovernability thesis that emerged in the 
1970s: in the US, neo-conservatives like Daniel Bell, Samuel Huntington, and Daniel Moynihan 
were turning against their backgrounds in liberal reform to diagnose a perceived crisis of family 
values and personal responsibility with the growth of welfare (Cooper, 2017). Neo-liberal 
economists like Samuel Brittan, Peter Jay, or Milton Friedman pitched the crisis of governance 
in terms of the inflationary tendencies of mass democracy (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). Finally, 
neo-Marxist scholars like Claus Offe and Jurgen Habermas began to speak of the inability of 
capitalism to sustain the welfare provision upon which the state’s legitimacy had come to depend.  
The idea of ungovernability in the 1970s built on a belief that the demands of mass 
democracy had placed an unbearable welfare burden upon the state. As people had become 
dependent upon the state, old bonds of familial and community responsibility were seen as being 
eroded. Moreover, the rise of welfare and diffuse budgetary arrangements had eroded the 
political authority and independence of the state. Welfare provision was seen to have eroded the 
government’s central authority as power spilled into the hands of professional teachers, doctors, 
social workers, or trade unions. 
Here, I suggest an additional voice in the chorus of ungovernability was a new social 
forces of public management. Frustrated by their efforts to remake the state through budgetary 
planning, public managers participated in discussions of ungovernability to lambast stale 
bureaucracies that resisted the interventions of rational planning. This increasingly 
institutionalised public managers community in the 1980s shared with neo-conservatives and 
neoliberals a perceived crisis of bureaucracy. Their response, however, was different. Whereas 
neoliberals preached markets, public management turned to a distinct discourse of ‘governance’. 
In an early text invoking ‘governance’, Wittrock argued that ‘the effectiveness of 
traditional policy instruments of the welfare state seem to be declining’ (Wittrock, 1983, p. 196). 
Wittrock presented ‘governance in crisis’ as a dual crisis of the effectiveness of its public policy 
instruments and the legitimacy of representational democracy upon which the state was built. 
He diagnosed a state ‘unable to cope with the widening set of problems with which the system 
is confronted and which its citizens expect it to master’ (Wittrock, 1983, p. 197).  
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This sentiment was mirrored among other European public managers. In France, the 
sociologist Crozier was most widely known to an international audience as a co-author of the 
Trilateral Commission tract The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier et al., 1975). The book was a major 
neo-conservative statement penned with Samuel J. Huntington and Joji Watanuki in the 1970s 
about the overburdening of the state by welfare demands. Crozier’s chapter built on his first 
major text, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Crozier, 2010). The widely read text offered a strong 
critique of the inadequacies of an alienating French bureaucracy, criticised for its insularity, 
single-mindedness and inflexibility. Throughout his work, Crozier had ‘expressed the loss of 
confidence in the ability of the state to solve economic and social problems’ (Hamelin, 2018, p. 
53). His Crisis of Democracy chapter blamed majoritarian democracy, arguing that it was showing 
an ‘incapacity to answer the challenges of modern times’ (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 11). Following 
the logic of administrative overload, Crozier observed that the majoritarian democratic state was 
suffering a crisis of effectiveness. Whereas it was ‘traditionally believed that the power of the 
state depended on the number of decisions it could take’, Crozier argued that ‘the more decisions 
the modern state has to handle, the more helpless it becomes’ (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 22).  
In West Germany, Scharpf and Mayntz were similarly observing what they saw as a 
crisis of state effectiveness (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1973). In a text reflecting on the German federal 
bureaucracy after the PRV reforms, they wrote that ‘the capacity of political systems in post-
industrial, Western societies to cope with an increasing problem load has become doubtful… 
we seem to be falling behind, rather than catching up with our most urgent problems. And the 
gap seems to widen the fast we run’ (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975, p. 1). Similarly, Scharpf later wrote 
that the postwar bureaucratic welfare state ‘may have reached the end of its vitality… [facing a] 
a failure of effectiveness in the management of the economy, the failure of efficiency in the 
management of the social service sector, and the failure of responsiveness to differentiated, 
qualitative demands in the performance of all government functions’ (Scharpf, 1977, p. 343). 
Mayntz agreed. She argued that ‘with the permanent increase of tasks assigned to public 
bureaucracies and with the increasing political emphasis on the achievement of defined system 
goals, the charges of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the public sector have gained weight and 
turned attention to the structural, procedural and personal conditions of its performance’ 
(Mayntz, 1979, p. 634).  
Public managers in the 1970s/1980s had agreed with neo-conservatives and neoliberals 
that the state had a problem. They saw a state with too many tasks, dwindling resources, and a 
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loss of independent political authority. This problem had been what budgetary planning had 
originally attempted to resolve. Perceiving the appropriation cycle as an aimless fight for 
resources without rationalised purpose, PPBS had attempted to submit the allocation of 
resources to rational planning. For public managers, then, the solution to the crisis of state 
effectiveness was not resolvable through the restoration of family values or expansion of market 
mechanisms. Instead, the crisis required an overhaul of the infrastructure of public policy – and 
the technique of systems/policy analysis with it. 
 
2.3 The 'Governance' Turn to Public Management 
 
The Institutional Turn to Policy Analysis 
In reacting to the failures of budgetary planning, European public managers began arguing that 
an institutionalist, rather than rational, form of policy analysis was required. This perspective was 
borne out of their experience attempting to reform the post-war redistributive state. PPBS had 
began from a premise that decision-making could be rationalised through the budgetary process. 
Systems analysis was meant to be a technique that could rationally determine how resources 
could be allocated effectively. This attempt ran up against the political reality that even the most 
perfectly designed budgetary programme quickly falls apart once it enters the dense inter-
organisational morass of bureaucracy and contends with the political challenges of moving 
public resources from one group to another. If public managers were going to reform a 
bureaucracy they saw as immovable, their analytical tools would likewise have to be adapted. 
Less important was devising perfectly rational plans that PPBS had attempted. More important 
was the organisational means through which plans could be achieved.  
For public managers, post-war planning had been in many ways an arrogant pursuit 
of omniscient government. A notable voice in making this case was Giandomenico Majone. 
Majone came to have a significant influence in shaping the governance paradigm through his 
work on ‘regulatory governance’ in the EU (Majone, 1994). Prior to this, Majone spent many 
years at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), a Cold War laboratory 
of East-West cooperation developing systems analysis (Rindzevičiūtė, 2016). Majone is thus a 
major representative of a broader European public management community that fed systems 
analysis into the governance paradigm. 
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Majone criticised the pitfalls of rational decision-making in ‘assuming the presence of 
a benevolent dictator’ that could perfectly execute acts of choice in a vacuum of institutions 
(Majone, 1975, p. 262). Elsewhere, Majone pointed to the deficiencies of a policy analysis that 
limited its focus solely to decision-making, arguing that ‘the concentration of traditional policy 
analysis on a mythical hero called the policymaker completely obscures the complexity of the 
process of policy formulation and implementation’ (Majone, 1986, p. 67). Scharpf similarly 
criticised rational policy analysis as equivalent to ‘the “great-man” approach to historiography’ – 
providing broad brush techniques with little practical bearing on the ground (Hanf & Scharpf, 
1978, p. 347).  
While sharing in a seemingly Hayekian criticism of the planner’s knowledge capacity, 
public managers did not turn to the information processing power of the market. Instead, the 
failures of the implementation of PPBS led to a rethinking of policy analysis in terms of the 
organisational conditions that could translate choice into action. Scharpf critiqued the 
‘instrumental logic of goals and means which underlies all policy analysis’ as ‘totally at odds with 
the inherent pluralism of intergovernmental decision-making’ (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978, p. 346). 
What was needed instead was a form of policy analysis that could consider the organisational 
determinants of decision-making. In Majone’s words, this meant ‘policy analysis without 
institutional analysis is empty; institutional analysis without policy analysis is blind’ (Majone, 
1986, p. 70). 
In both France and Germany, the concern with the organisational aspects of public 
management led to an interest in developing new policy analysis methodologies sensitive to 
institutions. In France at the CSO, Friedberg and Crozier’s seminal methodological work 
disaggregated the state bureaucracy to interrogate the implementation of public policy as a 
dynamic game-theoretic process of strategic interaction and negotiation between policy actors 
under conditions of uncertainty. Frieberg and Crozier’s work pushed beyond the sectoral 
interests of French corporatism, or the legalistic institutionalism of political science, and into 
policy fields reminiscent of the systems-based approach of the US policy sciences (e.g. urban 
policy, environmental policy, etc.) (Fontaine, 1996, p. 489). Through concepts such as ‘crossed 
regulation’ (régulation croisée), French policy analysis looked at the complex organisational 




A ‘cognitive’ approach to policy analysis led by Nizard had a significant influence on 
the flavour of French policy analysis. In contrast to the work of the CSO, the Nizard-led CERAT 
drew more heavily on the structural Marxism of French political science in the 1970s. Combining 
an analysis of state-society relations inspired by structural Marxism and the methodological 
innovations of the CSO, Muller describes the work of the CERAT as a ‘cognitive public policy 
analysis’ (Muller, 2015, p. 289). Nizard studied French planning of the CGP as a process 
diffusing shared cultural visions across society, beyond simply being an economic tool of 
industrial development (Nizard, 1972). Building on this, Pierre Muller and Bruno Jobert’s L’État 
en action introduced a kind of political public policy analysis that studied the implementation of 
policy as a process of social mediation organised around a collective ‘référentiel’, or the shared 
norms and values said to govern a particular policy area (Jobert & Muller, 1987). This trajectory 
of French policy analysis fed into the rise of an ideas-based institutionalism of Frank Fischer (F. 
Fischer & Forester, 1993), Peter A. Hall (P. A. Hall, 1993), or Vivian Schmidt (Schmidt, 2011) 
that remains central to public policy studies today.  
In West Germany too there was a concern that policy analysis should uncover the 
inter-organisational requirements for policy-making and delivery (Jann & Jantz, 2013, p. 32; 
Saretzki, 2007, p. 589; Wollmann, 1984, p. 30). Scharpf and Mayntz spearheaded this. Unlike the 
French emphasis on the role of norms and ideas, a German perspective on organisational policy-
analysis placed much more emphasis on questions of institutional design and the game-theoretic 
interaction of rational policy actors. An early statement of this was Scharpf and Hanf’s (1978) 
book on interorganisational policy-making. The two shared with Crozier an interest in an actor-
centred, game-theoretic methodology that explored organisational dynamics as a process of 
strategic interaction. For Scharpf, this meant developing how ‘a better understanding of the 
internal structures, processes, and selectivities of the public sector may become a crucial 
precondition of successful problem-solving strategies’ of the state (Scharpf, 1977, p. 346). 
Undertaking this institutionalist policy analysis, Mayntz and Scharpf developed a research agenda 
that addressed how different models of policy formulation, ‘decision-styles’, or implementation 
patterns impacted policy outcomes (Mayntz, 1980, 1983; Scharpf, 1989).  
 
The Rise of Governance Within and Beyond Budgeting 
By the 1980s, public management and policy analysis had become a well organised force 
of political studies and government reform. Increasing numbers of policy analysts were 
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graduating a growing number of specialist graduate schools of public policy. Other universities 
were adapting curriculums to reflect the rise a ‘policy’ orientation to political science that 
emphasised inputs and outputs, policy effectiveness, and the use of new economic techniques 
to study public policy. A vast and proliferating number of research institutes and think tanks 
were staking a claim within a policy-making process that increasingly began to speak the language 
of economics and cost-benefit analysis. 
It was this growing social power of public management, and their institutionalist forms 
of policy analysis, through which the governance paradigm should be understood. Public 
management’s growing influence had effects across policy-making. This included continuing to 
remake the budgeting system itself. Schick notes a turn to ‘budgeting for results’ in the 
1980s/1990s wrapped up with the NPM (Schick, 1990). Budgeting for results involved a 
remaking of programme budgeting from the 1960s/1970s. As Schick described, the ‘concept is 
simple - objectives, results, and resources should all be linked’ (Schick, 1990). The idea of output 
budgeting, programme budgeting, or linking budgeting with performance experienced a 
renaissance in the 1990s across the OECD, corresponding to the rise of the governance 
paradigm.  
In France, the 2001 ‘la loi organique relative aux lois de finances’ (the fundamental law 
relating to public finance - LOLF) constitutionally enshrined the use of programme budgeting 
across the public sector (Ongaro, 2009). In Belgium, the Copernicus reform from 1999 
implemented a new budgeting system focused on broadening managerial autonomy while 
constraining fiscal expansion. In the Netherlands, performance budgeting was resurrected from 
experiments of the 1970s, becoming legally mandated in 2001 with national budgets focused on 
outcomes, objectives, and performance measures (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 313). In Britain, 
the 1982 Financial Management Initiative (FMI) involved establishing multiple cost centres, 
fragmenting the budgetary management process, to then hold budget holders accountable for 
their results (Schick, 1990). Finally, in Germany under the label of the ‘New Steering Model’, 
and developed by the organisation Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für Verwaltungsmanagement 
(Municipal Association for Administration Rationalisation, KGSt), new budgeting practices were 
intended to establish greater managerial control over local governance - where many policy 
programmes are administered in the federal German system (Klages & Loffler, 1998, p. 48). 
Managerial autonomy was to be increased, responsibility delegated downwards, ‘performance 
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agreements’ were to replace fixed procedures, and an ‘output- and customer-orientation’ was 
introduced.  
In contrast to PPBS, these reforms as ‘budgeting by results’ no longer involved asking 
agencies to submit systems analysis-driven budgetary plans of strategic objectives and alternative 
costing arrangements. Instead, central authorities set objectives and demanded lower levels of 
the bureaucracy to work out how to achieve them within tight budgetary margins. As Schick 
described, this meant ‘to mould the budget into a “contract for performance”. In exchange for 
obtaining agreed-to resources, managers would be expected to achieve specified targets (Schick, 
1990). The lesson of PPBS had been that asking state agencies to design their own budgetary 
plans was met with resistance, incredulity, or neglect. In contrast, budgeting for results compelled 
agencies to develop a managerial function. Schick described how ‘letting managers manage, past 
experience has taught, does not mean that they will. The current emphasis is on making them 
manage by nailing -down the performance levels to which they will be held.’ (Schick, 1990, p. 
33). 
As the repurposing of public expenditure attempted with PPBS proved impossible, 
budgeting for results offered a financial mechanism through which to manage policy-making as 
the more diffuse and flexible process of inter-organisational governance outside bureaucratic 
hierarchies. It is in this framing that the rise of contractualism in the governance paradigm 
through public-private-partnerships (PPP), privative-finance-initiatives (PFI), or payment-by-
results (PBR) can be understood. Rather than having to repurpose entrenched state 
bureaucracies or welfare programmes that proved immovable by rational analysis, budgeting for 
results allowed the state to step outside of existing frameworks. By reorienting the purpose of 
government as achieving defined strategic objectives, it no longer mattered what the 
organisational vehicle was that delivered policy. Indeed, the purpose of institutional policy 
analysis became analysing the most economical organisational means through which to deliver 
on policy objectives, and to design the contractual terms (in the form of operational parameters, 
key performance indicators and evaluation techniques) through which to best guarantee policy 
success. Schick summarised this shift in budgeting how ‘unlike past innovations, which strove 






Governance as Planning Remade 
This emphasis on organisations spoke to how public management was remaking 
public policy beyond the appropriations system where it had first arisen as PPBS. In particular, 
the rise of ‘networks’ as a major trope of the governance turn reflected how public management 
sought to extend its reach both across the public sector and beyond. Failing to push the state to 
act more strategically as a consequence of an entrenched bureaucracy and immovable budgetary 
appropriations, the turn to networks built on a reassessment of the organisational means to 
achieve state policy objectives. Put in the game-theoretic terms of inter-organisational strategic 
interaction, policy analysis became about the diffuse and ‘networked’ means through which the 
state could get things done. The state’s intervention was thus no longer confined to its budgetary 
means. It was tied to the organisational design of its policy delivery. Such a radical shift opened 
the door to massively extend state intervention, no longer through its budget, nor the rigour of 
its policy analysis, but through its involvement in managing policy networks through the social 
forces of public management 
As a form of rule, this emphasis placed on inter-organisational networks was vastly 
different from neo/ordoliberal maxims of constitutional order and stability. Drawn from the 
managerial lineage of OR and systems analysis, the emphasis of governance was not on rules 
and fixity, but flexibility and cybernetic responsiveness. Far from the state being constrained to 
upholding a stable constitutional market framework, the ‘learning’ or ‘problem-solving’ 
approach to governance argued that such inflexibility was untenable given the deep uncertainties 
of policymaking in a continuously changing world. As a consequence, governance implied far 
greater activism on the part of political institutions for continuous, discretionary interventions 
driven by strategy and information processing.  
For neoliberalism, the logic of public management would be calamitous and 
illegitimate, reflecting Hayekian follies of planning. The ordoliberal Franz Böhm argued that 
societal complexity required institutional stability and the expert’s hand to deal with order: 
‘the more dynamic economic life becomes, the more stable must its order be. A comparison can be made 
with a machine: the more complex a machine is, and the more intricately-interdependent the movement of its 
separate parts, the more precise must its construction be.’ (F. Böhm, 2017, p. 116) 
But this was not the mechanical age. It was the computing age. As a result, public 
managers had a totally different understanding of governance. British public manager Les 
Metcalfe argued that ‘effectiveness requires a repertoire of management strategies and capacities 
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that match the complexity of the tasks being undertaken’ (Metcalfe, 1996a, p. 424). Social and 
economic life was complex and unknowable. To that extent, Metcalfe and other public managers 
agreed with Hayek. But, drawing on second order cybernetics, such complexity was not a call 
for restraint and stability. It was a call for discretion and responsiveness. Public management 
could not be held back by fixed principles. It needed regulatory complexity that could match 
societal complexity.  
This was a point made across the spectrum of public management. Crozier argued that 
the state was ‘too rigid to adjust without crisis to the transformations that the accelerated 
evolution of industrial society makes more and more imperative’ (Crozier, 2010, p. 198). Instead, 
he argued that the future of the state could not lie with standardized responses but had to 
develop more flexible and iterative forms of intervention (Crozier, 1985, p. 23). As Gerry Stoker 
put it, progenitor of British ‘local governance’ in the 1990s, governance was explicitly remaking 
planning. For Stoker, ‘governance therefore represents a response to the challenge posed by a 
society that is prone to rapid change and characterized by complexity and diversity’ (Brindley et 
al., 2005, p. 151). Drawing on cybernetics, Gerry Stoker, together with Tim Brindley and Yvonne 
Rydin, argued that a ‘complex, diverse and dynamic social-political world requires forms of 
governing which are themselves dynamic, complex and diverse’ (Brindley et al., 2005, p. 151). 
Governance was, then, the remaking of budgetary planning outside the parameters of 
the incumbent welfare state. In contrast to theories of governance that place it as either a reaction 
to, or rationality of, neoliberal austerity, this perspective argues placing governance within a 
lineage of public management and the remaking of budgetary planning from the 1960s. The 
governance paradigm preserved an emphasis on defining strategic objectives. Gone from PPBS 
was the attempt to link planning directly to the appropriation process. Instead, achieving 
objectives would be placed outside of the institutions of the state that proved impossible to 
bend. Through contracts of performance, political objectives would instead be met by a diverse 
range of organisational means through networks and contracts.  
Making this shift in theorising the governance paradigm puts in perspective its politics. 
The governance paradigm should be understood through this argument not in terms of how it 
makes the state more business-like or technocratic; nor how it was a reified shift from 
bureaucracy or markets to networks. Instead, the governance paradigm must be read as the 
institutionalisation of the social power of public management within the state. This is not the 
same as corporate power or ‘business-like’ methods. Rather, it refers to the historical lineage of 
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‘managerial governance’ drawn from the revolution of the social sciences, business, and public 
administration under the influence of, first, OR and, later, systems analysis. Having briefly 
attempted to enter the state in the 1960s through PPBS, the governance paradigm reflected the 
remaking of the state in the image of the policy sciences and the insertion of the public manager 
at the core of the activities of the state. This meant an emphasis on problem-definition and 
systems, not on department or policy function; an emphasis on strategy not rules; performance 
effectiveness not cost efficiency; policy evaluation, not legislative accountability or judicial 
review; and information processing not procedure setting. Governance has, then, been the 
managerialisation of the state. 
 
 
2.4 Governance's Supranational Appeal 
The historicization of the governance paradigm in this chapter has so far been a national story. 
It has looked at the rise and fall and rise of budgetary planning in the US, France, and Germany. 
Crucially for this thesis, governance was also a story of IOs. A concept and agenda of governance 
captured the mood of IOs in the 1990s and 2000s. In the wake of failed structural adjustment 
policies, the World Bank’s ‘good governance’ agenda attached development assistance less to 
the policies pursued but to the political institutions of recipient states (World Bank, 1989). The 
OECD’s 1995 Governance in Transition report embraced the language of governance to categorise 
a revolution in the nature of public policy in OECD countries (OECD, 1995). This built on the 
earlier establishment of the public management ‘PUMA’ committee at the OECD in the 1980s 
(Pal, 2012). Perhaps the most enthusiastic adopter of the language of governance among IOs 
was the EU. The 2001 White Paper on Governance pitched a new means of governing the union 
through participatory consultations, intergovernmental benchmarking, and new executive 
regulatory agencies.  
As IOs embraced the governance paradigm, scholars began pointing in the 1990s and 
2000s to the growing political weight IOs held in the global political economy. Michael Barnett 
and Martha Finnemore made this point most forcefully, arguing that IOs matter in the world 
because ‘at the most basic level, IOs are bureaucracies, and bureaucracy is the embodiment of 
rational-legal authority’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). IOs were important from this perspective 
as supranational Weberian bureaucracies exercising power by ‘regulating and constituting the 
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world’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Numbers and managerial techniques like benchmarking 
have been a key part of the growing attention and analytical weight given to IOs. (Clegg, 2010; 
Cooley & Snyder, 2015; H. K. Hansen & Mühlen-Schulte, 2012; H. K. Hansen & Porter, 2012; 
Mügge, 2016). Numbers and managerialism have been seen in the IO literature as key sources 
of supranational authority in the age of governance not in terms of how they forced states to do 
things against their will, but in framing the ways the world was imagined and what problems or 
actions were conceivable in the first place.  
To this extent, Seabrooke and Broome see IOs as possessing a ‘cognitive authority’ that 
allows them to ‘governance at a distance’ (Broome & Quirk, 2015). This governance at a distance 
has been understood as a form of power through ‘orchestration’ (Abbott et al., 2015). IOs have 
wielded power not through strong institutions for themselves, but through orchestrating the 
activities of others akin to a process of management. Seabrooke and Broome therefore ask us to 
‘see like an IO’ in terms of how their ‘analytic institutions’ do not use ‘formal levers of material 
influence and norm enforcement mechanisms’, but rather how IOs’ analytical construction of 
the world has significant effects on the nature of global governance (Broome & Quirk, 2015). 
Ben Clift offers a typical example of work in this tradition, exploring the ideational power of the 
IMF as a technocratic agent in its dealings with states since the financial crisis (Clift, 2018). 
The fact that IOs exploded in number and status in the 1990s was a remarkable 
transformation. For a long time, and for good reason, IOs were largely treated as peripheral to 
the study of international politics. In the neo-realist/neo-liberal debate that framed international 
relations in the twentieth century, IOs were given a marginal significance. When questions of 
global ordering arose, IOs were not understood as organisations with their own instrumentality. 
Instead, IOs were more ephemeral ‘institutions’ that neorealists and neoliberals similarly 
understood as sets of rules and norms that pattern state behaviour in some way. John J. 
Mearsheimer represented a typical neo-realist take on IOs as institutions to argue they ‘matter 
only on the margins’ (Mearsheimer, 1994). For Mearsheimer, IOs were a condensation of the 
material balance of sovereign state power and were therefore ‘merely an intervening variable’ in 
the affairs of global politics.  
Neoliberals like Robert Owen Keohane responded to this neorealist dismissal by 
arguing that institutions mattered to global affairs in economic terms as a response to ‘market 
failures’ or collective action problems (Keohane, 2002). And yet, neoliberal international 
relations gave little independent effect to IOs. They were instead more prone to talk in terms of 
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Krasner’s ‘international regimes’, made up of webs of rules and norms, rather than purposeful 
and autonomous IOs (Krasner, 1983). For the most part, IOs had no actorness but were 
understood in traditional IR terms of the international politics exercised through them. Ngaire 
Woods looked at the IMF and the World Bank in terms of the effects of US dominance (Woods, 
2014). Randall W. Stone likewise looked at the IMF, WTO, and EU in terms of their institutional 
design grounded in the balance of state power (Stone, 2011).  
IOs have, then, often been minimised as actors of world politics. There were good 
reasons for such perspectives. IOs face a fundamental dilemma that they are dependent on 
national states. National governments make up the boards of IOs, exercising close supervision 
and setting the remit over their activities. States therefore exert a hierarchical pressure on IOs, 
constraining their autonomy. A key part of this is that IOs for the most part lack an independent 
means to raise finance sufficient to conduct their business. IOs are reliant on the conditional 
subscriptions of national governments to finance their activities. In addition to lacking an 
autonomous financial means to govern, IOs lack the coercive means. National governments rely 
on an administrative and coercive infrastructure to implement and enforce public policy. In 
contrast, IOs suffer from an exteriority to policy delivery infrastructures. They rely on the 
goodwill and support of national governments to turn international decisions into action. 
The fact that IOs suffer these constraints makes it all the more remarkable that since 
the 1990s they have been theorised as having such a formidable presence in policy-making. 
Indeed, the need for such a perspective in the 1990s was pressing. It was expected at the end of 
the Cold War in the 1990s that many of the IOs like the EU that had been built to supervise US 
hegemony in the West would prove obsolete and wither away as the balance of state power 
shifted. Instead, IOs seemed to find themselves new purpose and became increasingly visible in 
world politics. Indeed, it was the rise of supranational authority in this period that in part 
provoked the concept of governance as public authority was decentred. Neo-realist Joseph 
Grieco, for example, was baffled by the willingness of states in Europe to move towards the 
EMU and hamstring their monetary autonomy, given the perceived marginality of international 
institutions and realist assumptions of state self-interest (Grieco, 1995). 
While the work of Barnett and Finnemore opened a theoretical perspective on the 
autonomy and authority of IOs as bureaucracies, scholars still had to reckon with the fact that 
IOs faced financial and administrative constraints to their activities. It was in this context that 
scholars emphasised the ‘cognitive authority’ of IOs drawing on Weberian bureaucracy. IOs may 
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lack a material and legal capacity to govern, but scholars remarked at their ability to set the terms 
of policy-making through expertise, standardisation, and agenda-setting (Broome, 2014). A 
crucial part of this observation was that IOs used a range of managerial techniques like 
indicators, benchmarks, or quantitative targets to stake a claim within policy-making. The highly 
illuminating literature on IOs as cognitive authorities has revealed how, by representing 
particular policy agendas as neutral scientific expertise, IOs have used a range of quantifying 
managerial policy instruments to become powerful merchants of ideas (Clift, 2018; Littoz-
Monnet, 2017).  
While noting the power of IOs since the 1990s, the specific managerial character this 
has taken often lacks a history.10 While scholars have developed elaborate typologies and 
hypothesis of the power numbers hold in global governance, we have lacked perspective on the 
history of the managerial techniques IOs use. Indeed, by drawing on Weberian bureaucracy we 
get a misleading perspective on IOs that reduces their policy techniques to the generic and 
timeless power of expertise. In fact, as the chapter has shown, the managerial techniques IOs 
have developed build in many ways on a public management perspective to statecraft that was 
explicitly built from the rejection of the rules and procedure of Weberian bureaucracy. A history 
of supranational managerialism is therefore pressing to make sense of the cognitive authority of 
IOs today. 
To make this point, I argue that rise of supranational authority under the governance 
paradigm in the 1990s was in part a consequence of IOs drawing on the social forces and format 
of public management. The governance paradigm more broadly referred to how public 
management pursued planning outside of the constraints of the appropriation cycle. Policy-
making would be rethought in terms of strategy and performance, but particular objectives were 
no longer necessarily attached to budgetary commitments. This orientation to policy-making was 
highly appealing to deal with the constraints IOs faced. While at a national level, public managers 
were frustrated by the immovability of appropriations and thus attempted to re-pitch their 
techniques at a more abstracted level, IOs faced the challenge that they never had sufficient 
financial or administrative resources in the first place. The format of public management under 
the banner of governance thus gave IOs a range of techniques, wielded by a new class of public 
managers, through which to intervene in domestic policy making without financial commitments 
 
10 While there are numerous specialist histories of individual IOs (Boughton, 2004; Kapur et al., 2011; Schmelzer, 2016), these histories are rarely 
used to theoretically rethink the rise of supranational authority in the 1990s and the role of new managerial practices in this process. 
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or requiring enforcement. IOs could thus leverage their limited resources to gain a stake in 
policy-making not through legal authority or financing, but through managerial techniques of 
benchmarking, policy evaluation, or strategy setting.  
 
Conclusion 
The 1990s brought with it an observation that the centralised, hierarchical authority of national 
government was giving way to decentred and horizontal governance. The governance paradigm 
has typically been placed in relation to neoliberalism. Governance is registered as either 
reflecting a Third Way attempt to remake public institutions that had been broken apart by the 
neoliberal NPM - turning privatisations into partnerships. Or, governance is seen as a 
continuation of the neoliberal project, reimagining the state along the lines of the firm. We 
tend to use the fact that the observed shift to governance followed neoliberal austerity to say 
that it must somehow be conceptually implicated with austerity and neoliberalism.  
I have argued instead that the rise of the governance paradigm should be placed in a 
more longstanding dilemma of government over the political control of public finance. As 
public expenditure grew through the expansion of welfare in the twentieth century, there was 
a growing governmental concern with the purposes of spending. A growing feeling that 
government was losing its grip on public expenditure was expressed in the 1970s as a crisis of 
fiscal overload and societal ungovernability.  
 I showed in the chapter how budgetary planning had attempted to remake the 
appropriation cycle through the technique of systems analysis. The purpose of this was to align 
public spending with rationally set priorities. What experiments in budgetary planning revealed, 
however, was that public finance was not as malleable to a managerial template as had been 
hoped. Budgeting was a political process, and therefore not easily responsive to the rational  
techniques of systems analysis. The governance paradigm reflected the attempts of public 
managers to reapply the techniques of budgetary planning, but outside of the appropriation 
cycle. Public managers asserted a strategic orientation to policy-making and helped build and 
run an informational architecture to monitor policy performance, but the pursuit of objectives 
would no longer be tied to public finance. 
Highlighting how the governance turn was built from a legacy of public management 
and planning, rather than neoliberalism and austerity, has two important consequences. First, 
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it brings into focus the forms of social power the governance turn set in motion. Namely, the 
diffusion of public management across the state. In the 1960s, efforts at a managerial approach 
to public policy through budgetary planning were frustrated by a combination of political 
resistance and a limited informational infrastructure. By the 1990s, a large community of public 
managers existed capable of wielding techniques of evaluation, cost-benefit analysis, and 
benchmarking to recreate public policy along managerial lines. Second, it reveals the distinctive 
form of rule public management represented compared to neoliberalism. Whereas 
neoliberalism preached order and markets, public management reformatted the nature of 
public policy along the lines of information-led strategic decision-making. The vast increase of 
information processing that governance brought with it was not to act as market-proxies. It 
was to feed the decision-making machine of public management that was sweeping state 
institutions.  
This chapter has provided a new theoretical framing of the governance turn as a 
managerial reformatting of policy-making that responded to a governmental dilemma over the 
political purpose of public finance. The chapter has provided an alternative way to look at 
governance as planning that subsequent chapters will analyse in relation to the EU. Indeed, as 
this chapter discussed, the managerial reformatting of policy-making proved highly attractive 
to IOs. In the next four chapters, I will demonstrate how in the turn to governance in the EU, 
the techniques of public management were integral to deal with the troubled construction of 
supranational authority in Europe. In the next chapter, I unravel the challenges of 
supranational authority that integration posed in the 1990s that corresponded to the national 
problems of public finance described in this chapter. Later chapters will then show how public 
management offered a response.  
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PART II - Governance and Dilemmas of Supranational 




Chapter 3: How to Govern a Continent? 
 
Introduction 
“But integration is not an automatic process. It must be deliberately managed; and 
effective management is becoming more important, not less”  (Metcalfe, 1992) 
 
As the previous chapter established, the rise of a governance paradigm spoke to how IOs were 
mobilising managerial techniques drawn from a history of budgetary planning to gain a stake 
in national policy-making. By reformatting the work of international policy-making along 
managerial lines, IOs could position themselves as comparative policy evaluators, 
benchmarkers of performance, or centres of strategy. In this way, new managerial techniques 
coming out of budgetary planning offered a solution to a longstanding dilemma of 
supranational authority – IO’s dependence and exteriority to nation-states. Few IOs possess 
an independent means to raise and administer their own resources sufficient to match the scope 
of their policy obligations. In addition, IOs lack the infrastructural power to enforce their 
desires. Instead, compliance with international agreements relies on the agreement and coercive 
infrastructures of national states. 
The EU is an exemplary case of an IO facing this dilemma. When the Treaty of Paris 
was signed in 1951, creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the ambition 
of many of its federalist architects like Jean Monnet was for a United States of Europe. Instead, 
national government opposition meant European integration spent much of the twentieth 
century as a patchwork of overlapping IOs like the European Economic Community, Western 
European Union, Council of Europe, or European Atomic Agency covering security, 
economic, or technological cooperation at different levels of intensity. The 1990s brought 
something different. The creation of the EU in 1992 at Maastricht set in motion an integration 
project that consolidated many earlier efforts and represented a major shift in sovereign 
authority to supranational institutions.  
The Union has many resemblances of a state. It has a judicial and legislative system, 
which gradually gained in political status through a combination of the ECJ’s judicial activism 
and the introduction of European elections in 1979. Since the end of the millennium the Union 
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has a single currency and market, with free movement of goods, people, and capital. The Union 
is involved in an increasing number of policy issues like competition and market regulation, 
external trade, and monetary affairs. In addition, it has responsibility to coordinate the 
macroeconomic, social, and welfare arrangements of heterogenous member states.  
Unlike a state though, the Union has little of the fiscal clout familiar to national 
governments. The EU has little capacity to raise its own finance, and the financial resources it 
does possess are meagre compared to the fiscal responsibilities expected of a monetary union. 
To this extent, the EU faces a dilemma familiar to many other IOs. For much critical literature 
on the EU, this fact is explained as an outcome of the triumph of a neoliberal project of market-
led integration that internationally constitutionalised markets (van Apeldoorn, 2003; 
Warlouzet, 2018). Rather than building a supranational fiscal capacity, in this framing, the EU 
uses international rules to constitutionalise austerity. And yet, these neoliberal rules have never 
worked as intended. The limited legal authority of the EU to enforce the SGP meant the spirit 
of the EU’s austerity rules were abandoned after only a few years in the mid-2000s. Again, this 
is an experience familiar to other IOs that lack an independent coercive infrastructure to 
implement policy. While the EU’s deep market integration and monetary union resembled the 
creation of a supranational state, its institutions continued to be haunted by the headaches of 
an IO.  
This chapter will argue that the governance turn the EU took at the end of the 
millennium must be placed in this historical grounding of the dilemma of supranational 
authority. The chapter will make the argument in three steps. First, the chapter will show how, 
in the early years of integration, the limited policy responsibilities of the European Commission 
meant its organisational capacity was poor but of less relevance. A string of reports in the 
1960s-1980s highlighted an organisation with serious management flaws. In particular, the 
Delors Commission (1985-1994), famous for relaunching integration in the 1980s with the 
Single Market plan, came in for sharp criticism. Before Maastricht the Commission viewed 
itself not as an institution that governed, but as an entrepreneurial motor of ‘ever closer union’. 
As a result, before Maastricht, issues of capacity were only an internal and technical concern 
for the Commission. 
Second, the chapter will argue that after Maastricht the question of supranational 
governing capacity became pressing. I show how, in contrast to a neoliberal perspective on 
European integration as a process of marketization, a public management community was 
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diagnosing a ‘management deficit’ facing European institutions. A major voice in this was Les 
Metcalfe. In the opening quote, Metcalfe expressed how the requirements of Europe’s 
supranational institutions had changed. The policy responsibilities created for European 
institutions with the creation of the EMU meant the capacity of the European Commission 
moved from a minor technical issue to a major political concern. A particular concern of the 
public management community was that the instrument of law that neoliberal integration relied 
upon was inadequate to the modern requirements of international policy-making. 
Finally, the chapter elaborates this management deficit in the realm of fiscal policy. 
I show how the Commission was asked to coordinate the fiscal affairs of member states in the 
EMU without a budget of its own and in the face of fierce resistance to the legal instruments 
of the SGP. At the same time, the Commission’s archaic internal financial management 
procedures were increasingly coming in for criticism, culminating in the fraud crisis in 1999 
and the fall of the Santer Commission. The significance of the crisis of internal financial 
management in the Commission and budgetary coordination of the SGP reflected how the 
connections between budgeting and management became a major political crisis at the turn of 
the millennium in the EU. The chapter therefore provides the historical grounding of the 
challenge of building supranational authority in the absence of an adequate financial and legal 
infrastructure that the later turn to ‘governance’ responded to. 
 
 
3.1 Governing Europe Before Maastricht 
Since the early years of European integration in the 1950s its political stakes have been cast as 
the balance of power between intergovernmental and supranational institutions. In legal terms, 
supranational institutions in the early years of integration through the EEC gained increasing 
formal authority over a range of policy issues like external tariffs or market competition. But it 
was a striking feature of the European project, from the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the 
EEC to the Treaty of Maastricht creating the EU in 1992, that the governing capacity of 
supranational institutions has been remarkably neglected. The European Commission may have 





European Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur on the Margins 
Before the 1970s, the capacity of European institutions was a peripheral question. 
Indeed, the early Commission had explicitly eschewed a management function. In the 
negotiations on the Treaty of Rome, creating the EEC, organisational issues ‘were perhaps given 
the lowest priorities’ (Cini, 1996, p. 13). In a pattern often repeated in European integration, the 
Treaty of Rome largely consisted of ‘general statements concerning objectives and intentions’ 
that ‘actually left virtually everything to be done’ (Dedman, 2010, p. 83). 
It was French planner Jean Monnet who set the tone and trajectory of early European 
administration. Monnet favoured the ad hoc and flexible when it came to organisation. He was 
President of the forerunner to the European Commission, the High Authority of ECSC. As 
President of the ECSC, Monnet envisaged an organisation that was ‘small, flexible, personalised, 
and non-hierarchical’ (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 15). Monnet’s approach to the ECSC was 
forward looking, he ‘had less interest in the increasingly bureaucratic management of the 
common market than in its establishment’ (Heyen, 1993, p. 42). The result was that Monnet 
came to personally embody the High Authority as an organisation. Hoping the ECSC was a step 
on the road to political and economic union in Europe, Monnet wanted to avoid prejudging this 
development by imposing a rigid bureaucratic architecture onto the fledging High Authority. 
Monnet was therefore ‘apprehensive about the emergence of administrative rigidities’ (Stevens 
& Stevens, 2001, p. 29). In his own words, Monnet argued that ‘under no circumstances will we 
create an administration’ (Seidel, 2010, p. 31). The goal for Monnet was not to create a 
bureaucracy for an international organisation, but to create an engine for a United States of 
Europe. 
In any case, Monnet had little experience with organisational planning. Monnet had 
decades of experience at the highest level of political and administrative office, most prominently 
being the chief of the post-war French planning bureau, the Commissariat général du Plan (CGP). 
He had, however, been catapulted to these positions by the force of his vision and networking 
prowess. As a result, he operated largely detached from the day-to-day mundanities of organising 
a bureaucracy. The result of his informality was an overreliance on the personal drive of Monnet 
and other key officials. The absence of formal structures led to ‘overlapping, duplication and 
confusion’ at the ECSC (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 16). For example, a Belgian auditor, 
contracted to review the finances of the High Authority, was left with an impression ‘of such 
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disorder and confusion that he thought the task was desperate’, eventually pleading with Belgian 
banks to lend additional auditors for the task (Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 28). 
This organisational pattern was carried into the European Commission when it was 
created through the 1957 Treaty of Rome, establishing the EEC. The Treaty of Rome was 
inconclusive on the question of how to establish a supranational governance capacity. On one 
side, governments chose to clip the wings of executive discretion held by the Commission 
compared to its predecessor the High Authority of the ECSC. Unlike the High Authority, the 
Commission had none of its own resources and little budgetary flexibility (Seidel, 2010, p. 68). 
Nevertheless, there were efforts to bureaucratise the Commission beyond the ad hoc High 
Authority. The administrative culture set by Monnet was, however, only partially dissipated. The 
first president of the Commission, Walter Hallstein (1958-1967), shared with Monnet a zeal for 
integration and a strong sense of self-importance concerning his role within it. Hallstein was apt 
to describe himself as Europe’s prime minister, much to the enragement of French President 
De Gaulle. Nevertheless, Hallstein put far greater credence than Monnet on the institutional 
coherence of the Commission. For Hallstein, the aim ‘was to create a truly European public 
service’, moving from ‘fluid processes to bureaucratic procedures’ (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, pp. 
17–18). In stamping this institutional structure, Hallstein ‘brought to the EEC the hierarchical 
traditions of the German administration’ (Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 30).  
To achieve this, the Dutch management consultancy Bosboom en Wegener was 
commissioned to review the Commission’s administrative structures. Their report of August 
1959 reflected the bureaucratic zeitgeist of the time, proposing ‘better horizontal coordination 
between services and more efficient division of work among DGs [Directorates-General]… to 
allocate responsibility’ (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 16). Along these lines, early reforms to the 
Commission saw staff regulations brought in, codified procedures for hiring and firing, work 
allocations set among departments and procedures formalised, dispensing with the informal 
working arrangements of Monnet’s High Authority. 
Administrative reform in the Commission at this time though was less interested in 
governing capacity and more in the optimum organigram that would balance national 
representation and efficient task distribution. The early Commission had little interest in the 
tedium of policy management. Instead, the institution continued to view its function as 
entrepreneurial policy initiation – launching grand initiatives and battling with national 
governments to push integration forward. A report from the 1960 Comité de rationalisation made 
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this clear. It was argued that the Commission’s task was ‘about initiation rather than decision 
and management… without any relay from conception or negotiation tasks to managerial ones’ 
(Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 17). On this basis, the early Commission primarily saw itself as an 
‘administration de mission’ (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011). It was responsible through political 
entrepreneurship for the launching of policy initiatives tied to the personality of the president 
towards the goal of ever closer union. The question of administrative capacity and reach was 
marginal. What was important at this time was the creation of new European policies, not their 
administration. 
The  Commission’s entrepreneurial pursuit of deepened integration through grand 
initiative has long been held as the source of the institution’s power. In terms of the 
Commission’s infrastructural capacity, however, the reliance on initiative is in many ways a 
testament to just how weak the organisation was as a supranational authority, far removed from 
the locus of state power. From its inception, the Commission was administratively peripheral. 
The EEC had been created in 1956 to deal with regional competition under post-war US 
hegemony. Through a loose customs union, the EEC provided a framework of intra-
European/Eurafrican trade that could drive levels of economic growth to fund emergent welfare 
systems and colonial development (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2015; Milward, 2000). The first decade 
of integration was therefore focused on realising the core of the Treaty of Rome. Internal tariffs 
were to be lowered and collective external tariffs negotiated. By the late 1960s, this task had been 
largely completed and European institutions were somewhat bereft of purpose. 
The 1960s saw efforts to turn the Commission from an organisation without a task 
into a machine of European planning. French economist and Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECFIN), Robert Marjolin, attempted as much in the 1960s (Warlouzet, 2018). 
But there was little interest from member states in extending supranational governance. Instead, 
the 1960s and 1970s were a period of tumultuous inter-state negotiations and the marginalisation 
of European institutions. Epitomising this, the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965 saw French President 
De Gaulle boycotting European institutions in protest at a proposed package of reforms from 
the Commission to expand its budgetary autonomy and reduce the irrelevance of the European 
Parliament. Lacking any institutional levers, and politically marginalised by the empty chair crisis, 
the Commission’s efforts at launching grand policy initiatives were a stab in the dark rather than 
a source of empowerment. Dedman, for example, describes how Roy Jenkins launched a project 
for monetary union in 1977 ‘apparently to counter the tedium of being President of the 
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European Commission’ (Dedman, 2010, p. 111). The launch of the European Council in 1975 
confirmed the marginalisation of the Commission and the displacement of the supranational 
authority of the Commission in the trajectory of European integration (Cini, 1996, p. 52).  
 
Growing Governance Burden of European Institutions 
The early Commission’s political marginalisation had made matters of supranational 
capacity of relatively little concern. This situation began to change around the 1970s. Growing 
policy programmes meant the Commission was gaining increasing responsibilities to discharge 
policy functions and not just lobby for new European projects. The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) was introduced in 1962, eating the majority of the EEC’s budget. The creation of the 
European Regional Development Fund in 1975 considerably increased the responsibility of the 
Commission to supervise the allocation of resources to the Community’s neediest regions. These 
growing responsibilities meant the organisational state of the EEC’s institutions was of growing 
concern. Alongside this, ideas circulating in the 1970s over possible political and economic union 
in Europe meant the question of the kinds of supranational authority that would be required in 
such a project began to be addressed. While ideas of such a union imagined a vast empowerment 
of supranational capacities, evaluations of the state of the Commission’s organisation was 
pointing to serious concerns. 
The idea of fiscal and monetary union had been most prominently first raised in the 
1970 Werner Report. The report foresaw that a union would require substantial new 
supranational capacities to manage it. Namely, if Europe’s economies and currencies were to be 
united, then there needed to be sufficient financial firepower to cope. The Werner Report was 
explicit that ‘in the long run it [EMU] cannot do without’ political union, in terms of full 
budgetary integration, common financial supervision, and capital tax harmonisation (Werner, 
1970, p. 12). Building on this, the 1977 MacDougall Report imagined what a community fiscal 
policy would have to look like to make the EMU work (European Commission, 1977). The 
report foresaw big transfers of fiscal capacity to the community level for the purposes of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and resource redistribution. Donald MacDougall later wrote about 
the report that not even ‘the relatively modest Community budget we were proposing would be 
nearly sufficient to sustain a monetary union’ (MacDougall, 1992, p. 65).  
It was not only federalist policy-makers, however, that foresaw the need for a vast 
empowerment of supranational authorities to make a single currency viable. For many neoliberal 
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economists and thinkers, monetary union would bring with it an unsavoury pooling of national 
budgets. For this reason, most neoliberals opposed it. Friedrich von Hayek, in a 1976 publication 
for the Institute for Economic Affairs, was sharply opposed to any ‘utopian European Monetary 
Unit’ (von Hayek, 1976, p. 17). Rather than a single currency, von Hayek instead proposed a 
monetary system of competing private currencies issued by banks. Milton Friedman was also 
critical of monetary union. He argued that ‘Europe’s common market exemplifies a situation 
that is unfavourable to a common currency’ (Friedman, 1997).  
While 1970s proposals for economic union assumed the need for a massive 
empowerment of supranational authority in budgetary terms, the state of the European 
Commission to discharge its existing policy responsibilities was beginning to be seriously 
questioned. The early 1970s had seen a transformation in the way the Community was financed. 
The Council decision of 21 April 1970 had introduced the financing of the Community not just 
through national financial contributions, but ‘own resources’ for supranational institutions 
drawn from external tariff levies and, later, a slice of VAT revenue. The turn to an independently, 
yet meagrely, financed European Commission led to pressure from national governments for a 
more rational use of Community resources. A similar point had previously been made as early 
as 1960. The 1960 Comité de rationalisation had complained that the Commission put little effort 
into rationally prioritising its work, ‘instead treating all aspects of the EEC treaty as equally 
important’ (Seidel, 2010, p. 104).  
Meeting the governmental tribute for financial autonomy, the Commission agreed on 
14 October 1970 to experiment with the latest techniques of budgetary planning through 
adoption of PPBS (European Commission, 1971, p. 373). PPBS was meant to bring greater 
accountability to the Commission’s use of resources by placing them on the rational footing of 
systems analysis (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 29). As within national governments, the turn to 
PPBS within the Commission was short lived. The fact that it was proposed though reflected a 
concern that the Commission as an organisation had little coherence and capacity to perform its 
responsibilities in an effective way. In the early years of the Commission this had not mattered 
so much. But, as supranational institutions gained in responsibilities, it was a growing concern.  
The internal managerial pressures on the Commission was most prominently made at 
the end of the 1970s with the 1978 Spierenburg Report. More than any report previously, the 
Spierenburg Report critiqued the Commission for neglecting a management function in its work, 
distinct from its self-perceived role as a policy entrepreneur (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, pp. 28, 34).  
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The report pointed to how ‘the Commission is being managed in a manner and with techniques 
which are inappropriate’ given its growing tasks (Spierenburg, 1979, p. 4). Senior management 
was singled out in the report. In a critique of the preference given to policy initiation, the report 
argued that Director-Generals are ‘of course responsible for directing the conceptual work of 
his [sic.] department, but he should not on that account neglect his duties of management, which 
are equally important’ (Spierenburg, 1979, p. 18). Spierenburg argued that in future ‘it should not 
be possible for anyone to be appointed Head of Division (and a fortiori to a higher position) 
unless he has shown aptitude for management’ (Spierenburg, 1979, p. 24). Seeking to counter 
the way in which the Commission had developed policy specialists holding siloed positions of 
high authority, the report argued that a managerial authority could be enhanced by enforcing 
mobility across the Commission, such that ‘a Head of Division should also have had experience 
throughout his [sic.] career of several different sectors of the Commission activities’ 
(Spierenburg, 1979, p. 24). This focus on mobility would be a key feature of the later Kinnock 
Reforms in an attempt to displace perceived ‘policy experts’ from their institutional castles.  
Very little of the Spierenburg Report was taken onboard (Cram, 2001, p. 778). Instead, 
the arrival of Jacques Delors to the Commission in 1985 brought an almost total neglect of the 
organisation’s management structures, while exponentially increasing the Commission’s tasks 
first with 1986 Single European Act (SEA) and later with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Delors’ 
leadership style was fiercely hierarchal and personal. Built around a powerful central apparatus 
of political cabinets outside the formal hierarchies of the Commission bureaucracy, Delors’ 
administrative machine was built on personal connections to key individuals centred on his 
powerful lieutenant Pascal Lamy (Ross, 1995, p. 68). George Ross describes how Delors’ Cabinet 
members ‘were believers and dedicated activists for the cause, not simply civil servants’ (Ross, 
1995, p. 68). While conducive to the singular drive and direction emblematic of the Delors 
Commission, the result was a neglect of the Commission’s management structures (Ross, 1995, 
p. 68). Instead, Delors ‘preferred to set up informal short-cuts in policy conception and decision-
making in order to achieve his goals’ (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 42). Some officials were 
concerned that the Commission’s basic organisation was being undermined under Delors. One 
argued that ‘by relying excessively on informal channels, the formal channels have become 
atrophied’ (Grant, 1994, p. 112). 
Most problematic for the Commission was financial management. The 1970 proposals 
for monetary union had proposed the need for substantial new budgetary powers for 
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supranational authorities, and the road to the EMU in the 1990s suggested European institutions 
would find themselves responsible for the budgetary and economic coordination of half a 
continent. The experience of the Delors Commission, however, revealed the Commission was 
an organisation that could barely cope with its own financial affairs, let alone the budgetary 
affairs of a monetary union.  
The Commission’s financial management tasks had grown considerably over the 1960s 
and 1970s with new funds and policy programmes. Post-Maastricht, they were to grow even 
more. At a time where NPM reforms were sweeping OECD countries, the Commission’s 
procedures for processing transactions (let alone administering any kind of budgetary planning) 
were archaic (Kassim et al., 2013, p. 212). The Commission had repeatedly toyed with developing 
modern financial management practices. PPBS had been officially adopted in the 1970s. Efforts 
to reform the Commission’s financial systems were, however, undermined by member state 
opposition to the expansion of the EEC’s budgetary autonomy. Repeated proposals from the 
Commission to broaden its budgetary capacity were vociferously rebutted by the Council, most 
notably precipitating the 1965 Empty Chair Crisis. Delors himself had attempted to settle 
budgetary conflicts in the EEC with the 1988 Delors I Package, followed up by the Delors II 
Package in 1992. 
While the EEC’s financial duties increased through the 1970s, the neglect of the 
administrative requirements of this, and the refusal of the Council to countenance them, meant 
the Commission turned to more ad hoc organisational methods. Among the most infamous of 
these were the so-called ‘mini-budgets’ of Delors. Facing the refusal of the Council to fund 
additional staff, the Delors Commission simply reallocated funds from operational budgets, 
meant for direct use in policy programmes, to cover administrative costs (Stevens & Stevens, 
2001, p. 95). This reached a greater level of formalisation with emergence of Technical 
Assistance Offices (TAOs) under Delors. These were a mechanism of informal and sporadic 
contracting out of administrative services to external firms that became the norm within the 
Commission during the 1980s. The heavy use of TAOs created a mess of contracts servicing 
some of the EEC’s biggest programmes. The informality of the system meant they were 
impossible to accurately count, let alone audit. Indeed, it was from many of such financial 
management practices that fraud allegations would later surface in the 1990s.  
The Delors Commission thus suffered from a ‘culture of “adhocness”’ (Schön-
Quinlivan, 2011, p. 42). With a meagre budget, and growing tasks, the Commission found itself 
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‘incapable of adequately discharging the new “competences” it claimed after 1986’ following the 
SEA (Gillingham, 2003, p. 159). In a note to the incoming Santer Commission, Commissioner 
Peter Schmidhuber, responsible for the EU budget under Delors, ‘highlighted problems of 
budget planning, implementation, evaluation and financial control’ (Laffan, 1997, p. 430). 
Likewise, in 1994, in a confidential internal note reflecting on the state of the Commission at the 
end of Delors’ tenure, it was highlighted that ‘current administrative and managerial structure of 
the Commission is recognisably that of 20 or 30 years ago, despite the more than doubling of 
the number of member states and the greatly increased responsibilities delegated to it’ (European 
Commission, 1994). The note went on to complain there had been a ‘general undervaluing of 
management’. The Delors Commission was an organisation riddled by duplicated activity, 
unclear staffing levels and task designation, borderline (and sometimes explicit) fraud. When 
grilled by journalists about fraud and mismanagement accusations surrounding the Commission 
in 1999, Commission President Santer told them to ‘ask my predecessor’, Delors (Tucker, 1999). 
By the 1990s, then, the European Commission was facing a serious management crisis. 
The early Commission’s management capacities were acceptably ignored, given its limited role 
in governance within the customs union of the EEC. In contrast, by the 1980s the Commission 
was administering a range policy programmes and yet the organisation’s structure had hardly 
changed. Opposed to substantially empowering supranational authorities budgetarily or 
administratively, national governments nevertheless continued to give the Commission an 
increasing numbers of tasks. In the 1980s, the Delors Commission had attempted to compensate 
for this through sheer will and political zeal. The effect, however, was to compound rather than 
resolve the Commission’s management problems.  
The 1980s/1990s seemingly offered one solution to this crisis of management within 
European institutions in the form of neoliberal marketization. The Thatcher and transnational 
capitalist-led proposals for a Single Market put aside Marjolin’s 1960s proposals for a European 
planning capacity or Werner’s proposals for supranational budgetary authority. Instead, 
deepened marketization in Europe would intensify the removal of barriers between the nations 
of the EEC and strip back Brussels bureaucracy. One might have presumed that in the drive for 
marketization growing questions of supranational administration would become redundant once 
more. If the EEC was to become a market-led project, European policy programmes were more 
likely to be cut than requiring improved management. In reality, the rise of ‘neoliberal’ 
integration at the end of the 1980s, culminating in the creation of the European Union at 
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Maastricht in 1992, opened renewed questions of a ‘management deficit’ facing supranational 
authorities. This time, management would become not just an internal or technical concern. It 
framed the biggest political crisis the Commission had faced as an organisation in its history. 
 
 
3.2 A Market Without Management?  
The 1980s marked a major shift in the shape of European integration. What had become in the 
1960s and 1970s a stalling project of inter-governmental disputes, mega projects going nowhere, 
and archaic supranational institutions was rejuvenated through a mission for completing the 
single market proposed at Rome in the 1950s. In the eyes of scholars, European integration in 
the 1980s took a decidedly neoliberal shift away from visions of supranational authority and 
instead to the market. John Grahl and Paul Teague, for example, observed that the 1980s ‘will 
doubtless be the decade of the market’ (Grahl & Teague, 1990, pp. 17–18). Likewise, van 
Apeldoorn argued that the period was defined by ‘negative integration… more market and less 
state at all levels of the EU’ (van Apeldoorn, 2003, pp. 80–81). Perry Anderson similarly 
observed that neoliberal integration launched meant not ‘a superstate, but less state’ (Anderson, 
2009, p. 30). For a growing community of public managers, however, ‘negative integration’ in 
the 1980s/1990s did not imply a withdrawal of the state, it posed serious challenges of 
governance. Metcalfe, a major voice of European public management, spoke after Maastricht of 
a growing ‘management deficit’ facing supranational institutions that had been building since the 
1970s (Metcalfe, 1992). 
 
The Rise of ‘Neoliberal’ Market Integration 
The 1980s saw the rise of a neoliberal perspective on the direction European integration 
should go. Most prominently giving voice to this perspective was the corporate executive 
planning body, the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). The ERT was founded in 
1983 upon the initiative of Pehr Gyllenhammar (then CEO of Volvo), with the encouragement 
of the European Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Etienne Davignon. Since the industrial 
cartel project of the ECSC, European integration had always been a corporate project. The ERT 
was, however, something different. Previous decades of European integration had seen big 
business largely ignoring European institutions, instead holding onto privileged access to 
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national governments within domestic corporatist structures. Moreover, the Vredeling Directive 
from the European Commission in the early 1980s had ‘temporarily slammed the door on 
cooperation with big business’ (Gillingham, 2003, p. 238). The directive proposed a mandatory 
system of employee consultation and co-management for multinationals operating in Europe. 
Its effect was that in the early 1980s European institutions were seen by big business as more of 
a threat than a space to influence. Ironically, it was the controversy of the Vredeling directive’s 
proposal that directed a significant reorientation of corporate lobbying activity to the European 
level (Gillingham, 2003, p. 238). US multinationals in particular began pouring funds into 
lobbying European institutions in reaction to the, ultimately unsuccessful, directive (Danis & 
Hoffmann, 1995).  
The ERT emerged from this context. It differed significantly, however, from the 
European employer associations that predominated at the time. Indeed, it was founded on the 
premise that the dominant European business groups ‘were poorly run organizations that could 
not promote a major European initiative’ (Cowles, 1995, p. 504). Unlike a traditional corporatist 
employer organisation, membership of the ERT was personal – individual CEOs of Europe’s 
largest companies were represented rather than the companies themselves. Indeed, Cowles 
describes how the ‘first list of potential industry members was drawn up in 1982 in the 
Commission’s Berlaymont building by Volvo and Commission staff (Cowles, 1995, p. 504). In 
the makeup of the ERT, the ‘concept of “industrialist” was all important’ (Richardson, 2000, p. 
10). Members came from Europe’s largest industrial corporations, such as Thyssen, Fiat, 
Siemens, Volvo, Shell, and Nestlé. The ERT, then, represented a novel means for the expression 
of corporate interests. Executives stepped outside of the traditional corporatist structures that 
were then breaking down across Europe and directed themselves personally to EU policy-
makers. 
For the corporate executives of the ERT, Europe of the 1970s was facing a crisis of 
Eurosclerosis. The term was coined by economist Herbert Giersch at a Mont Pélerin Society 
lecture delivered in Sydney in 1985. Eurosclerosis captured what were seen as a collection of 
rigidities between Europe’s economies. Internally, ‘unemployment has become Europe’s 
economic problem No.1’ (Giersch, 1985, p. 4). Indeed, almost full employment post-war had 
been replaced in the 1970s with rates averaging 12 percent, and inflation rates ranging around 9-
18 percent (Grahl & Teague, 1990). Explaining this, Giersch pointed to the usual culprits of 
neoliberal critique: rigid labour markets, overly powerful unions, and a bloated public sector.  
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Between Europe’s economies, Giersch bemoaned the inadequacy of the common 
market. Harmonisation covered only a fraction of industries. Non-tariff barriers were said to be 
undermining the coherence of those industries already integrated. Non-tariff barriers had been 
steadily raised across Europe throughout the 1970s (Gillingham, 2003, p. 108). Using highly-
specified safety and environmental protections that EEC institutions could not keep pace with 
harmonising, Europe’s states had hoped to shelter domestic industries from regional 
competition during the tumultuous 1970s while staying within the rules of the Common Market 
(Dedman, 2010, p. 113). The result for Giersch was a continental economic crisis. Chronic 
underperformance was said to plague Europe’s economies in relation to the past successes of 
the 1950s and global competition being felt from the US and Japan.  
Eurosclerosis became a rallying call for Europe’s neoliberal ideologues and corporate 
executives of the ERT (van Apeldoorn, 2003, p. 67). The proposals in response were to wipe 
away Europe’s non-tariff barriers and shed labour regulations. Most notably, the so-called 
‘Dekker Paper’ proposed a series of measures to realise market integration.11 The paper is 
described by Cowles as ‘revolutionary… because it produced what had escaped national and 
European policy-makers – a simple plan for a unified market’ (Cowles, 1995, p. 514). Through 
their proximity to the upper echelons of European institutions and national governments, the 
ERT played a key role in raising a renewal of economic integration to the top of the European 
political agenda, as well as engaging in active lobbying efforts to push it through European 
institutions. The Dekker Paper was a key vehicle around which, after much ERT lobbying, 
national capitals and the Delors Commission drove forward the Single Market agenda in the 
1980s. To this extent, Keith Richardson argued ‘the Single Market is the brightest battle–honour 
on the ERT flag, surely the most clear–cut example of success’ of their influence (Richardson, 
2000, p. 24).  
Alongside this corporate push, efforts to realise the promise of Rome had been 
ongoing for years within European institutions. The Commission was fully aware that nontariff 
market barriers created in the tumult of the 1970s economic crisis were undermining the 
Common Market’s coherence (Gillingham, 2003, p. 232). The Kangaroo Group, formed in the 
European Parliament after the first direct elections of 1979, had been pushing already for several 
years for an intensified effort at completing the Common Market through a removal of barriers 
 
11 The paper was named after Wisse Dekker, the chair of Philips and the ERT in the 1980s 
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to trade and freedom of movement. Thatcher’s confidante Lord Cockfield, upon taking office 
within Delors Commission as Commissioner for Internal Market, immediately issued a White 
Paper on Completing the Internal Market in June 1985. The paper listed 300 detailed legislative 
measures to unify the fragmented Common Market.  The White Paper laid the groundwork for 
the passage of the SEA in 1986. The SEA set a deadline of 1992 for the completion of a 
harmonised Single Market in the EEC, removing all remaining barriers to trade. Alongside this, 
the 1988 Cecchini Report discussed the ’costs of non-Europe’, offering a landmark economic 
analysis costing barriers to trade and the growth potential that was possible through regulatory 
subtraction or ‘negative integration’ (Cecchini et al., 1988).  
By the 1990s, then, European integration had seemingly gone neoliberal.  The Single 
Market was rapidly nearing completion. The non-tariff barriers between countries of the newly 
created EU were to establish a single space of capitalist accumulation. External tariffs were being 
slashed in the shadow of the new WTO, embracing the market forces of globalization. The move 
to the EMU, agreed at Maastricht in 1992, promised to liberalise capital movements across the 
Union. Previous attempts at integration in the 1960s and 1970s based on ideas to bolster the 
capacities of supranational institutions were dropped. Instead, the turn to market-led neoliberal 
integration was slashing barriers between states, seemingly leaving supranational institutions with 
nothing to do but get out of the way. And yet, for a group of public managers, a very different 
perspective on the neoliberal turn to integration was forming. Rather than marketization 
diminishing the role of the EU’s supranational institutions, it was compounding its management 
problems. 
 
Follies of Negative Integration  
Public managers in the 1990s began speaking of a ‘management deficit’ facing European 
institutions. The term was coined by Les Metcalfe (Metcalfe, 1992). Metcalfe had previously 
been a vocal commentator and participant in NPM reforms in the UK, having spent time within 
Thatcher’s Efficiency Unit (Metcalfe & Richards, 1990). Later, he would become an important 
figure in theorising ‘governance’, apt to make cybernetic metaphors to describe changes that 
were taking place to public administration (Metcalfe, 1993). In the 1990s, Metcalfe was Professor 
of Public Administration within the Management Unit of the European Institute of Public 
Administration (EIPA). The institute was a major centre of public management research and 
practice. It had been set up in 1981 through European funding as a training centre for civil 
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servants within the EEC. Through exchanges, trainings, and reports EIPA’s mission was to 
diffuse the latest management techniques to Europe’s civil servants, with a particular focus on 
implementing Community legislation. To this extent, EIPA’s manta was ‘managing European 
policies’ (Interview 3, EIPA official). Major figures of international public management passed 
through EIPA at various stages, delivering training or writing reports. The policy analyst 
Yehezhel Dror delivered crisis-management workshops for senior Commission civil servants 
(Interview 3, EIPA official). Aaron Wildavsky collaborated on a report on implementing 
budgetary reforms under the EMU (Wildavsky & Zapico-Goñi, 1993).  
At EIPA, Metcalfe wrote extensively on questions of public management within the new 
EU. What he saw concerned him. Metcalfe observed that within the high-level political 
negotiations at Maastricht, and the drive for a market-led path of integration, there was ‘a 
widening gap between increasing responsibilities and the limited capacities for fulfilling them’ 
(Metcalfe, 1996a). As European institutions were increasingly being charged with governing a 
single currency and market, Metcalfe considered that ‘there is hardly any serious discussion of 
whether the EC is equipped to handle its new tasks’ (Metcalfe, 1992). Delors was a prime target 
of this. Metcalfe wrote ‘Delors capitalized on the strengths of the Commission but did little to 
remedy its weaknesses’ (Metcalfe, 1996b, p. 53). Taking particular flak was Pascal Lamy, Delors’ 
chef de cabinet. Metcalfe accused him of a ‘disdainful and simplistic attitude to the whole question 
of management’ (ibid.).  
For some time, Metcalfe was a ‘lone voice who has identified the management 
problems of the Union’ (Laffan, 1997, p. 425). As the decade progressed, however, a chorus of 
public managers queried the management capacities of European institutions to cope with 
neoliberal integration (Laffan, 1997; Pappas, 1992; Stevens & Stevens, 1997). European 
institutions were likewise not blind to the widening management deficit. Already in 1992 the 
Sutherland Report pointed out the oncoming managerial challenges that neoliberal integration 
would pose (Sutherland, 1992b). In a speech to EIPA, the author of the report, former 
Competition Commissioner and Irish banker Peter Sutherland, posed the same question as 
Metcalfe: ‘the responsibilities of the Commission for making European policies work in practice 
have been increased. The main question we have to ask is whether there are the capacities to 
match the increased competence?’ (Sutherland, 1992a).  
For Metcalfe, rather than being a process of subtraction, or even re-regulation, 
‘negative integration’ required substantial new active management capacities at a European level. 
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Metcalfe argued that ‘integration was not an automatic process. It must be deliberately managed; 
and effective management is becoming more important, not less’ (Metcalfe, 1992, p. 117). Riffing 
off Milton Friedman’s ‘There’s no such thing as a free lunch’, Metcalfe argued ‘There’s no such 
thing as a free market’. The ‘transaction costs of creating and managing the market framework 
and maintaining the institutional infrastructure at the European level’ were a neglected but 
crucial element of the move towards the single market (Metcalfe, 1992, p. 122).  
Whereas the ERT and neoliberal economists pronounced the creation of the Single 
Market as a straightforward step of either removing obstacles or enshrining new rules in 
international constitution, Metcalfe highlighted the active elements of management that were 
needed to govern effectively within the new EU: ‘positive integration is essential to establish and 
maintain the framework for negative integration. The latter cannot proceed without the former” 
(Metcalfe, 1992, p. 122). This went beyond an ordoliberal concern with framework tweaking to 
preserve stability. It was a call for active steering to achieve desired policy outcomes. On this 
basis, Metcalfe argued that ‘the biggest danger in European governance is not excessive control, 
as Europhobes fear, but the opposite – fragmentation. The EU is undermanaged rather than 
overmanaged’ (Metcalfe, 2001, p. 434). 
 
 
3.3 The Inadequacy of Law for Supranational Governance 
In pointing to the ‘management deficit’ of European institutions, public managers in the 1990s 
were highlighting the need for capacities qualitatively different from those of neo/ordoliberals. 
Scholars of neoliberalism have highlighted the primacy of law and constitution in the making of 
neoliberal integration as a process of ‘encasing’ or ‘constitutionalising’ markets (Gill, 1998; 
Slobodian, 2018). For the public managers of the 1990s, however, it was precisely the inadequacy 
of law as an instrument of international regulation that was compounding the EU’s crisis of 
management.  
Since the late 1980s there was a growing anxiety surrounding integration about levels 
of compliance with EU law. Much of the major steps of integration prior to the 1990s was 
propelled by the ECJ’s judicial activism. Notably, the Cassis de Dijon case of the 1970s saw the 
ECJ acting as an agent for marketization through its judgement for the mutual recognition of 
products in the Common Market. By the 1980s, rapid progress to the Single Market had made a 
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growing body of European regulation much more important. In this context, however, public 
management scholars began asking whether the growing body of European law was actually 
being adhered to. An early text from EIPA by Heinrich Siendentopf and Jacques Ziller 
empirically mapped levels of implementation of European Community measures (Siendentopf 
& Ziller, 1988). They found high levels of non-compliance. Later, Maria Mendrinou similarly 
observed that ‘member state non-compliance is a significant system phenomenon in the EU’s 
development’, highlighting the dramatic spike in non-compliance proceeding launched by the 
European Commission since the late-1980s (Mendrinou, 1996, p. 16). Mastenbroek also argued 
that the while formally Single Market legislative provisions were adopted by the 1992 deadline, 
‘member states’ compliance with the programme turned out to be poor’ (Mastenbroek, 2005, p. 
1104). 
Neoliberals saw in law the principle instrument to achieve a market order, constraining 
discretionary state action and insulating a competition principle from popular pressure. But for 
public managers the compliance gap showed how law was limited in providing the infrastructural 
power required to achieve desired policy objectives. Simply strengthening enforcement of the 
EU’s legal provisions was not enough. Instead, the basic instruments of public authority had to 
be questioned. Phedon Nicolaidas and Helen Oberg, for example, wrote for EIPA that harsher 
penalties were unlikely to help the compliance problem since ‘if urging Member States to act in 
the common interest or threatening them with legal action were sufficient, the situation would 
have improved a long time ago’ (Nicolaides & Oberg, 2006, p. 17).  
Instead, the problems of effective implementation provoked a more fundamental 
question within public management communities concerning the adequacy of law. Guy Peters, 
for example, argued ‘legal incorporation does not guarantee that there will actually be effective 
translation of EU laws and policies into action’ (Peters, 1997, p. 190). Similarly, Metcalfe 
highlighted that formal steps in integration through law should not be mistaken for the 
construction of supranational capacities to achieve policy changes domestically. Related to 
constitutional and legal advances in European integration agreed at Maastricht, Metcalfe argued 
that ‘competences, in the sense of formal responsibilities and authority, can be enlarged without 
any corresponding increase in management capacities. There is no automatic connection 
between the two’ (Metcalfe, 1992, p. 117). The challenge was, therefore, not deepening legal 
commitments in a neoliberal sense, but creating the organisational infrastructure to assert a 
European policy agenda along the lines of public management. 
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Voice was also given to this perspective within the heart of European institutions. 
Most notable was the work of La Cellule de prospective/Forward Studies Unit (FSU), an internal 
think tank of the Commission. The FSU was set up in 1989 by Commission President Jacques 
Delors as an internal think-tank for the European Commission. Under the early leadership of 
Jérôme Vignon, its purpose was to provide foresight and planning for the Commission and to 
‘monitor and evaluate European integration’.12 The FSU represented the introduction of policy 
analysis into the Commission (Sherrington, 2000, p. 180). Prospective – or foresight – had a long 
history in France connected to state planning (Andersson, 2018). The FSU was only a tiny part 
of the Commission. It had only around 30 people, most of which were senior civil servants. It 
operated through a flat structure and open remit, unlike the formalised hierarchies found 
elsewhere in the Commission (European Commission, 1999). The FSU’s broad focus set by 
Delors was on issues of European identity, education, economic development, and Community 
enlargement. While formally independent, the FSU was ‘always part of the Delors machine,’ 
pursuing an agenda closely aligned to his personal priorities (Ross, 1995, p. 61). After Delors, 
the FSU became something of an organisational football, with successive presidents renaming 
and restructuring it.13 
In the mid-1990s, the FSU ran a project on ‘Governance’. The project emerged from 
a period of uncertainty for the FSU. The departure of Delors in 1995 left it somewhat isolated 
and bereft of a strategic direction. Facing a need to justify its continued existence, the FSU 
proposed a project exploring governance. This connected with an interest of the incoming Santer 
Commission in management reform and the wider discourse of governance circulating in 
international policy circles at the time, such as at the World Bank (Interview 2, former FSU 
official). To this extent, governance was not a straightforward category to reach for. It was a 
politically expedient project that could provide a new raison d’etre for the FSU that slotted into 
the reformist agenda of the Santer Commission.  
The project consisted of a series of seminars and reports run together with the Centre 
of Philosophy of Law at the Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain). It was coordinated by Dr 
John Paterson (then at UCLouvain) and Notis Lebessis (a Commission official and advisor in the 
FSU). The project brought together a range of scholars and public officials. Participants included 
 
12 See http://ec.europa.eu/archives/cdp/mission/index_en.htm 
13 First into the Group of Policy Advisers under Romano Prodi, then the Bureau of European Policy Advisers under José Manuel Barroso, 
and finally the European Political Strategy Centre under Jean-Claude Juncker 
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many figures of European public management, including Giandomenico Majone, Christopher 
Hood, Jean-Claude Thoenig, Les Metcalfe, and Fritz W. Scharpf. The project of the FSU 
therefore spoke to how public management had a major voice in the 1990s in proposing new 
directions for European institutions. 
 Coming out of the project was a perspective that law was too rigid to govern effectively. 
The fixity of law and bureaucratic regulation meant that regulators were constantly playing catch-
up with what had become dynamic, uncertain, and complex economies and societies. One report 
lamented that law was ‘never taken aback by the circumstances they encounter and which refuse 
to take seriously the complexity of real life’ (De Schutter et al., 2001, p. 25). The belief that law 
could be adequately used as a means of control was considered to be underpinned by a fiction 
‘that phenomena obey laws, that we can update these laws, and that, thanks to the accumulation 
and processing of information, we can use our knowledge to act effectively’ (De Schutter et al., 
2001, p. 18). Similarly, Majone expressed frustration that fixed regulations ‘are largely ineffective 
and intrinsically rigid, and have a built-in tendency to become obsolete rapidly’ (Majone, 1983, 
p. 286). 
More than just the instrument of law being in crisis, the project pointed to a more 
general crisis of the bureaucratic state and representative democracy that mirrored earlier public 
management critiques in the ‘ungovernability’ debates of the 1970s. One FSU report argued that 
‘representative democracy and the bureaucratic state upon which government action has 
traditionally been founded is increasingly inadequate to cope with the scale of the problems 
confronting it’ (Lebessis & Paterson, 1999, p. 27). The result was that ‘the most pressing 
problems of society appear beyond the reach of the political programmes and the bureaucratic 
administrative bodies which have traditionally been deployed to resolve them’ (FSU, 1996). 
Scharpf had previously made a similar point in relation to the EU, conjoining a compliant over 
state capacities with the question of democratic legitimacy. Scharpf argued that the EU’s 
‘problem-solving deficits…present the most serious challenge to the democratic legitimacy of 
the multi-level European polity’ (Scharpf, 1999, p. 3). It was not just law as an instrument that 
was in crisis. It was the entire machinery of the liberal democratic state. 
This perceived crisis among public management of the instruments of public authority 
in the EU became a political crisis over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s. At a time when 
European institutions were being burdened with the task of coordinating the budgetary affairs 
of a single currency, they were denied the principle instrument of public policy in a budget of 
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their own. Moreover, the financial management tasks the Commission was responsible for were 
being run increasingly chaotically, continuing the patterns of Delors. Budgeting thus became for 
the EU a source of political crisis at the turn of the millennium, as its coordination instruments 
fell flat and the Commission became engulfed in a fraud scandal.  The response to this crisis as 
diagnosed by public management is from where the governance agenda arose. 
 
 
3.4 Budgetary Woes of Maastricht 
Budgeting and fiscal policy in the 1990s became a major source of tension in the EU that exposed 
the limits of supranational authority. A supranational budget had been ruled out at Maastricht 
by the central bankers of the 1989 Delors Report, which had designed the path to monetary 
union. Instead rules would coordinate austerity between EU members. The problem, however, 
and as predicted by public management, was that rules proved of little practical use as tools of 
governance. Not only were supranational institutions denied sufficient financial resources, their 
legal authority was given tight constraints by governments refusing to be subject to the sanctions 
of supranational institutions. This refusal came from different perspectives. For a sceptical social 
democratic and trade union movement, European encroachments on national budgeting 
symbolised the submission of democracy to the austerity demands of a corporate elite. For an 
insurgent nationalist movement, the surrendering of taxpayer’s cash to foreign interests was a 
threat to the sovereignty of the blood-bound nation.  Given these political stakes, the rules never 
worked as intended. The convergence criteria to join the EMU was observed as widely gamed 
rather than adhered to. The SGP lasted just a few years before its principle German architect 
was wilfully breaching its limits. 
Alongside the crisis of fiscal coordination, the internal financial management of the 
Commission became an issue at the end of the millennium threatening the integrity of the 
European project. Years of delayed reform and neglect under Delors meant even the minimal 
increase in financial management tasks the Commission was responsible for after Maastricht 
proved too much. After years of complaint, in 1999 the Commission was dogged by a fraud 
scandal that would provoke the unprecedented resignation of the Santer Commission. Reform 
would follow, and improved management would be the solution. By the end of the 1990s, the 
EU faced the dilemma that it lacked sufficient financial resources, legal authority, and the 
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managerial competence to govern in budgetary terms. It was from this crisis that ‘governance’ 
was born, pitching an alternative form of budgeting as planning. 
 
Political Limits to Supranational Authority after Maastricht 
When the path to monetary union was set at Maastricht in 1992, it was agreed that 
monetary union would not bring with it fiscal and political union. While members of the EU 
would share a currency and deeply integrate their economies, there would be no collective fiscal 
means to perform traditional functions of a monetary union like macroeconomic stabilisation or 
political redistribution. This was a massive shift from earlier proposals in the 1970s. Werner and 
MacDougall had proposed decades before that any move to monetary union needed a significant 
increase in financial resources for supranational institutions. For the central bankers of the 
Delors Report, an overriding concern with the moral hazard risks of inflation in a monetary 
union meant their focus in the design of the EMU was on containing government spending, 
rather than building a supranational fiscal capacity. Nevertheless, the report foresaw much 
stronger coordination than was eventually agreed. The central bankers argued that ‘without such 
coordination it would be impossible for the Community as a whole to establish a fiscal/monetary 
policy mix appropriate for the preservation of internal balance… Monetary policy alone cannot 
be expected to perform these functions’ (Delors, 1989, p. 20). For the ordoliberals of the 
Bundesbank, which dominated discussions in the Delors Repot, this meant political union to 
control inflationary pressures of uncoordinated fiscal policies. Bundesbank vice-president Hans 
Tietmeyer, for example, saw political union as ‘indispensable for the lasting success of monetary 
union’ (Baun, 1996, p. 109). 
In the end, the policy-making architecture designed at Maastricht was a loose system 
of coordination through rules and guidelines covering fiscal and macroeconomic policies. The 
Maastricht convergence criteria set the terms of access to the monetary union, including the 3 
percent deficit and 60 percent public debt limits. The SGP, agreed in 1997 as the Euro launch 
approached, made these figures a permanent feature, legally enshrining deficit and debt limits 
through international agreement. As a means of coordination, the SGP was a thin legal regime 
of supranational surveillance that attempted to constrain state expenditure through law and 
minimise the perceived moral hazard of a shared currency. Alongside this, the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) set common terms for macroeconomic policies of national 
governments, with no mechanism to operationalise or enforcing them. 
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For the Commission and economists promoting the path to monetary union, such a 
loose arrangement would work out fine. Reinterpreting Robert Mundell’s optimum currency 
area (OCA) thesis, including by Mundell himself, as long as Europe’s economies sufficiently 
converged and national fiscal policy remained prudent, then monetary union did not necessarily 
need a fiscal and political union (R. M. W. J. Beetsma & Uhlig, 1997; European Commission, 
1998; Mundell, 2000). While coded in the language of macroeconomics, the decision not to 
create a strong supranational fiscal capacity for the EMU hid the massive political tensions that 
opened over the expansion of supranational authority in the path to the Euro.  
Even the minimal level of cooperation that was agreed was highly controversial. 
Indeed, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was surprising in its difficulty. Given that the 
majority of political parties in member countries supported it, ratification was presumed to be 
almost a formality (Franklin et al., 1994, p. 456). The first sign of difficulty was the Danish 
referendum on 2nd June 1992 where 50.7 percent of Danish voters rejected the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. After agreeing opt outs to the EMU and CFSP at the Edinburgh Council of 
1992, a second Danish referendum in May 1993 this time ratified the treaty with 56.8 percent of 
the vote. Nevertheless, despite the eventual result, the Danish experience acted as a ‘symptom 
and a trigger of Euro-pessimism’ across the Union (Sternberg, 2013). The optimism surrounding 
the launching of the EU was quickly punctured in the wake of the Danish referendum. 
Attempting to counter this, but in the end compounding it, President Mitterrand announced a 
day after the first Danish vote a ‘constitutionally unnecessary’ referendum in France on the treaty 
(Baun, 1996, p. 111). France’s petit-oui delivered Maastricht with 51.05 percent in favour. In the 
process, however, the lacklustre support put a permanent dent on the democratic credentials of 
the EU.  
The opposition to Maastricht, in France and elsewhere, was built on a critique of the 
EU that drew together tropes of nation, democracy, money and budgeting. In France, the 
‘ratification debate spurred a reinvestment of the concept of “nation”’ (Sternberg, 2013, p. 118). 
Similarly in Germany, the ratification process led to a resurfacing of nationalism and ‘a string of 
racist and xenophobic assaults in 1992’ (Sternberg, 2013, p. 112). In attacking the new EU, 
nationalist critics asserted what they saw as a line between nationhood, budgeting, and 
democracy. For the Gaullist politician Philippe Séguin, ‘democracy is inseparable from national 
sovereignty’ (Sternberg, 2013, p. 119). By connecting democracy to the nation, and control over 
public finance as a foundational feature of democratic governance, any attempt to transfer fiscal 
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affairs to a supranational level was seen as inherently undemocratic. A similar logic was 
developed in Germany. A Federal Constitutional Court decision on October 12th 1993 
conceded the legality of Maastricht, but questioned the democratic basis of integration. In 
making this case, the judgement drew explicitly on ‘ideas of an ethno-culturally homogenous 
Volk and the unholy trinity of Volk-Staat-Staatsanghörige [people-state-citizen]’ (Weiler, 1995, p. 
223). The court argued that without the presence of a European ‘people’, who maintained 
sufficient collective solidarity to tolerate redistributive transfers, supranational governance could 
not be democratically legitimate and must, therefore, be constrained.  
A shared currency touched these nationalist concerns. In France, the concern over 
integration’s erosion of sovereignty and the nation was connected to fears over German 
domination of an EMU. For the German debate, opposition to integration’s encroachment on 
the sovereign nation came through the prospect of the end of the Deutschmark. Bild-Zeitung’s 
notable headline at the time ‘The End of the D-Mark’ captured this, claiming ‘at Maastricht a 
funeral bell “tolled for the symbol of German prosperity, of the economic miracle”’ (Baun, 1996, 
p. 108).   
Alongside these associations drawn between money and nationhood, the prospect of 
an enlarged administrative capacity of European institutions drew the ire of the opposition to 
Maastricht. The Front National in France attacked the longstanding trope of ‘the Brussels 
bureaucracy’ in stifling the French nation. French nationalist Séguin targeted in particular a 
perceived technocratic logic of European integration cast as management, compared to a French 
spirit of zealous reform. He described Maastricht as: ‘the work of the spirit of management and 
the triumph of political renouncement. French politics does not reform anything anymore, it no 
longer builds anything, it no longer changes anything, it manages’ (Sternberg, 2013, p. 121).  
When European institutions raised the possibility of expanding their financial 
resources, the idea of supranational institutions gaining an autonomous political capacity was 
met with fierce opposition. Most notably, Delors’ efforts to broaden the budget of European 
institutions provoked attacks on the institution for waste, lethargy, and bureaucratic 
encroachment. Leading this charge was a neoliberal critique. British Prime Minister Thatcher’s 
infamous Hague speech in May 1992 captured this opposition to what was seen as a ‘tightly 
regulated, centralized bureaucratic federal state, imposing uniform standards throughout the 
continent’ (Baun, 1996, p. 106). Likewise, US liberal economist Martin Feldstein argued against 
monetary union in The Economist, highlighting that it ‘is not indeed to achieve the advantages 
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of a free trade zone’ but is rather a statist, federal plot (Feldstein, 1992). The most bombastic 
neoliberal opposition to monetary union came from the avowed Thatcherite and Commission 
insider Bernard Connolly. His 1995 book The Rotten Heart of Europe offered a scathing critique of 
attempts at monetary cooperation in the 1990s through the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
(Connolly, 2013). In the vein of British Eurosceptic neoliberalism (Slobodian & Plehwe, 2018), 
the book lambasted Europe’s elites. Connolly argued that the ‘true story of the ERM has been 
one of duplicity, skulduggery, conflict; of economic harm done to every country in the caste 
interests of the élite; of the distortion of economic logic and the dilution of political 
accountability’ (Connolly, 2013, p. 378). 
 
The Political and Managerial Failure of Budgetary Rules 
The political limits put on supranational authority by a mostly nationalist opposition to 
integration led to the limited system of coordinated austerity agreed at Maastricht. Rather than 
collective fiscal and economic instruments (principally a large supranational budget), policies 
were to be coordinated through rule, guidelines, and dialogue. As the system was implemented, 
however, first with the convergence criteria to join the Euro, and then the SGP, it became 
apparent that rules were a poor instrument to coordinate budgetary affairs. The assumed legal 
authority of supranational institutions to use sanctions against recalcitrant states quickly hit 
against the reality that national governments put sharp limits on the extent they would be subject 
to the decisions of the EU. 
In line with their critique of law and fixed bureaucracy, public managers disputed the 
viability of the rules-based system agreed at Maastricht to coordinate budgets. Indeed, it was 
very hard to cut budgets. In national budgeting systems, where spending allocation decisions 
were distributed throughout different departments, setting an international fiscal target would 
not automatically translate into reductions. Maastricht or the SGP gave little clue as to how 
targets would be realised. Verdun describes how, ‘when the SGP was agreed upon in 1997, it 
was not clear at all how it might be implemented’ (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, p. 113). At EIPA, 
US budgeting expert Aaron Wildavsky participated in a workshop on ‘National Budgeting for 
Economic and Monetary Union’. In the summary of the workshop, it was observed that while much 
political energy had been spent on pressing for budgetary restraint at Maastricht, ‘relatively little 
attention has been paid to identifying and analysing concrete measures to make it feasible’ 
(Wildavsky & Zapico-Goñi, 1993). Highlighting the deficiencies in the national policy-making 
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processes, the authors argued ‘it is not enough merely to formulate tight budgets if there is 
insufficient capacity in the budgetary system to meet objectives’ (ibid.).  For budgeting experts 
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf Rainer Strauch, and Mark Hallerberg, the targets of the SGP were 
insufficient to achieve the politically desired levels of austerity, instead ‘fiscal institutions rather 
than ex ante fiscal rules are most crucial’ (Hallerberg et al., 2009, p. 19). Similarly to how public 
managers were criticising law more broadly, budgeting experts were arguing that rather than 
rules, it was the management practices of governments that would determine the realities of 
austerity. Hallerberg argued that ‘the sources of fiscal discipline need to be internal to be 
effective’ (Hallerberg, 2004, p. 7). Austerity was not something that could be proclaimed into 
existence through rules. It was a question of management. 
Given that budgets were considered hard to cut, public managers began to draw 
attention to the potential accounting gimmickry states may exploit to meet the convergence 
criteria and join the EMU. It was taken that fiscal rules, by their nature, encouraged gaming 
(Hallerberg et al., 2009, p. 18). Setting hard rules on public spending was seen by public managers 
as a false promise. Accounting and finance were more flexible than any fiscal rule could capture. 
Off-budget financing, manipulating financial derivatives, accounting reclassifications, or 
extraordinary taxation measures could all manipulate deficit and debt figures to either evade or 
mimic legally obliged limits. The result would be that states ‘comply with the letter, but not the 
spirit, of the antideficit provisions’ (Poterba & von Hagen, 1999, p. 2). In approaching the EMU, 
and the enshrining of legal and constitutional fiscal constraints upon states, public managers 
were therefore sceptical. Building on a large body of organisational theory into budgeting, von 
Hagen concluded that ‘the effectiveness of fiscal rules is limited at best, because politicians are 
likely to find ways to circumvent them’ (Hagen, 2002, p. 265).  
Indeed, in attempting to meet the convergence criteria, the 1990s brought with it a 
slew of controversial and contested budgetary tricks by prospective members of the EMU. In a 
controversial case, reforms to France Télécom in 1996 resulted in a huge injection of funds for the 
French government to make up a pension shortfall totalling 37.5 billion francs (distributed at 1 
billion franc per year). A Eurostat decision that this was a capital transfer and not a financial 
transaction, and therefore would count towards reducing France’s deficit, provoked a major 
backlash. For many this accounting trick was a ‘French conspiracy, made up of a French 
commissioner, a French director of Eurostat, and French staff in Eurostat’s unit B-4, aimed at 
aiding France’s efforts at deficit reduction’ (Savage, 2007, p. 110). But it was not just France 
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using these tricks. Likewise Germany, the standard bearer of the balanced budget, participated 
in accounting tricks to meet the convergence criteria in the 1990s. Most notably, the move by 
finance minister Theodor Waigel to revalue gold stocks earlier than scheduled ‘provoked the 
greatest criticism any government suffered for creative accounting in the critical year of 1997’ 
(Savage, 2007, p. 124). Italy also responded to these tricks. Prodi declared that ‘if others carry 
out window-dressing we can do the same’ (Lagna, 2016, p. 177). The government used a 
combination of currency and interest rate swaps, and a controversial ‘eurotax’, to eventually fall 
inside the criteria. The eurotax in particular was described by Savage as ‘one of the most cynical 
fiscal policy schemes’ to meet the criteria, involving a one off levy to boost revenues for the 
crucial 1997 budget, to be returned once inside the EMU (although it never was) (Savage, 2007, 
p. 130). Indeed, the heavy reliance on derivatives to manage public debt led EU states to being 
an international accounting anomaly in the 1990s. Except for in Europe, international standards 
did not favourably count currency and interest rate swaps in the calculation of national accounts 
(Savage, 2007, p. 153). 
Following the adoption of the Euro, the SGP was meant to take over the task of 
coordinating fiscal policies in the EU. From its beginning the SGP was in crisis. What was meant 
to limit state debts and deficits through constitution, quickly hit the political and administrative 
realities that it was both electorally unpalatable and technically difficult to control state spending. 
The SGP entered into force in 1999, hoping to maintain the commitment of states to reduce 
public spending as the Maastricht convergence criteria had done in the move to the EMU. The 
convergence criteria had clear leverage motivating states to stick to commitments. Following the 
rules, in letter more often than spirit as it turned out, would lead to membership to the coveted 
EMU. The SGP had no such carrot. Instead, it attempted to overcome the manipulation 
problems of the convergence criteria  through a legalised system of sanctions. The intention was 
for sanctions to apply automatically. In reality, the SGP was never applied as intended. 
The first major blow to the EU’s economic governance tools came in 2001. In the 
face of an overheating Irish economy, the Commission issued a critical recommendation under 
the BEPGs to the Irish government over proposed tax cuts in its 2001 budget.14 The 
recommendation adopted by the Council in 2001 called on Ireland to take ‘countervailing 
budgetary measures during the current fiscal year… [to] ensure that no reduction in the 
 
14 Given Ireland was at the time running a budgetary surplus, such a measure could not have taken place through the SGP 
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underlying budgetary surplus from 2000 takes place’ (Council of the European Union, 2001). 
The response from Ireland was robust and continued the criticism of European institutions 
surrounding budgets and sovereignty seen in the ratification process. Framing the issue in 
longstanding tropes of integration as an incursion into ‘Irish national interest and sovereignty’, 
the Irish government mobilised perceptions of the inherent illegitimacy of the EU to make 
political interventions into domestic economic policy (Meyer, 2004, p. 821). Criticising the 
BEPGs directly, The Irish Minister for Finance Charlie McCreevy made clear the BEPGs had 
little relevance to domestic policy making, arguing ‘[w]e are not bound by the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines because, as their name suggests, they are broad and they are guidelines’ 
(Staunton, 2001). 
By 2002, the SGP itself was thrown into doubt. The dotcom recession and rising 
deficits in Germany, France, and Portugal led the Commission to appeal to the Council to launch 
proceedings over excessive deficits. Despite growing breaches of the SGP’s rules, national 
governments refused to recognise the legal weight of the SGP and trigger the sanction process 
of excessive deficits. German Chancellor Schröder declared that, despite its deficit, it would not 
be aiming for a balanced budget. In May 2003, he stated that his domestic political commitments 
trumped any international agreements of the SGP: ‘A balanced budget by 2006 would require 
growth rates that I cannot realistically expect… if achieving this aim meant cutting spending as 
much as revenues are falling, or giving up on the 2005 step of the tax reform, I would not be 
ready for it’ (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, p. 139).  
Similarly in France, the rules of the SGP proved too much to bear compared to 
domestic political priorities. In 2002, the passage of a French budget, by increasingly unpopular 
Prime Minister Raffarin, included income and corporation tax cuts and increased military and 
welfare spending. It was met with consternation by the Commission (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, 
p. 133). A Eurogroup meeting in October saw French Finance Minister Mer refuse to amend 
their budget, triggering ‘the most serious rift in the group since the launch of the euro’ and 
threats of an early warning to be issued, which it eventually was in January (Heipertz & Verdun, 
2010, p. 133). By the end of 2002, the SGP was on the ropes. Testing the limits of the fiscal rules 
were the EU’s two pivotal countries, France and Germany. 
In response to this crisis, the Commission attempted to make noises over adding 
flexibility to the rules of the SGP. What had only entered into force three years previously as 
Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ or Slobodian’s ordoliberal ‘encasing’ of austerity in law was already 
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being watered down. The Commission offered to take into consideration the ‘economic 
rationale’ of the Pact in disciplining states, rather than nominal debt and deficit values (Heipertz 
& Verdun, 2010, p. 133). In October 2002, Commission President Prodi expressed his own 
frustration with the SGP straightjacket, declaring it ‘stupid, like all rigid decisions’ (Heipertz & 
Verdun, 2010, p. 135).  
In 2003, the SGP was thrown into full crisis, leading to its effective suspension at the 
end of the year. The crisis came after the Council refused to accept the recommendations 
proposed by the Commission in October 2003 to launch steps entering France and Germany 
into the EDP. In a meeting on 25 November 2003, the Council refused the Commission’s 
recommendations via a blocking majority of larger states of France, Germany, Italy, and UK (J. 
Fischer et al., 2007). Rather than adopting the Commission’s recommendations, as was required 
by the legal steps of the SGP, the Council adopted their own conclusions. The effect of these 
conclusions was that they ‘effectively replaced the EDP with political pledges’ from France and 
Germany to keep their deficit below 3 per cent, thereby suspending the SGP as a legal instrument 
(Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, p. 148). The moment was pivotal for the development of the SGP. 
Its legal authority was lost, replaced by the discretion of executive exception. 
The response of the Commission to the sidestepping of their procedural role in fiscal 
governance was to refer the matter to the ECJ. The ruling from the Court in July 2004 was 
double edged. The Commission had appealed to the Court that the Council had to follow the 
recommendations it issued to launch the SGP’s compliance procedure against France and 
Germany. The Court, however, decided that the Council had no such legal requirement to adopt 
the Commission’s recommendations. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the legal validity of the 
conclusions adopted by the Council. The Court argued that the Council’s conclusions had the 
intention of replacing the legal steps laid out in the SGP, in terms of reporting deadlines and 
requirements, with their own politically determined steps.  
The case marked a turning point in the SGP. By 2004, the SGP was in tatters as a legal 
instrument of austerity. The political opposition to supranational intervention in the sacred area 
of fiscal policy exposed the idea of internationally constitutionalised austerity as illusory. It 
exposed the managerial and democratic limits to rules-based international governance. Not only 
were the rules of the SGP administratively redundant in domestic policy, they were politically 
intolerable. While the instruments of budgetary coordination between EU states fell into disarray 
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in the mid-2000s, just a few years earlier it was the financial management of the EU’s 
supranational institutions themselves that were in the spotlight. 
 
Crisis in the Commission 
Just as the EU’s supranational capacity to coordinate the budgets of member states fell 
apart at the turn of the millennium, the integrity of the supranational European Commission’s 
ability to manage its own budget was thrown into crisis in 1999 with the fraud scandal of the 
Santer Commission. The resignation and ensuing political crisis bound together the question of 
extending the management capacities of European institutions with the democratisation of the 
EU.  
The ratification of Maastricht thrust the archaic management structures of the 
Commission into the political spotlight. The poor state of management in the Commission was 
not for lack of trying to reform. A series of initiatives had unfolded over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Few substantive reforms were, however, undertaken as a consequence. Henning Christopher, 
Commissioner for Personnel and Administration in the 1980s, had launched a series of initiatives 
‘to improve the quality of management, to devolve greater responsibility to Directors-General 
and to develop a tier of middle management’ but made little progress (Kassim, 2008, p. 656; 
Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 39). Ironically it was the fraud accused Santer Commission which was 
‘the first to make administrative questions a main Commission priority’ (Kassim, 2008, p. 657). 
The Santer Commission made a serious effort to launch reform activities. There were three key 
initiatives in this period, the 1995 Sound and Efficient Management Programme (SEM 2000), 
the 1997 Modernization of Administration and Personnel Policy (MAP), and the 1998 Designing 
the Commission of Tomorrow (DECODE).  
Despite these efforts at reform, at the end of the 1990s the management structures of 
the Commission went from an internal technical issue to the largest political scandal the 
organisation had ever faced. The crisis emerged at the end of 1998 when the European 
Parliament threatened to not discharge the EU’s budget. Allegations of mis-managed and 
misappropriated funds within the EU budget had rumbled throughout the summer. Near the 
end of the year, Commission auditor Paul van Buitenen had passed the Parliament a dossier of 
fraud allegations within the EU budget. Two cases stood out in particular.  
First, it was reported that $1 billion was missing from EU humanitarian aid between 
1993-1995 (Buckley & Smith, 1998). The case reflected a classic issue with EU financial 
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management in the use of off-budget accounting to handle administrative costs. The case was 
more complicated, however, by the fact that a series of off-budget contracts were found to be 
‘fictitious’, with ECU400,000-600,000 completely untraceable (Buckley, 1998). 
Second, and even more sensationally for tabloid headlines, was the case of former 
French Prime Minister and Commissioner for Research, Science and Technology Edith Cresson. 
Cresson was accused of nepotism and fraud in the hiring of her local dentist René Berthelot 
within the Leonardo youth training programme for which his suitability was dubious. The 
Cresson case cast a shadow across Brussels of sleaze, scandal, and intimidation. In passing details 
of the Cresson affair, van Buitenen feared for his safety. Writing to his manager, van Buitenen 
was concerned that his ‘internal Commission phone line is under surveillance’ by the security 
office and was convinced that ‘I and my family were in possible serious and immediate danger’ 
while in possession of incriminating files (van Buitenen, 1998). Indeed, in a bizarre twist, the 
Commission security office became embroiled in the scandal. Van Buitenen claimed to have 
evidence the office was in possession of ‘snipers equipment’ (van Buitenen, 1998). Rumours 
circulated Brussels of a security office running amok, acquiring weapons it did not need and 
operating beyond political control (Buckley, 1999a). Amidst accusations of fraud, publishers 
snapped up a stream of popular books blasting the European Commission, its inadequate 
management structures and its officials on the take (Andreasen, 2009; van Buitenen, 2000). 
In December 1998, the Parliament refused to approve the 1996 budget and proposed 
a vote of censure against the Commission, being the only recourse to accountability the 
institution possessed. The treatment of van Buitenen further infuriated the Parliament. 
Disputing his status as a whistle-blower, the Commission had suspended van Buitenen and 
launched disciplinary procedures accusing him of breaching staff regulations. Green MEPs 
pledged to set up a ‘solidarity group in the fight against fraud’, publicly backing van Buitenen 
(Financial Times, 1999a). The Brussels machinery, meanwhile, sought to manage criticism 
surrounding the fraud allegations that were surfacing. In a note from the UK Permanent 
Representatives Geoffrey Martin, it was proposed that the Commission should adopt a line in 
public interviews drawing a strange relativity between the budgetary mis-management of 
Commissioners and national ‘social security fraud’ (Martin, 1999). 
The Parliament was, however, split on whether to use a seismic censure vote to bring 
down the Commission. The European Liberals, the third largest group at the time, 
predominantly called for Cresson’s resignation. In January 1999 they tabled a resolution calling 
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for her to go (Buckley, 1999b). For the Socialists, the parliament’s largest political group at the 
time, this was not sufficient. Instead, the Socialists, who originally tabled the censure motion at 
the end of 1998, argued any attempt to target individuals would push the Socialists to vote to 
remove the whole Commission. Socialist leader Pauline Green told the Parliament ‘we do not 
have the institutional right to cherry-pick among commissioners’ leaving censure as the only 
option (Buckley, 1999d). The Socialists were, however, split. The French refused to back any 
censure motion, while the Germans were divided. The conservative European People’s Party 
group were less eager to press for resignations or censure. Cresson was steadfast on not 
resigning. Rejecting the accusations, she put it down to politicking ahead of approaching 
European elections and the ‘desire for human sacrifices’ surrounding Brussels’ well-known and 
long-standing financial management issues (Buckley, 1999c). In the end, the censure motion 
went ahead in January. The vote fell short of the required two-thirds majority, receiving only 44 
percent of the vote, described by the Financial Times as a only ‘bloody nose’ for the Commission 
(Financial Times, 1999b). Diffusing the crisis temporarily, Santer and the Parliament agreed to 
form a ‘Committee of Experts’ to investigate the allegations.  
When the Committee reported in March, however, time quickly ran out for the 
Commission. The report was definitive in its judgment. In a ‘damning document’, the report did 
not make accusations of fraud, but confirmed a series of budgetary irregularities, mis-
management, an absence of political control, and inadequate mechanisms of financial audit and 
control (Financial Times, 1999c). In making this case, the report reflected the management 
deficit already articulated by Metcalfe. The report argued that ‘the Commission has seen its direct 
management responsibility increase substantially’ but ‘senior hierarchy in particular remains 
more concerned with the political aspect of the Commission’s work than with management’ 
(Committee of Independent Experts, 1999). In response to the report, the Parliament, with the 
notable exception of the European People’s Party group, demanded the Commission resign (M. 
Smith, 1999). In the end, the Commission took the decision to resign on 15 March.  
The resignation set the stage for a remaking of the EU’s administrative structures. 
Internal movements for reform had previously been grounded in improving the Commission’s 
ability to meet the management obligations deepened integration had brought. But management 
reform had been an internal and technical issue. The effect of the Santer scandal was to 
transform this. Increasingly,  questions of legitimation of a mistrusted Commission were 
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becoming bound with reforms required to enhance its managerial capacities. Democracy was 
increasingly implicated in the EU’s eyes with management and budgeting reform . 
 
Conclusion 
The creation of the EU in 1992 was a major shift in the distribution of sovereign power in 
Europe. The members of the new EU increasingly looked like they occupied a shared polity. 
This new polity was peculiar compared to the nation-states that made up its membership. A 
nationalist opposition to the use of taxpayer money for foreign ventures meant the tax-and-
spend budgetary instruments fundamental to national policy-making were denied to 
supranational institutions in the EU. In contrast, critical scholars have observed how the role 
of supranational authority within this new polity reflected a neoliberal imaginary of an 
economic constitution. Rather than developing independent political capacities through 
budgets, supranational authority was expected to be mobilised in the EU through law and 
regulation to bind national democracies into market freedom.   
 As this chapter has shown, however, while the EU was denied the financial means of 
a supranational administrative capacity, the ‘neoliberal’ legal instruments they did possess 
proved unusable. For the same reasons supranational authorities were denied financial 
resources, national governments refused to be held accountable to supranational rules. In this 
way, the chapter has shown how rather than being the triumph of neoliberalism in Europe, the 
EU’s peculiar design and fraught beginnings reflected a longstanding dilemma of supranational 
authority discussed in chapter two. 
The chapter has unravelled how this dilemma of supranational authority changed over 
the history of European integration since the 1950s. I showed how the consequence of the 
move to the EU was that supranational authorities were asked to do more than ever. The 
organisational effectiveness of the European Commission, the closest thing the EU has to an 
executive, had always been a concern since its creation in the 1950s. The difference of the 
1990s was that the scale of political responsibilities falling on the Commission’s shoulders at 
Maastricht meant the question of capacity moved from being a technical administrative issue 
to a major political crisis – culminating in the 1999 fraud scandal of the Santer Commission. 
By elaborating the dilemma of supranational authority facing European institutions 
with the creation of the EU in the 1990s, this chapter has provided the historical grounding 
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from which to make sense of the turn to ‘governance’ at the end of the millennium. The next 
chapter will show how remarks of a governance paradigm in the 1990s/2000s reflected how 
supranational institutions mobilised the social forces and format of public management to 
respond to the dilemma of supranational authority. The rest of the thesis will subsequently 
look at how the EU’s new managerial policy instruments were thrown into question by the 
financial crisis since 2008 (chapter five), but how the governance reforms made to the EU 





Chapter 4: The 'Governance Turn' To Supranational Rule 
 
Introduction 
“We are all benchmarkers now” Jacques Santer, Commission President (Richardson, 
2000, p. 26) 
 
The creation of the EU in the 1990s used rules to coordinate the budgetary and macroeconomic 
affairs of member states within a market and monetary union.  Despite much critical theorisation 
of the EU being premised on the significance of such rules (i.e. Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’), 
as a policy technique rules were quickly found to be of limited use. The SGP was suspended in 
2003 amidst resistance from France and Germany battling recession. The problem of rules 
reflected a dilemma of supranational authority faced by the EU and IOs in general. Supranational 
rules limiting national spending, rather than common budgetary instruments, had been the 
closest cooperation that could be agreed amongst the EU’s member states committed to deep 
market integration. But the crisis of the 2000s showed that even these rules were felt to be an 
intolerable foreign incursion into domestic affairs. Supranational authorities were being asked to 
do more than ever at Maastricht, but political opposition to the range of policy instruments they 
could legitimately wield put severe dents in their capacity to govern. The result was a 
‘management deficit’ identified by a European public management community facing EU 
institutions in the 1990s. 
As supranational authority was questioned in the 1990s, the new millennium saw the 
EU set in motion a series of innovations to policy coordination that mobilised a discourse of 
governance as a project of reform. The 2000 Lisbon Council’s ‘Lisbon Agenda’ set quantitative 
targets towards the infamous objective of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world’. The launch of the OMC at Lisbon introduced a new 
managerial policy instrument that built on a previous dabbling with social policy coordination 
through the European Employment Strategy. The OMC shifted away from the traditional 
legislative Community method of negotiated convergence. Instead, the OMC was a voluntary 
inter-governmental process of benchmarking competitiveness that relied on quantitative 
indicators to compare governmental performance. The 2001 White Paper on Governance attached 
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a democratising fervour to these changes. The White Paper, and a voluminous literature on 
governance, emphasised transparency, participation, and managerial effectiveness as the new 
locus of EU legitimation beyond ‘peace and prosperity’. A concern with converging European 
economies and social policies was replaced with an iterative objective of benchmarking 
competitiveness. Labour was called on to become more dynamic in the face of a globalising 
economy. Wages would be lowered, labour markets made flexible, and welfare replaced by 
workfare. The singular authority of national government, or visions of creating a supranational 
government, was replaced with a more flexible, dynamic, and interactive process of ‘multi-level 
governance’.  
As critiqued in chapter one, critical literature on the EU often equates ‘EU governance’ 
with a neoliberal social policy. As chapter three revealed, however, a managerial policy 
perspective touched the core of economic integration in the EU. A public management 
perspective on European integration built on a premise that law was too inflexible to manage 
the Single Market and EMU. The public management community saw techniques of 
benchmarking or flexible network-based regulation as a solution to the EU’s ‘management 
deficit’ in general, rather than exclusively in social policy. Indeed, one of the first scoreboards 
used in the EU was not in social policy but in compliance with the Single Market, given the 
known failures of domestic legal transposition (European Commission, 1997a). Similarly, 
prominent policy analyst Jonathan Zeitlin developed a concept of ‘experimentalist governance’ 
that spoke to not just social policy but a general transformation in the EU’s policy architecture 
across market, product, and welfare regulation (Zeitlin, 2015).  
The fact that managerial techniques touched not only an additive social policy as the 
hedging of hegemony, but also the fundamentals of economic integration, speaks to how public 
management had a more transformative impact on the form European integration took than 
critical scholarship on the EU often captures. Building on this point, this chapter shows how the 
governance agenda spoke to the EU’s attempt to build supranational authority along managerial 
lines and the mobilisation of the social forces of public management to do so. Rather than 
distributing resources or controlling expenditure, that the previous chapter demonstrated the 
EU struggled at, the European Commission recreated itself at the turn of the millennium as a 
centre of strategy and information processing drawing on a lineage of public management. This 
required reformatting the work of European institutions into a performance monitoring 
machinery to feed strategic decision-making processes and empowering a new managerial class 
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within the institutions of the EU. The chapter shows this development across three sites of 
reform in the 1990s/2000s -  benchmarking competitiveness through the OMC; the reform of 




4.1 Benchmarking Competitiveness 
As Santer admits in the opening quote, benchmarking competitiveness is everywhere in the EU. 
Benchmarking competitiveness was a pivotal innovation that epitomised the governance agenda 
in the 1990s. It was most prominently proposed by the corporate executives of the ERT through 
a series of workshops and publications in the mid-1990s (ERT, 1996; European Commission, 
1996, 1997b). The 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment, which called for a 
remaking of the EU social model post-Maastricht, similarly built on a framing of competitiveness 
(European Commission, 1993). This fed strongly into the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, where 
benchmarking competitiveness became a key discourse in the governance of social and 
economic policy-making in the EU.  
The correlation between benchmarking competitiveness and efforts to develop a 
European social policy to balance market integration led scholars to conflate the governance 
agenda with neoliberalism. Indeed, governance theorists themselves were apt to make an 
argument that benchmarking competitiveness was a Polanyian makeweight to the marketization 
of Maastricht. For Rhodes, a major governance theorist, the OMC was the ‘Maastricht’ for a 
European welfare state - using new managerial instruments to propel social policy integration 
just as Maastricht had done for monetary and economic policy (Rhodes, 2000).  But by conflating 
the governance agenda with social policy, this perspective blurs the broader significance of the 
managerial transformation of the EU in the 2000s. In particular it elides the managerial roots to 
benchmarking competitiveness. It was not straightforward to mobilise managerial techniques of 
benchmarking competitiveness as an instrument of social policy. Benchmarking competitiveness 
had been a management trope since the 1960s. It was, however, usually tied to industrial policy 
and not social policy. Moreover, the technique of benchmarking was never imagined to be a 
regulatory instrument as the EU created with the OMC (Arrowsmith et al., 2004). Rather, the 
ERT had proposed benchmarking as a peripheral aid to decision-makers.  
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Making sense of this, in this section I will argue that social policy was just one area 
where a more general managerial turn to EU governance became visible. The EU’s 
inter/supranational institutions appropriated benchmarking competitiveness from its industrial 
origins and applied it to social policy in order to develop a means to intervene into sensitive 
economic and social affairs following the heated ratification of Maastricht. The significance of 
this is to reveal how the reformatting of EU governance along the lines of public management 
has been a key way in which the EU’s institutions have built themselves a stake in policy-making. 
 
Managerial Origins of Benchmarking Competitiveness: From Industrial to Social Policy 
Benchmarking national competitiveness emerged in the 1960s as a concept expanding 
the gaze of management theory from the firm to the state. William Davies highlights its origins 
in the 1960s work of Richard Farmer and Barry Richman (Davies, 2014, p. 120). Their 1965 
book Comparative Management and Economic Progress was a major shift in evaluating industrial 
performance (Farmer & Richman, 1965). For Farmer and Richman, industrial performance was 
not just a question of a firm’s behaviour and organisation. It was a question of public policy that 
management had the answers to. Later management theorists built on this work (Porter, 1990). 
Taking perhaps the most expansive view was Klaus Schwab. Most infamously, Schwab 
established the yearly elite summit the World Economic Forum (WEF), originally the European 
Management Forum. Since 1979, the WEF has published reports benchmarking national 
competitiveness. In Schwab’s hands, competitiveness put an almost unlimited range of social 
and political issues into the rubric of managerial evaluation (Davies, 2014, p. 126). But Schwab 
was an exception. For the most part, national competitiveness specifically referred to industrial 
policy. This meant the state structuring of industry, the ability of firms to respond to 
technological innovation, and the uneven national responses to globalisation. Government was 
here viewed as a framework setter for industrial innovation, not an object itself that needed 
reform in line with competitiveness.  
The idea of national competitiveness gained significant political traction in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Numerous commissions and reports were established by governments and IOs 
around the world, desperate to discover their own sources of national industrial competitiveness 
at a time of economic slowdown. In the US, the 1985 Commission on Industrial Competitiveness was 
established to, in Reagan’s words, determine how US industry could ‘transform new knowledge 
and innovations into commercial products, services and manufacturing processes’ (The New 
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York Times, 1983). Likewise, the OECD’s 1991 report Technology and Productivity: The Challenge for 
Economic Policy made competitiveness a question of responding to the uneven spread of 
technological innovation under a process of globalisation (OECD, 1991). 
This development was mirrored in the EEC. The earliest institutional discussion of 
European competitiveness was a 1982 report The Competitiveness of the Community Industry 
(European Commission, 1982). The report was hesitant about the notion of competitiveness 
and hostile to an expansive understanding of it. It hedged over a ‘widely-held but vague general 
feeling’ that ‘the competitiveness of Community industry’ was ‘in danger of “losing the race”’ as 
traditional industries decline, patterns of world trade changed, and new technologies arose 
(European Commission, 1982, p. i). The report adopted a narrow  definition of competitiveness, 
focused on industrial issues of ‘export market shares; specialisation of industrial structure; costs 
and exchange rates; profitability and the financial structure of industry; industrial investment; the 
structure of the industrial labour force’ (European Commission, 1982, p. 2). Explicitly side-lined 
in the report was Schwab’s modish perspective, criticised for having ‘used as many as 240 
different criteria, many of which are unquantifiable’ (European Commission, 1982, p. 16).  
By the 1990s, benchmarking competitiveness had entered the mainstream of the EU. 
The ERT was crucial for this. Most notably, the ERT’s 1993 report Beating the Crisis pushed 
competitiveness as a central orienting principle for the post-Maastricht EU (ERT, 1993). As 
Richardson explains, ‘competitiveness was and remained the spearhead of ERT activity’ after 
the Single Market was achieved (Richardson, 2000, p. 8). The 1990s saw the ERT prominently 
promoting benchmarking competitiveness in the EU through a series of seminars for the 
Commission running around the same time as the FSU’s Governance project. The culmination 
of this was the report Benchmarking for Policy-Makers (ERT, 1996). The proposal was readily 
adopted by the Commission, who issued two papers proposing benchmarking’s implementation 
(European Commission, 1996, 1997b). 
Alongside this, the 1994 Essen Council created a ‘high-level group’ to address the 
question of competitiveness within Europe. The ‘Competitiveness Advisory Group’ (CAG) was 
stocked with key figures of the ERT such that it ‘effectively duplicates the ERT’s voice’ (Balanyá 
et al., 2000, p. 20). While not the progenitors of a competitiveness discourse, the ERT and CAG 
were pivotal in solidifying the discourse in the EU. The work of the CAG could be ‘read as a 
blueprint for the Lisbon Strategy’, that made competitiveness a key EU strategic focus (Holman, 
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2012, p. 323). Indeed, Professor Maria João Rodrigues, architect of the Lisbon Strategy, was a 
member of the CAG.  
A shift was taking place though in the definition of benchmarking competitiveness 
through the work of the ERT and CAG. Whereas benchmarking competitiveness had previously 
focused squarely on industrial policy, a new layer of welfare and employment was added to 
discussions. The reason for this was that the context had changed. Unemployment emerged as 
a major political issue over the 1990s. The Single Market had promised to unleash a wave of 
economic growth to beat the malaise of Eurosclerosis. But by the turn of the millennium, 
Europe’s biggest economies found themselves struggling with ingrained unemployment and 
troubled public finances.  
Alongside this dire economic picture, there was a transformation post-Maastricht in 
the political landscape of Europe. Conservative governments dominated the negotiation of the 
Single Market and the terms of Maastricht. In the 1990s, however, social democratic parties 
swept into office across Europe. These new social democratic governments were increasingly 
concerned with responding to the employment and growth crisis facing Europe. Their proposals 
were, however, not like previous social democrats. Romano Prodi’s ‘Olive Tree’ alliance in Italy, 
Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ New Labour in the UK, and Gerhard Schröder’s ‘Die Neue Mitte’ in 
Germany were redefining social democracy, replacing welfarism and corporatism with workfare 
and public-private partnership. In relation to the EU, Blair and Schröder had launched a joint 
platform ahead of the 1999 European elections (Blair & Schröder, 1998). In it, they called for a 
focus on employability not employment targeting, labour market activation not welfare, and the 
abandoning of moves towards European convergence. Invoking the language of NPM, the joint 
platform argued the ‘state should not row, but steer’. Translated into the institutions of the EU, 
the Blair-Schröder platform called for inter-governmental coordination rather than convergence, 
arguing they ‘do not advocate a single European model’ but a new managerial agenda focused 
on flexibility, performance, and effectiveness (Pollack, 2000). 
Indeed, efforts to establish a European social policy had proven difficult. Under 
Delors, convergence over welfare and labour arrangements had been the objective. Alongside 
Delors’ drive for the Internal Market, the European Social Dialogue was relaunched. The 
Dialogue brought together employers and labour organisations to develop social policy alongside 
deepening market integration (Smismans, 2008b). It eventually culminated three directives on 
parental leave (1997), part time workers (1997), and fixed-term contracts (1999) (Goetschy, 
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1999). The difficulty of finding consensus on harmonised social standards, and the lack of 
political will, meant social policy convergence lagged behind the rapidly implemented Single 
Market and Monetary Union programme (Scharpf, 2010).  
It was in this context of entrenched unemployment, the rise of a Third Way social 
democracy invested with a modernising managerial zeal, and a frustration with existing European 
policy tools, that benchmarking competitiveness was turned to. Benchmarking competitiveness 
was not a functional consequence of this context. Rather, it was faced with this context that 
benchmarking competitiveness was appropriated from its origins in industrial management to 
solve a new problem of EU social policy. 
Competitiveness over the 1990s shifted away from industrial policy towards issues of 
welfare and employment. A hint of what was to come was visible already in 1986. A European 
Commission report on Improving Competitiveness and Industrial Structures in the Community put social 
and employment issues in the same frame as competitiveness. The report made the objective of 
industrial competitiveness not winning a global race of technological innovation, but to also 
‘offer a more effective response to social and employment concerns’ (European Commission, 
1986). The shift from industrial to social issues was most clearly laid out in the 1993 White Paper 
on Competitiveness. Justifying the paper, it was said that ‘the one and only reason is unemployment’ 
(European Commission, 1993, p. 9). The Paper described a ‘triangular relationship growth-
competitiveness-employment’ whereby ‘for the level of employment in the Community to 
improve, firms must achieve global competitiveness’ (European Commission, 1993, p. 57). 
While the CAG reports continued to frame competitiveness around an external race of 
technological innovation, this triangular relationship was also prominent in their reports. One 
report argued that ‘competitiveness should be seen as a basic means to raise the standard of 
living, provide jobs to the unemployed and eradicate poverty’ (Ciampi, 1995, p. 7). The 
Commission reinforced this point in its 1996 report on benchmarking, drawing a two way line 
between industrial competitiveness and labour markets: 
‘A better functioning labour market is generally acknowledged to be a vital factor for the 
competitiveness of European industry, just as the competitiveness of industry is, in itself, a determining factor for 
the level of employment’ (European Commission, 1996, p. 11) 
Competitiveness had traditionally looked into the industrial ‘framework conditions’ of 
firm performance. Amidst the employment crisis of the 1990s, however, an additional layer was 
added. Competitiveness referred not just to the framework conditions for industrial performance 
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for its own sake, but how industrial performance was a vehicle to improve standards of living 
and employment levels.  
 
The Managerial Reformatting of EU Policy Coordination  
Building on the changing definition of competitiveness, the associated policy instrument 
of benchmarking was repurposed at the end of the millennium in a way that reformatted EU 
policy-making along managerial lines. For the ERT and earlier EU policy-makers, benchmarking 
was on the margins of public policy. In contrast, in the hands of EU policy-makers and the social 
democratic governments at the 2000 Lisbon Council, benchmarking was generalised into a major 
regulatory instrument coordinating EU labour and welfare policies (Arrowsmith et al., 2004). 
Making this shift, the 2000 Lisbon Council introduced a ‘new open method of coordination’, 
cemented in the 2001 White Paper on Governance. Alongside this, the Lisbon Agenda adopted at 
the 2000 Council set broad objectives for development against the infamous goal to ‘become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’. 
Crucially, in invoking competitiveness now defined in social terms, the Agenda targeted 
not just market ‘structural reform for competitiveness’ but also ‘modernising the European social 
model’ (European Council, 2000). A follow-up report from André Sapir (economist and advisor 
to Commission Presidents Prodi and Barroso) made this connection between compulsions for 
competitiveness and welfare reform most clear. The report argued the purpose of Lisbon was ‘a 
massive change in economic institutions and organisations’ (Sapir, 2003). Elaborating his 
thinking, Sapir wrote elsewhere how ‘[t]he greatest challenge for the European economy is to 
become sufficiently flexible... This requires, above all, reforming labour market and social 
policies’ (Sapir, 2006, p. 370). From its original focus on inter-firm comparisons for industrial 
innovation or international comparisons of industrial policy, benchmarking at Lisbon became a 
central mechanism to coordinate the social policies of member states towards a broader 
conception of competitiveness.  
 The significance of benchmarking competitiveness at Lisbon and through the OMC was 
how social and welfare coordination in the EU was reformatted along the lines of public 
management in a way that gave supranational institutions a stake within policy-making. The 
OMC worked through guidelines and targets based on negotiated ‘quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and benchmarks’ (European Council, 2000). The traditional legislative method for 
social policy in the European Social Dialogue had proven slow and fraught with political 
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difficulty. Likewise, a series of summits on social policy and employment in the late 1990s had 
surfaced a frustration with convergence as a policy goal. The OMC provided a means to develop 
a European stake in social policy through the language of competitiveness and the technique of 
benchmarking by stepping outside of the EU legislative process and into a field of extra-
institutional, intergovernmental coordination according to a logic of strategic performance 
management. This extra-institutional push of governance was recognised as a tension in the 
White Paper on Governance, hesitating that the OMC ‘should be a complement, rather than a 
replacement, for Community action’ (European Commission, 2001). The OMC would, however, 
go on to dominate social policy coordination, shifting it from the convergence sought by Delors 
to strategic performance management of Third Way social democracy.  
Originally, the Lisbon Agenda was an intergovernmental affair. The OMC and other 
benchmarking activities largely took place in the impenetrable and opaque sub-committees of 
the Council. To this extent, the Commission was somewhat shut out of the Lisbon Agenda. 
Nevertheless, the Commission increasingly attempted to take charge of the Lisbon Agenda as it 
developed. Most pivotally, a relaunch of Lisbon in 2005 was directed by the Commission as a 
means to increase its involvement in the governance of social and economic affairs (Paul 
Copeland, 2012, p. 5). Adopting a strategy that had worked well for the Single Market 
programme, the Commission relaunched Lisbon via two high-level groups, resulting in the 2003 
Sapir and 2004 Kok Reports (Kenneth A. Armstrong, 2012, p. 213). Reflecting the rightward 
shift of the Commission under incoming President José Manuel Barroso, the long list of goals 
set at Lisbon was refocused onto the overarching objective of labour market reform and Lisbon 
was rebranded as the Partnership for Growth and Jobs (European Commission, 2005).   
For the Commission, this rebranding came with an assertion of its political control 
over the growing managerial orientation to EU policy-making. The new agenda was more 
integrated into existing reporting processes the Commission controlled and refocused on issues 
that suited the political proclivities of the Barroso Commission. The BEPGs and Employment 
Guidelines were brought together into a single reporting process, while the more social policy 
oriented OMsC were side-lined (Paul Copeland & Daly, 2015, p. 142).  
 This construction of supranational authority through performance management has 
often been played down because the core of the EU is critically understood through a neoliberal 
agenda for a Hayekian federalism of internationally constitutionalised markets. Drawing 
attention to the managerial origins of benchmarking competitiveness though reveals the 
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governance turn implied a considerably different vision of governance to neoliberalism.  
Whereas neo/ordoliberals emphasised rigid rules for a legitimate market order, benchmarking 
competitiveness advocated a flexible and iterative form of governance based on information-led 
strategic decision-making. The FSU project on governance offers perspective on this vision of 
intervention that permeated the OMC. In the FSU project on governance, flexible techniques 
were heralded as offering a way to overcome the stasis of the bureaucratic state. Within the FSU 
project discussed in the previous chapter, this vision was termed ‘proceduralism’. Proceduralism 
meant facing the crisis of implementation and rationality by opening a ‘dialectic between the rule 
and its application’ through a ‘proceduralisation’ of governance (De Schutter et al., 2001, p. 41). 
By placing rules and their implementation in an interactive relationship, proceduralisation meant 
‘a putting in place of mechanisms which enable learning processes to be generated at a collective 
level which can cope with the uncertainty’ of the world (De Schutter et al., 2001, p. 43).  
Benchmarking was imagined as such a tool for the proceduralisation of governance 
that the FSU proposed. The ERT, for example, saw benchmarking as a policy tool that dealt 
with the complexity and uncertainty of a ‘continually changing world’ (ERT, 1996, p. 5). It was 
an instrument that could confront such complexity through a tool that ‘is non-stop. It is a tool 
to bring about the continuous improvement and adaptation’ of policy (ibid.). Benchmarking as 
it was imagined in the EU was a legacy of the cybernetic-inspired search for managerial 
instruments to aid constant adjustment in the face of uncertainty. It was not an instrument of 
neoliberal market order. Testifying to this, the ERT elaborated that ‘it is no good setting targets 
because they will move in tune with constant change in the world outside. What matters is your 
position on the journey of change and improvements’ (ERT, 1996, p. 5). Similarly, as Lisbon’s 
architect Rodrigues elaborated, governance was meant to ‘organise a learning process at the 
European level in order to stimulate exchange and the emulation of best practices as well as to 
help member states improve their own national policies’ (Rodrigues, 2002, p. 23).These were 
instruments that emphasised a dynamic and responsive approach to decision-making that built 
directly on the institutionalist policy analysis of public management scholars like Scharpf, 
Metcalfe, or Majone.  
The significance of this is to show the importance how the format of public 
management underpinned the ‘governance turn’ in the EU. Neoliberals had foreseen that market 
integration would mean a curtailment of a Brussels bureaucracy. But it was the management 
deficit that loomed over EU policy-makers in the 1990s. The turn to benchmarking 
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competitiveness offered the EU a technique and framing (appropriated from management 
theorists) that would broaden the reach of European institutions into areas of economic and 




 While recasting economic and social issues as managerial concerns, this was not 
straightforwardly a process of depoliticisation or technocracy. Rather, the turn to governance 
was explicitly framed as a project of democratisation. Indeed, Commission President Romano 
Prodi argued that ‘when we speak of governance we are, in fact, discussing democracy’ (Prodi, 
2001). Likewise, for the architects of the Lisbon Agenda, the OMC, and the White Paper on 
Governance, a more flexible managerial approach was meant to rejuvenate democracy in the EU. 
For political operator Pascal Lamy, the political backlash to Maastricht meant technocracy would 
no longer cut it. Ross reports Lamy as arguing ‘Now St Simonianism is finished. It can’t work 
when you have to face democratic opinion’ (Ross, 1995, p. 194). Rather than the stale rules and 
regulations agreed by experts in basement committee rooms, the benchmarking and evaluation 
of the governance turn was meant to throw open policy making to participatory consultation 
exercises and the radical transparency of quantitative indicators. Rather than the sanctity of 
traditional expertise, governance was built from a redefinition of democracy as managerial 
evaluation. 
This managerial redefinition was clearly visible in the work of two prominent public 
managers discussed in the previous chapters - Fritz Scharpf and Giandomenico Majone. Public 
management discussions of the democratic implications of European integration in the 1990s 
put legitimacy in cybernetic terms of input and output (Scharpf, 1970, 1999). The framing itself 
was uncontroversial. Input referred to who participates in the making of public-policy. Output 
referred to the performance or quality of governing institutions. But this common sense framing 
hid a managerial inflection that has come to redefine the question of legitimacy in the EU.  
Output legitimacy for public managers was not simply adhering to a republican 
sentiment of the common good, nor a utopian promise of ‘peace and prosperity’. Rather, it was 
grounded in a managerial assessment of adherence to KPIs. Majone’s description of output 
legitimacy, for example, reads as an NPM manifesto: ‘clear and narrowly defined objectives; 
accountability by results; strict procedural requirements; professionalism; transparency; public 
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participation; and even inter-agency rivalry and regulatory competition’ (Majone, 2002, p. 5). 
Output legitimacy meant analytically-determined effectiveness. This bundling of managerial 
effectiveness and legitimacy was also prominent in the FSU. The major report of the FSU’s 
‘Governance Project’ argued that one must ‘reject the idea that a conflict exists between the 
effectiveness of a rule and its legitimacy in the eyes of those it affects… since what has no 
legitimacy cannot be effective, and what is ineffective cannot be maintained on the sole pretext 
of preserving vested interests’ (De Schutter et al., 2001, p. 18).  
The equation of output legitimacy and managerial effectiveness was seen as 
particularly relevant for the EU. In discussing EU democratic reform, Majone disputed the 
predominant concern with bolstering traditional democratic institutions such as the European 
Parliament (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Instead, he argued ‘there is an urgent need to re-set the 
standards by which we assess the legitimacy of European integration and of the institutions 
which guide it’ (Majone, 1998, p. 5). For Majone, democratic legitimation of the EU could not 
be compared to its national counterpart because ‘the process of European integration is 
inherently non-majoritarian’ (Majone, 1998, p. 7). Integration was cast as a process of regulatory 
cooperation that was, for Majone, concerned with efficiency and effectiveness. The benchmark 
of the EU’s legitimacy could not, therefore, be found in popular control. Instead, legitimacy was 
to be grounded in the analytically determined effectiveness of its output and the managerial 
accountability of its institutions. 
While emphasising that the EU’s primary legitimating mechanism was managerially 
determined output, Majone put a clear limit on the extent to which this could apply. Majone 
argued that non-majoritarian output legitimacy was only relevant for areas of pareto-efficiency, 
where all would be affected equally. As soon as questions of distribution were at stake that 
involved transfers from one group to another, Majone argued that output legitimacy (and hence 
EU action) was unacceptable. Majone wrote how redistributive policies can be legitimated only 
by majoritarian means and thus cannot be delegated to institutions independent of the political 
process’ (Giandomenico Majone, 1998, p. 28). For Majone, this meant that redistributive policy 
must remain the province of national governments: the space of parliaments, elections, and 
public opinion. As came out in the debates on Maastricht in the 1990s, budgeting and welfare 
redistribution was an issue seen as intimately bound with the liberal democratic nation-state. 
Redistribution could only be decided by majoritarian means, not regulatory.  
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The trouble with this was that benchmarking competitiveness was being repurposed 
in the EU to intervene in the areas that Majone disputed public management could legitimately 
stretch. Offering a solution to this, and in contrast to Majone, Scharpf suggested that a 
managerial interpretation of legitimacy was possible for redistributive issues by invoking a 
principle of feasibility. For Scharpf, economic integration and the threat of capital flight it 
brought was said to be putting a strain on the viability of welfare states (Scharpf, 1977). As a 
consequence, while an expansionist social policy might be popular, its infeasibility within the 
EMU meant ‘democratic self-determination had lost its effectiveness’ (Scharpf, 1997, p. 28). This 
meant that whereas more generous welfare policies were popular, nation-states under a condition 
of economic integration were increasingly unable to deliver them.  
The seemingly obvious solution to this problem for Scharpf was to increase ‘the 
capacity for market-correcting measures of positive integration at the European level’ (Scharpf, 
1999, p. 71). If popular welfare policies could not be effectively pursued domestically, then the 
European level at which the constraints had been created through market integration in the first 
place should be mobilised to compensate. The trouble for Scharpf was that while he saw market-
correcting measures were required at a supranational level, he argued that it was impossible to 
legitimate them at that level along the majoritarian lines Majone argued were necessary (Scharpf, 
1997, p. 29).  
Scharpf’s solution to this was to argue that the benchmark of effectiveness could 
equally legitimate redistributive policies. Scharpf recognised that this perspective ‘seems to point 
in exactly the opposite direction from the one suggested by Professor Majone’ (Scharpf, 1997, 
p. 29). By including a criterion of ‘effective fate control’ in conceptualising democratic legitimacy, 
Scharpf argued that constrained options make majoritarian rule largely a fallacy if presented 
choices cannot actually be delivered (Scharpf, 1997, p. 19). As a consequence, in determining 
welfare and economic policies, majority decisions were of lesser importance than more 
analytically determined questions of feasibility and the ‘technical quality of policy choices in the 
light of feasible alternatives’ (Scharpf, 1997, p. 29). What this meant was that output legitimacy, 
in terms of policy effectiveness as determined by the analyst, could also be stretched to 
fundamental issues of redistribution and welfare that Majone explicitly sought to remove from 
the table.  
Scharpf thus gave the EU a set of legitimation claims through which to pursue social 
policy through a managerial format of benchmarking competitiveness. By placing the legitimacy 
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of redistributive policy as a question of analytically-determined effectiveness, rather than 
majoritarian decision, Scharpf argued the EU should be grounded in a managerial understanding 
of democratic governance. The argument of Scharpf proved persuasive in setting the coordinates 
of EU legitimation claims for the managerial changes made at Lisbon. In a book edited by the 
author of the Lisbon Agenda (Maria João Rodrigues), Mario Telò argued that ‘the “Lisbon 
strategy” is based on the conviction that the efficiency of economic and social policies is a worthy 
criterion of legitimacy for the EU’ (Telò, 2003, p. 263). Just as benchmarking competitiveness 
was remade as a technique and agenda to intervene in welfare and employment issues, managerial 
effectiveness was recast as a criterion of legitimacy for  interventions into redistributive affairs. 
This was not the technocracy of a Brussels bureaucracy. Nor was it the legal order of 
neo/ordoliberals. The EU’s new managerial regime appealed to constantly adjusting 
performance indicators for its legitimacy. Democracy had been managerialised. 
 
 
4.2 The SGP as a Planning Tool 
Despite the explosion of scholarly interest in benchmarking instruments like the OMC since 
2000, for much literature they have always been bracketed off as a supplementary and 
exceptional development at the margins of EU policy making. Compared to the hard law of the 
Single Market and the strict international constitutional rules of the SGP, experiments with 
quantitative benchmarking are often seen as an add-on in the field of social policy. Van 
Apeldoorn, for example, writes that ‘EU [social] governance indeed remains limited to policy 
coordination through benchmarking, whereas in the case of several policies deemed critical for 
achieving ‘competitiveness’, ‘old-fashioned’, ‘hard’ supranational law-making is still preferred’ 
(van Apeldoorn et al., 2009, p. 30). Meanwhile, Kelemen describes how, ‘in core areas of EU 
competence, such new modes of governance will remain of little significance. They will be over-
shadowed by the persistent tendency of the EU to rely on judicial enforcement of strict legal 
norms’ (Kelemen, 2012, p. 31). The managerial tools of the governance turn have thus been 
bracketed off in the literature as peripheral and weak in remaking the EU. They are seen as a 
testament to the EU’s suppression of the progressive use of public finance, rather than anything 
significant that deviates from it. 
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There is, however, a notable oversight in these readings. Managerial instruments of 
benchmarking were not supplementary to traditional methods. They arose from a deeper 
concern of public management that traditional legal instruments were no longer fit for purpose, 
and especially not fit for the peculiar circumstances of the EU. As such, the governance turn 
extended far deeper than social policy, even if it was expressed most prominently in this field. 
Rather, the format of public management touched the very fundament of neoliberal integration 
– the rules of the SGP. 
The ECJ case discussed in the last chapter triggered a reform of the SGP in 2005. 
States were unhappy with the rigidity built into the rules of the SGP. The Commission and ECB, 
meanwhile, were dissatisfied with the unenforceability of the legal procedure. The response to 
these issues was to introduce greater flexibility into the SGP. The disciplinary procedure would 
be loosened and extended. The Commission would take more issues into account in determining 
‘excessive’ deficits. At first sight, the effect of these changes was a weakening of the SGP. For 
Waltraud Schelkle (2009), however, the reforms of 2005 did not weaken the SGP. They changed 
its logic. What was previously a rules-based instrument governing a perceived moral hazard risk 
became a mechanism of fiscal coordination concerned with the ‘sustainability of public finances’ 
(Schelkle, 2009, p. 834). To this extent, Ben Clift argues the SGP has increasingly resembled 
French dirigisme rather than its ordoliberal foundations (Clift, 2006).  
I argue this transformation to the SGP built on a public management diagnosis that 
fixed rules were unenforceable and, more broadly, law was an inadequate instrument to pursue 
austerity. Through the 2005 reforms to the SGP, states would not be held to nominal rules on 
the size of their debts and deficits. Instead, they would be required to open their books to much 
greater scrutiny from European institutions to assess the long-term ‘sustainability’ and ‘quality’ 
of state budgets. Similarly to the effect of benchmarking competitiveness on managerialising 
social policy, the SGP reforms recast budgetary coordination from contentious questions of 
expenditure control to a managerial issue of fiscal performance. In this way, the EU’s 
supranational institutions were remade in relation to fiscal policy from a weak legal authority 
failing to enforce the EU’s rules, to managerial planners of Europeanised fiscal coordination. As 
such, what ironically came out of national government opposition to supranational institutions 
intervening in domestic budgeting via the rules of the SGP was an empowerment of the 




Reforming the SGP 
The crisis of the SGP in 2004 launched a ‘veritable industry of SGP therapists’ (J. 
Fischer et al., 2007, p. 4). The reform process unfolded over a series of Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and European Council meetings and Commission communications. 
Reflecting on the impending Court judgement, a 24 June 2004 communication  Public Finances in 
EMU 2004 began the process of considering changes, arguing that ‘the effectiveness of 
economic governance has suffered from the developments in 2003’ (European Commission, 
2004b, p. 62). A further communication from the Commission on 3 September 2004 Strengthening 
Economic Governance and Clarifying the Implementation of the SGP laid out a number of the terms that 
would ultimately be agreed (European Commission, 2004a). This was discussed at a Eurogroup 
meeting 7-8 March 2005. No agreement was reached here but the meeting triggered a rebuke 
from the ECB (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, p. 163). In a statement on 21 March 2005, the ECB 
declared it was ‘seriously concerned’ with proposed changes to introduce flexibility into the SGP, 
arguing that ‘it must be avoided that changes in the corrective arm undermine confidence in the 
fiscal framework of the European Union’ (ECB, 2005). The ECB’s unheeded demand to 
strengthen the automaticity and simplicity of fiscal rules has been a consistent theme through 
the life of the SGP. While they shout rules and sanctions, fiscal governance in the EU has 
developed along the lines of planning. The European Council conclusions in March 2005 
adopted an ECOFIN report Improving the Implementation of the SGP reforming fiscal governance, 
which was legally incorporated into the regulations and code of conduct of the SGP in June 2005 
(European Council, 2005). 
There were four major changes made to the SGP. 1) More focus was placed on debt 
and sustainability, rather than a rigid deficit criterion. 2) The objective of ‘close to balance or in 
surplus’ was replaced by country-specific ‘Medium-Term Objectives’ (MTO) for debt and deficit 
reduction. 3) Country-specific economic circumstances were considered in the EDP, thereby 
making the procedure tailored to individual country assessments rather than an automatic legal 
process. 4) Enhanced surveillance and action were introduced at the preventive stage of the 
SGP. 
 
Sustainability of Finances: Broadening the Fiscal Gaze 
A major call of SGP reform was to focus on the sustainability of finances and not just 
the quantitative level of debts and deficits. The 2004 Commission communication saw a need 
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for ‘an increased focus on safeguarding the sustainability of public finances’ (European 
Commission, 2004a, p. 4). The call came from a desire to take into consideration various 
exceptional circumstances and economic developments faced by the member states in the 
handling of their public finances. ‘Sustainability’ offered a more complex approach to governing 
state budgets. It focused on a longer time horizon and budgetary composition, rather than just 
headline nominal debt and deficit figures. In addition to regular economic fluctuations, the 
impact of structural reforms and ‘implicit liabilities’ was deemed particularly relevant by 
European authorities in adjudicating sustainability (European Commission, 2004a).  
The proposal to focus on sustainability and not nominal targets was entirely logical in 
terms of getting a full picture of the state of public finances as a means of resisting the rigidity 
of the SGP’s rules. And yet, the effect of opening up the composition of public finances to 
deeper scrutiny paradoxically went against the premise of national opposition to supranational 
intervention into fiscal affairs. Proving state finances were in better shape than nominal debt and 
deficit figures might reveal required much more supranational intrusion into studying domestic 
budgets according to an indefinite criterion of ‘sustainability’. 
 Paramount in the push to consider public finances in light of implicit liabilities and 
structural reforms was the question of pensions. The France Télécom case discussed in chapter 
three had revealed the gimmickry of states using pension reforms to receive immediate deficit 
reducing cash injections but taking on longer term implicit liabilities of pension obligations. The 
shift in 2005 attempted to tackle this by focusing on the structural (accrual rather than cash) 
deficit ‘net of temporary factors and one-off measures’ (R. Beetsma & Oksanen, 2007, p. 11).  
Other arguments to broaden the SGP to consider budgetary composition came from 
Central and Eastern European governments. These governments were concerned that the SGP 
did not consider how short term costs of pension structural reform could mean longer term 
sustainability. These countries had undergone a rapid and extensive privatisation of their pension 
systems at the turn of the millennium (Orenstein, 2008). They had moved from publicly funded 
systems with large implicit liabilities to multi-pillar models that, in the short term, increased their 
deficits but, they felt, would improve the longer-term sustainability of public finances. As a result, 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe were particularly concerned with implicit liabilities and 
structural reforms being considered in the SGP. Doing so would allow them to not fall foul of 
SGP rules that were squarely concerned with nominal debt and deficit values (Heipertz & 
Verdun, 2010).  
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The effect of the shift to ‘sustainability’ by taking country specific circumstances and 
implicit liabilities into account in the SGP was to expose member states to far greater levels of 
budgetary scrutiny from European authorities than under the nominal rules of the early SGP. 
The Commission described how under the SGP’s reformed Code of Conduct the submission of 
‘detailed government expenditure and revenue account… has now become fully mandatory, 
while in the past only total revenue and expenditure, interest and balances were’ (European 
Commission, 2006). These ‘detailed accounts’ of expenditure touched almost the entirety of 
government policy. The Commission described how it used a ‘relatively broad definition of net 
implicit liabilities’ that would analyse vast and fundamental areas of redistributive policies like 
‘pensions, health and long-term care, unemployment benefits and education’ (European 
Commission, 2007, p. 92). Indeed, by design the Commission’s fiscal gaze had to cover the entire 
budget in considering its sustainability. In taking into consideration country-specific issues to 
calculate budgetary sustainability, Servaas Deroose and Sven Langedijk described how the 
Commission could not remove anything from the table lest that budget area become a channel 
for processing funds, akin to the gimmickry of the 1990s:  
‘The Commission does not favour excluding certain budgetary items from the budgetary 
surveillance process. Such suggestions would dramatically weaken the Pact. Any such 
exclusion from surveillance would lead to a bias towards certain expenditures. 
Governments would have an incentive for “overspending” on expenditures that are exempt 
from fiscal surveillance’ (Deroose & Langedijk, 2005, p. 19)  
The move to acknowledge implicitly liabilities and country specific circumstances had 
come from an intention to limit European intervention into national budgeting – both in terms 
of the expenditure control of the SGP’s early years but also the idea of a supranational fiscal 
capacity discussed since Maastricht. Ironically though, given the resistance to financially 
empowering supranational institutions, the 2005 SGP reforms empowered the Commission to 
analyse the contents of national budgets. The building of a sustainability criterion into the SGP 
gave European institutions a huge new stake in the fiscal affairs of member states – but not one 
traditionally recognised. The Commission was denied a financial capacity of its own and had its 
wings clipped as a legal authority in compelling states to meet fiscal rules. But by being given 
access to a huge swathe of budgetary data, the Commission was empowered as a managerial 




Passing Judgement on Budgetary ‘Quality’ 
Alongside sustainability, the SGP reforms called for a focus on ‘quality’. Whereas 
sustainability opened the door to an information processing capacity for the Commission 
through the scrutiny of state budgets, ‘quality’ allowed European authorities to pass normative 
judgements on budgetary composition. As the SGP became about planning rather than 
expenditure control, judgements over budgetary ‘quality’ empowered the Commission as a 
centre of strategy for Europeanised fiscal policy. 
The issue of budgetary quality emerged out of the context of recession and 
unemployment in the 1990s that underlined the broader turn to the governance agenda. 
Concerned about high unemployment, the Lisbon Council Conclusions asked what ‘the 
contribution of public finances to growth and employment’ could be (European Council, 2000). 
The agreement at Lisbon on a series of developmental targets for the EU made this more 
specific, asking how national budgeting could be marshalled towards European objectives in the 
interests of growth. This spoke to a legacy of budgetary planning concerning how strategic 
objectives could be more aligned with financial resources. The EU’s own budget was both 
miniscule in comparison to the size of the economy and was notoriously intractable to negotiate 
adjustments to (RE). Instead, the tools of fiscal coordination in the SGP were looked at as a 
possible avenue to steer member state budgetary choices in line with European objectives. A 
2004 communication, for example, asked ‘how the instruments for EU economic governance 
could be better interlinked in order to enhance the contribution of fiscal policy to economic 
growth and support progress towards realising the Lisbon strategy’ (European Commission, 
2004a). Lacking a budget of its own, the EU instead sought to steer member state budgets in 
line with its strategic objectives. Assessments of budgetary quality provided a means to do this. 
Invoking quality offered a means to cast budgeting as a managerial issue of evaluation, rather 
than a political issue of redistribution.  
Like many new terms introduced into European discourse, the concept of quality was 
undefined. Operationalising quality was undertaken in the Public Finances in EMU – 2004 report 
(European Commission, 2004b). The report landed on a definition of quality that closely skirted 
to the premise of budgetary planning whereby ‘the quality of public finances concerns the 
allocation of resources and the efficient and effective use of those resources in relation to 
identified strategic priorities’ (European Commission, 2004b, p. 185). Building on this 
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managerial definition of quality, the Commission likewise proposed use of the techniques of 
budgetary planning in order to achieve a quality budget. The 2004 report called for the 
generalisation of cost-benefit analysis within member state budgetary assessments as the means 
of determining quality. For the Commission, cost-benefit analysis was the ‘principal tool for 
identifying “productive” investment’ and thereby what would constitute a ‘quality’ budget 
(European Commission, 2004b, p. 184). Cost-benefit analysis was a key RAND innovation 
emerging from systems analysis to make a rationally determined decision between alternatives. 
The report described how through a ‘shift in focus from cross-country differences in fiscal 
aggregates towards the techniques and institutions that can be used to improve the quality of 
public finances… the technique of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) provides for the essential 
criterion for distinguishing between “productive” and “non-productive” public investment’ 
(European Commission, 2004b, p. 202). CBA would in this way turn the SGP into a managerial 
tool akin to budgetary planning, providing the ‘institutional arrangements for linking public 
expenditure to policy outcomes in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
expenditure’ (European Commission, 2004b, p. 183). 
In combination, the turn to sustainability and quality since the 2005 reforms radically 
altered the logic of the SGP. Far from being a constitutionalised instrument of austerity, it has 
become a coordination process of budgetary planning. This was a point the Commission has 
made explicit. Writing from DG ECFIN, Deroose and Langedijk identified the reforms were 
‘reorienting the Stability and Convergence Programmes towards strategic planning and away 
from the description of the annual budget bill’ (Deroose & Langedijk, 2005, p. 20). 
Financial resources of the EU’s own, large enough to perform redistributive or 
stabilisation functions, were politically foreclosed since Maastricht. Likewise, the fiscal rules of 
expenditure control in the SGP proved administratively and politically infeasible in the face of 
resistance to the EU’s legal authority. The SGP was consequently remade in the 2000s as part of 
a broader turn to governance. It became less a neoliberal device for constitutionalised austerity, 
but instead a planning tool that gave supranational institutions a stake in policy-making as an 
information processor of fiscal performance and a strategiser of the ‘quality’ use of financial 





4.3 Managing 'Neoliberal' Europe Through Reforming the Commission 
The rise of EU governance across social and fiscal policy mobilised the practices and legitimacy 
claims of public management to build the capacities of supranational institutions. To do so, 
however, required a very different European Commission. As chapter three established, the 
Commission was for a long time focused on launching grand initiatives and engaging in high-
level inter-state negotiations. But under the weight of neoliberal integration, the Commission 
was increasingly responsible for tasks of market regulation and macroeconomic governance. The 
‘management deficit’ diagnosis was that in this new context the Commission’s role as a policy 
entrepreneur no longer suited. The institution had, however, been largely unreformed since its 
inception in the 1950s. More pressingly, the Commission in 1999 was facing its greatest political 
scandal with the resignation of the Santer Commission, questioning its legitimacy to act at all.  
The response to this dilemma arrived in 2000 with the launching of the ‘Kinnock 
Reforms’ in the new Prodi Commission. The reforms were seen as part of the broader 
governance turn, focused on the internal administrative dimension of the Commission 
compared to the Governance White Paper’s focus on external and inter-institutional relations 
(Höreth, 2001). The reforms were led by Neil Kinnock. If the objective of the reforms was to 
inject a Third Way managerialism into the Commission, Kinnock was an ideal candidate. He is 
perhaps best known as the leader of the UK Labour Party from 1983-1992 responsible for 
revolutionising the party on the road to the Third Way of Tony Blair. After losing the 1992 
general election, Kinnock began an almost decade long stint as a European Commissioner. He 
was first Commissioner for Transport under Jacques Santer 1995-1999, before its collective 
resignation. Kinnock was subsequently one of several returning Commissioners under Prodi in 
1999 that was relatively untainted by the Santer fraud scandal. Modern managerialism as a 
process of information-led decision-making was a field Kinnock was closely familiar with. In a 
speech to Andersen Consulting, Kinnock discussed what he felt as the deep interrelations 
between data and management whereby ‘supplying knowledge to find out how existing 
knowledge can be best applied to produce results is, in effect, what is now meant by 
management’ (Kinnock, 1993).15 
 
15 Andersen Consulting was the independent but closely affiliated consultancy wing of the global accountancy firm Arthur Andersen. The firms 
were most notable for their implication in the 2001/2002 corporate scandal of Enron. Kinnock and the broader Third Way UK Labour Party 




Bringing this background of Third Way managerialism to the Commission, ‘Kinnock 
therefore came into the job with a set of ideas on how to reform the Commission’ (Schön-
Quinlivan, 2011, p. 68). The fact that he was placed in the position of designing and delivering 
the reforms was, however, not an inevitability. It was not even his priority. In a note from his 
Cabinet as the Prodi Commission was being put together, Kinnock’s Chef de Cabinet Andrew 
Cahn highlighted enlargement as Kinnock’s ‘objective for some time’ (Cahn, 1999). In contrast, 
Cahn was hesitant over the administrative reform position. In the end, Cahn recommended to 
‘go for Enlargement, with Mr Institutions/Reform being the alternative which I fear but feel 
may prove inevitable’ (Cahn, 1999). Indeed, prior to the Prodi Commission being formed, 
Kinnock was privately vocal to Prodi on reform options, but keen to stress his disinclination to 
take charge of them. Writing to Prodi, Kinnock suggested the administrative reforms needed a 
‘Commissioner to deliver the programme for you’ but was adamant that ‘I am not volunteering’ 
(Kinnock, 1999b). Nevertheless, Prodi appointed Kinnock as the chief of the reforms holding 
the position of Vice-President and Commissioner for Administrative Reform. 
The reforms had three major themes (European Commission, 2000a, 2000b). First, a 
focus on ‘Audit, financial management and control’ responded directly to the criticisms of the 
European Parliament appointed Committee of Independent Experts. The Independent Experts 
report had triggered the eventual downfall of the Santer Commission and the reform White 
Paper incorporated many of their recommendations on financial management. Second, ‘human 
resources development’ attempted to restructure staff policy to an unprecedented degree - 
replacing the old seniority privileges with a greater emphasis on performance-related pay and 
managerial skill. Finally, ‘priority setting, allocation and efficient use of resources’ attempted to 
rationalise the strategic use of resources in the Commission, introducing a new budgetary 
planning technique of Activity-Based Management (ABM). 
 
Democratising the Commission by Managerialising It  
The majority of the reforms were not new. Ellinas describes how ‘a number of the 
proposed measures had been either initiated or suggested by previous Commissions’ (Ellinas & 
Suleiman, 2008, p. 710). While many of the reforms were familiar, their significance was far 
greater than past efforts. Whereas previous reforms had been largely technical and internal, the 
political context of the resignation of the Santer Commission placed huge significance on 
delivering the reforms. Bizarrely, as a consequence of this political significance, the 
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managerialisation of the European Commission became bound up with claims of re-establishing 
its legitimacy. The paradoxical result was that in response to criticisms of the Commission as a 
self-interested bureaucracy, the solution became to empower the Commission as a managerial 
actor.  
The reform agenda had huge political significance following the Santer fraud scandal 
that turned usually banal questions of administration into a major political issue. Reform became 
seen as not just organisationally necessary, but politically mandatory. At stake was the legitimacy 
of the EU’s supranational institutions. Kinnock felt this political pressure strongly. He described 
the window opened by the Santer fraud scandal as a ‘burning platform’, such that ‘people here 
know that if we don't reform this institution ourselves, it will be done from outside. The choice 
therefore is improve yourselves effectively, or it will be done for you’ (Buckley, 1999e). 
Elsewhere, Kinnock argued that the Commission will be ‘attacked remorselessly… if it doesn’t 
modernise in order to manifest its full capacity and capability’ (Kinnock, 2000d). In a handover 
document to incoming President Barroso, Kinnock later wrote how fraud allegations taint the 
institutional integrity of the whole Commission whereby ‘mistakes or mismanagement in 
Departments may have absolutely nothing to do with a Commissioner… the political criticism 
will, nevertheless, be aimed directly at that Member of the College’  (Kinnock, 2004).  
These political stakes surrounding the disputed legitimacy of the Commission in the 
wake of the fraud scandal meant the success of the reforms became equated with boosting the 
legitimacy of the EU. Metcalfe described how, in facing the EU’s various problems of ‘poor 
performance, negligence and lack of accountability’, there was ‘surprisingly rapid agreement on 
better management as the solution’ (Metcalfe, 1999, p. 6). The significance was that good 
management became conflated with democracy. Just as Majone and Scharpf had proposed a 
managerial framing for EU legitimacy claims, the bolstering of a management function and a 
managerial class in the EU’s institutions became equated with democratising it. 
 Kinnock was explicit in the fact that the reforms were linked to an agenda of, at least 
appearing to, democratise the EU. Writing in a letter to DG ECHO official Sean Greenaway, 
Kinnock drew a direct link between the reforms and an appeal to legitimacy. Kinnock wrote 
‘‘two things are certain – the modernisation of the Commission is essential to the strengthening 
of EU governance, and the strengthening of governance (at all levels) is essential to the credibility 
and the vitality – the “legitimacy” – of modern democracy’ (Kinnock, 2000c). Facing an affliction 
136 
 
of political legitimacy backlash and a crisis of effectiveness, management became the 
Commission’s tonic.  
Having conflated management reform with democratisation, the means to achieve this 
through the reforms was to displace the authority of policy experts within the Commission with 
that of public managers. The logic of this was that by enhancing the organisational capacities of 
the Commission, through the social forces and format of public management, the institution’s 
legitimacy would be enhanced. What this translated into was replacing the traditional 
entrepreneurial mission of the Commission with a managerial one. The traditional function and 
orientation of the Commission was as a policy initiator. Within isolated DGs, policy experts 
would cook up initiatives to drive integration forward. To the consternation of public managers 
like Metcalfe, managerial tasks were traditionally looked down upon within the Commission – 
having little effect on career progression or notoriety. Metcalfe chastised that ‘established 
patterns of EU decision-making have a built-in bias towards increasing the scale and complexity 
of responsibilities much more rapidly that management and governance capacities. This is a 
recipe for a chronic, and potentially acute, management deficit’ (Metcalfe, 2001, p. 421). 
Elsewhere, Metcalfe described how whereas launching policy initiatives meant ‘Commission 
officials could expect to enhance their reputations and advance their career prospects... tasks of 
management making the resulting policies work in practice have been perceived as much less 
rewarding… and, therefore, unworthy of the time and attention of top level officials’ (Metcalfe, 
1999, p. 6).  
More than just a disdain with careerist Commission officials not taking their 
management tasks seriously, public managers like Metcalfe disputed the very idea of policy 
expertise upon which many Commission officials had grounded their organisational authority. 
The FSU attacked what it saw as a ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ reliance on policy-specific experts 
in the Commission. The final FSU project report argued that ‘knowledge is no longer “given” 
and accessible by the mechanisms of elected representation or by the concentration of specialist 
expertise’ (De Schutter et al., 2001, p. 3). This was a longstanding sentiment within public 
management built on a cybernetic interpretation of the inherent dynamism of the world. Majone 
described elsewhere how ‘under conditions of increasing cognitive and social complexity… the 
very notion of expertise must be either abandoned or drastically revised’ (Majone, 1979, p. 564).   
This managerialisation of the Commission through the Kinnock reforms was not a 
deepening of technocracy in the EU. Rather, it built on Majone and Scharpf’s managerial 
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criterion of ‘output’ legitimacy. Public managers and policy analysts were on this basis not 
technocratic experts. They were viewed as agents of democratisation not by their possession of 
specialist knowledge. Rather, it was because they were equipped with the techniques that could 
construct the intra-executive accountability mechanisms required in a managerial democracy that 
they were equated in the reforms with democratising the Commission. A new class of policy 
evaluators, middle-managers, and auditors were regarded in the reforms as possessing the 
techniques that could hold policy specialist staff accountable. 
Building on this critique of expertise, the Commission management reforms sought 
to displace experts with managers. The reform White Paper put great emphasis on the skills and 
organisational stature of management. In a note from Kinnock to Prodi, it was argued that what 
the Commission needed was a transformation ‘from a limited, policy-focused culture to one 
where management skills are truly valued’ (Kinnock, 1999b). Elsewhere, Kinnock argued that a 
new layer of middle managers needed empowering through the reform, displacing the hitherto 
strength of policy experts: ‘we need to demonstrate in deed and word that – for the first time – 
middle managers are being treated seriously as a professional group with demanding 
responsibilities’ (Kinnock, 1999a).  
Delivering this, the reform process was awash with managerial influences. It has often 
been observed that the Kinnock reforms did not make an extensive use of management 
consultants. Spence argues that ‘there has been no attempt to appeal to outside management 
consultants’ in the reforms (Spence, 2014, p. 53). Similarly, Schön-Quinlivan wrote how 
‘consultants were not brought in to draft the core and structure of the reform programme’ 
because Kinnock felt that ‘the reform would only be successful if the in-house knowledge was 
used’ (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, p. 75). Indeed, the White Paper and the majority of the reform 
process was designed and delivered internally by working groups, task forces, the policy 
machinery of Kinnock’s cabinet, DG Admin, and DG Budget.  
And yet, external managerial influences were present throughout the reform process, 
reflecting the weight attached to management as a field in driving the reforms. Michel Barnier 
wrote to Kinnock in October 2000 proposing he approach consultants Herbemont César and 
Associates to advise on the reform process (Kinnock, 2000e). Kinnock was also in 
correspondence with a consultancy connected to Philip Gould. Gould was a political consultant 
who had worked closely with Tony Blair on massaging the public image of the UK Labour Party. 
Gould proposed a series of interviews with upper management of the Commission on ‘change 
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processes’ and a senior associate to Gould, Joel Levy, visited the Commission (Kinnock, 2000b). 
Change management experts Liz Richards and Andrew Lewis from SDL Consulting were also 
brought in to run seminars for the College on how to deliver the reform agenda (Richards & 
Lewis, 2000). A Pricewaterhouse report, held in the files of Kinnock’s Chef de Cabinet Philip 
Lowe, spoke directly to the agenda of displacing experts with managers. It argued for a new 
emphasis on ‘adaptability and flexibility when faced with change, being accountable for results, 
and visionary and strategic thinking’ that would mean ‘technical expertise is the least important’ 
attribute in an organisation compared to managerial competence (Abramson et al., 1999). While 
consultants may not have driven the reform process directly, management as a field was firmly 
in the minds of the Commission staff who did shape the reforms. 
The emphasis placed on management within the Commission at the expense of 
expertise or initiation drew much criticism. Much of the criticism depicted the reforms as an 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ coup to transform the Commission from a unique and political institution, with 
a mission to drive forward European integration, into an enfeebled managerial organisation, 
pushing papers at the behest of member states and modelled on a multi-national corporation. A 
contributor to the reform consultation process criticised that in the draft white paper ‘the 
Commission is not identified as a driving force of the Community process, and its political role 
and right of initiative are largely overlooked’ (Trojan, 2000). The anonymous author was worried 
that the emphasis on management cast ‘the Commission as an almost purely project-managing, 
money-spending, administrative organisation’, and thereby marginalised its traditional, active 
political role.  
Likewise, staff unions criticised what they saw as ‘an Anglo-Saxon offensive to unseat 
the culture we’ve had for forty years’ (Osborn, 2001). A Le Monde headline identified a 
managerial ‘Anglo-Saxon infiltration’ of the Commission threatening a degradation of its 
traditional political function (Laurent, 2000). A newsletter from GRASPE in January 2001 
sought to defend this political purpose for the Commission against the management reforms.16 
The paper argued that ‘fonctionnaires of the European Commission are not traditional 
bureaucrats: they are, so far as possible, militants of the European project’. The push for 
management reforms, rather than empowering the Commission, was seen as neglecting its 
 
16 Groupe de Réflexion sur l’avenir du Service Public Européen [GRASPE - Reflection Group on the Future of the European Civil Service] is an 
internal network of European civil servants that arose in 2001 as part of the reform process of the 2000s to reflect on process of European 
integration https://graspe.eu/  
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traditional role of developing broad policy initiatives: ‘The Commission is and will be, together 
with the member states and the European Parliament, judged on outcomes (e.g. the completion 
of the Single Market, the launch of the Euro) as much as on its sound management practices’ 
(GRASPE, 2001, p. 6). Working from the premise that policy development, rather than a 
strengthened management process, was of paramount importance, the paper ended by asking 
‘What is the next flagship project that we want to propose to Europeans?’ (GRASPE, 2001, p. 
6). 
At the time, then, the managerialisation of the Commission was widely read as an 
impoverishment of the institution’s classical role and authority. Building on chapter two, 
however, I argue that the shift to a more managerial outlook for the Commission was a testament 
to the dilemma of supranational authority thrown up by ‘neoliberal’ integration. The 
Commission’s entrepreneurial role had for a long time been a detriment to its actual capacity to 
govern. At a time post-Maastricht where the EU’s governance responsibilities were growing, but 
it lacked traditional policy instruments and was facing a major legitimacy crisis, the social forces 
and format of public management offered an alternative means to wield a supranational 
governing capacity built from techniques of information processing and the legitimacy claims of 
managerial ‘output’. A principle area in which the reform process manifest the empowering of a 
managerial function in the Commission was the resurrection of programme budgeting under the 
banner of ABM. 
 
Between the ‘Betrayal of Efficiency’ and Budgetary Planning Resurrected 
The legacy of the Santer corruption scandal loomed large on the content of the 
administrative reforms. Building directly on the criticism of the Committee of Independent 
Expert reports, a major section of the reforms focused on financial management, audit, and 
control. Given perceived levels of fraud, a large portion of this was concerned with tightening 
financial control processes. As chapter three discussed, a growing EU budget had descended 
into a morass of informal outsourcing, ad hoc budgeting, and cronyism. The previous system of 
financial controls was heavily centralised to the point of lacking any oversight. Control and audit 
within the Commission was done from a central office removed from the point of spending and 
only signed off after it had happened.  
There was a belief at the highest level of the Commission that this system had allowed 
staff to get away with budgetary laxity, negligence, and fraud. A confidential note passed to 
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Santer from Delors at the start of the new Commission in 1994 wrote that ‘some individuals 
have abused their relative freedom, either to adopt attitudes towards professional responsibilities 
which are unacceptable, or to indulge in practices which are indefensible’ (European 
Commission, 1994). The final reform White Paper, however, sought to play down any direct 
accusations against staff, focusing instead on structures. This came after a backlash from staff 
feeling accused of the malfeasance of individual Commissioners. A response to the reform 
consultations described how ‘there is a widespread perception among staff that the Consultative 
Document unfairly apportioned blame to them… the Commission’s problems result from 
structures and systems and not from its staff’ (Kinnock, 2000a).  
Indeed, there was a concern among staff over possible retribution against individual 
staff members that may be a consequence of the reform process. In a letter to Kinnock, a 
colleague wrote ‘many are frightened, and that is not too strong a word, that there will be a 
blacklist, or that retribution will come from somewhere at some time unspecified in the future’ 
(Kinnock, 2000d). The concern was that, whereas the scandal that had triggered the crisis was 
the behaviour of specific Commissioners, notably Edith Cresson, the reform process it initiated 
targeted financial control over lower rungs of the Commission. Alan Hick, the president of the 
Union Syndicale, criticised at the time how staff ‘are being made scapegoats for the past behaviour 
of commissioners. Kinnock is suggesting that there is something dreadfully wrong with the 
European civil service, when it was the commissioners who were guilty of giving jobs to the 
boys’ (Evans-Prichard, 2001).  
The reforms indeed beefed up financial control. DGs were made directly responsible 
for the execution of their own finances, an Internal Audit Service was set up to monitor DGs, 
as well as further auditing services within DGs established to monitor financial control 
processes. The emphasis placed on budgetary control and audit led to criticisms from some 
public managers over the heavy bureaucratic load it would bring. Budgetary delegation was a key 
plank of many NPM reforms, commonly used to hold managers accountable for outcomes as 
‘budgeting for results’ (Schick, 1990). But the context of the fraud scandal within the 
Commission meant the reforms were more heavily weighted to exercising financial control 
through minute cost supervision rather than the planning leverage of budgeting for results.  
As a result, public managers in the FSU criticised how the reforms were ‘rather limited 
in its ambitions’ (De Schutter et al., 2001, p. 263). The report went on to say that the control 
and audit reforms ‘represent the bare minimum… and the fact that they can be presented 
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respectively as ‘important’ and as ‘an overhaul’ at the turn of the 21st century would be a cause 
for embarrassment if they were not so obviously and urgently required’ (De Schutter et al., 2001, 
p. 263). Disappointed by the focus on control rather than planning, the FSU said the reforms 
‘betray an overwhelming concern with efficiency which, while commendable, is conspicuously 
not qualified by a commensurate concern with legitimacy and effectiveness’ (De Schutter et al., 
2001, p. 263). While vital, the focus on budgetary supervision and audit were far removed from 
the releasing of managerial discretion and governing according to a budgetary planning logic. 
Indeed, in a handover to Commission President Barroso in 2004, it was felt that since the 
reforms ‘too many Commission staff are executing budgets, too few are working on the 
Commission’s core tasks of policy conception and delivery’ (Kinnock, 2004). 
Despite this heavy emphasis on control, the reforms also introduced important 
innovations with the resurrection of budgetary planning. The adoption of Activity-Based 
Management (ABM) resurrected programme budgeting within the Commission that had been 
first attempted in 1970 (and discussed in chapter three). The significance of this has been that 
policy-making and political power has shifted to the centre of the Commission, emboldening 
the Commission President and attached Secretariat-General to steer the organisation according 
to centrally defined political objectives (Hartlapp et al., 2013). 
ABM is classically not a device of programme budgeting. Its corporate origins are as 
a costing system for organisations. It emerged from the work of Gary Cokins on activity-based 
costings (Cokins, 1996). Cokins was one of the many students of the business school and 
consultancy revolution of the 1950s and 1960s that underpinned the global rise of public 
management (Khurana, 2010). He graduated Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management 
and was a consultant at KPMG. He produced an enormous number of texts on activity based 
costings and, along with Robert Kaplan, the ‘balanced scorecard’ method of performance 
management that has also proven extremely popular in the EU (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). The 
purpose of activity-based costing was not enhancing strategy per se in line with the tradition of 
budgetary planning, but rather to provide the infrastructure of organisational costing to generate 
the information that could be used for strategic decision-making. 
Much like the EU appropriated benchmarking beyond its origins, the Commission 
recast ABM for the broader purposes of strategic decision-making (Levy, 2004, pp. 173–174). 
ABM in the Commission’s hands was developed as an attempt to bring together policy objectives 
with resource allocation. To do so, a Strategic Planning and Programming (SPP) Unit was 
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introduced into the Secretariat-General (SG) of the Commission that would work on developing 
an Annual Policy Strategy. Assisting this, a new informational architecture of Integration 
Resource Management System was established in the Commission and each DG set up its own 
SPP function to feed into the SG’s central process.  
The first planning cycle was underdeveloped. A planning official in the central office 
told Michael Barzelay and Anne Sofie Jacobsen how the first annual strategy was just a long to 
do list drawn from consultations with staff: “We developed the political priorities in the first 
round by going out and asking all of the Commission staff and all the senior officials in the 
Commission what they felt were their big challenges’ (Barzelay & Jacobsen, 2009, p. 324). 
Moreover, Commission staff pushed back against ABM for being an overly complicated and 
bureaucratic exercise. In the summary of a reform consultation, staff were noted as feeling ‘ABM 
seems overly complicated and will require a lot of effort to implement or else it will become a 
bureaucratic exercise’ (Task Force on Administrative Reform, 2000). Similarly, in a steering brief 
for Kinnock, his office described how a mood amongst staff was that ABM was ‘some luxurious 
add-on to their normal and essential duties. They will do it if they have time but otherwise it’s 
just a nuisance’ (Office of Neil Kinnock, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the introduction of ABM significantly altered the internal balance of 
power within the Commission. Using the instruments of management, the executive authority 
of the Commission President and SG have progressively taken a central place within the 
workings of the institution. The development of ABM ‘created a central capacity for priority 
setting, resource allocation and compliance monitoring within the Commission’ that placed the 
President at its core (Kassim et al., 2017, pp. 659–660). This was closely connected to replacing 
policy experts with public managers. Indeed, at the time of its adoption there was a concern that 
ABM was part of the assault on policy focused staff, displacing their role in policy-formulation 
with a managerial focus on budgetary planning. One concerned official warned that ‘a political 
definition of priorities cannot be replaced by ABM; it must be policy-driven, not budget-driven’ 
(Kinnock, 2000a). As DGs began to realise that ABM was going to have significant bearing on 
their level of resourcing, they began attempting to strengthen their own internal SPP functions, 
recognising that ‘the amount of resources they received depended on the quality of their inputs 
to the APS exercise’ (Barzelay & Jacobsen, 2009, p. 326).  
The introduction of ABM, then, changed the social fabric of the Commission. Less 
important was policy experts, more important was the techniques and social power of public 
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managers. Rather than understanding the technical nuances of agricultural or competition policy, 
increasingly the Commission looked to the skills of management - cost-benefit analysis, policy 
evaluation, or strategic planning - as the source of internal institutional authority. 
At the beginning of the millennium,  the future and integrity of the Commission was 
seriously in doubt. The institution was haunted by the Santer Commission scandal. Fraud 
scandals continued to weigh on the Commission throughout the 2000s, with a stream of further 
allegations from Paul van Buitenen, chief internal auditor Jules Muis, and chief accountant Marta 
Andreasen. The response to this crisis was to pick up longstanding agendas for management 
reform and recast them as the means for democratisation and modernisation. Financial control 
would be strengthened and policy experts would be brought to heel under the scrutiny of public 
managers. The Commission would regain a sense of purpose not through political vision but 
through strategic managerial planning. For many, the Commission’s turn to management in the 
early 2000s was testament to its long drift out of the political spotlight. The reforms of the 
governance turn are from this perspective reflect the shifting centre of gravity from 
supranational authorities to intergovernmental sites like the European Council. And yet, the turn 
to management reinvented the Commission as an organisation. Where it lost stature as a policy 
entrepreneur, the cementing of a European polity at Maastricht meant the turn to management 
gave the Commission a new stake in a Europeanising policy-making system as a planner.  
 
Conclusion 
The 2000s was the decade of governance. Through the turn to the OMC at Lisbon, the 
watering down of the SGP’s fiscal rules, and the management reform of the Commission, 
‘governance’ spoke to the ways in which the European project was being reinvented as a 
managerial project. Critical scholars have tended to read the rise of governance as a highpoint 
of neoliberal integration. Through supranational law and constitution, national governments 
were prevented from encroaching on markets by restricting the progressive use of public 
expenditure. Techniques like benchmarking were subsequently registered in critical EU 
scholarship as poor approximations to traditional fiscal policy. They were thus significant only 
insofar as they produced neoliberal subjects fit for a market framework by turning policy-
making into a competitive process of climbing rankings. 
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In this chapter, I have argued that the rise of governance at the turn of the 
millennium reflected an effort by supranational institutions to respond to the dilemma of 
supranational authority discussed in chapter three. By remaking the work of supranational 
institutions along managerial lines, they attempted to gain a stake in national policy-making 
despite their limited financial means and the failure of their legal authority. By discussing 
welfare as a question of competitiveness that could be benchmarked, or discussing national 
budgets in terms of their fiscal performance, the EU developed capacities of intervening into 
social, economic, and fiscal affairs on managerial terms, despite lacking the fundamental 
instrument of public authority in an actual budget.  
The EU’s lack of fiscal tools that could perform stabilising, redistributive, or 
expenditure control budgetary functions has meant these shifts of governance have often been 
read as a poor and peripheral approximation of a working fiscal policy. By highlighting the 
history of another budgetary function of planning discussed in chapter two, this chapter has 
shown how the governance turn signified the efforts of supranational authorities to build their 
capacities by drawing on public management. This meant empowering a new managerial class 
within the institutions of the EU and developing the European Commission’s cognitive 
authority as a centre of strategy and information processing. 
Governance as an explicit reform agenda was short lived. The onset of the global 
financial crisis meant voluntary coordination through the Lisbon Agenda or OMsC was a 
luxury. As Europe plunged into crisis after the crash of transatlantic finance in 2008, the Euro 
currency came under existential threat - and the EU’s institutions with it. The EU entered a 
frenzy of institutional reform around 2010. Its instruments of governance were relaunched as 
the ‘New Economic Governance’, the ECB embarked on extraordinary bond purchases, and 
new bailout institutions like the ESM were created. As the next chapter five will show, it 
seemed in this process that the managerial planning of ‘governance’ was out and neoliberal 
rules and imposition were back. As chapter 6 will show, however, while the governance agenda 
itself died, the managerial inflection to European policy-making did not.  
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Chapter 5: The Crisis of 'Governance' and the Return of Rules? 
 
Introduction 
‘The present rules-based system of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has become 
nearly unmanageable due to its complexity, and the constant addition of exceptions, escape 
clauses, and other factors’ (Wieser, 2018) 
 
Facing a dilemma of supranational authority, European institutions turned to ‘governance’ in 
the 2000s. I argued in the previous chapter that governance was an agenda of EU reform that 
mobilised the social forces and format of public management to coordinate EU policies. EU 
governance did not introduce the stabilisation or redistributive budgetary functions of a 
European welfare state, nor the expenditure control of a neo/ordoliberal constitution. EU 
governance instead built on the legacy of public management and budgetary planning. By 
reformatting the work of European institutions along managerial lines, the governance turn 
reflected an attempt to build supranational authority and legitimacy through the practices of 
strategising and information processing. In doing so, European institutions increasingly became 
populated by a managerial class trained in techniques of policy analysis, evaluation, and planning. 
The reform euphoria around EU governance was, however, short-lived. By 2010 
governance became a conceptual banality. The EU, meanwhile, was facing an existential crisis. 
As the ramifications of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis worked their way through the nodes 
of trans-Atlantic finance, a heavily exposed European banking system found itself at the gates 
of a severe liquidity crunch and left holding an unbearable debt burden. What followed were 
years of lurching from crisis to crisis. Banking crises turned into a sovereign debt crisis for 
Europe’s most precarious governments. A sovereign debt crisis turned into a political crisis as 
governments collapsed across the Union and the future of the EMU was put in doubt.  
Even before bailout battles, extraordinary monetary policy, and prolonged recession, 
the EU’s ‘governance’ agenda was in tatters. The new techniques of benchmarking 
competitiveness had done little to achieve the targets of Lisbon. Taking over the rotating 
presidency in 2009, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Finance Minister Anders Borg 
observed that ‘with only a year remaining before it is to be evaluated, [the Lisbon Agenda] has 
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been a failure’ (EURACTIV, 2009). Likewise, despite revisions in 2005 to the SGP turning it 
into a more flexible process of strategic planning, the financial crisis exposed the limits of EU 
fiscal coordination to either prevent or handle a budgetary crisis. The depth and protraction of 
the Eurozone’s crisis made the EU’s peculiar governance arrangements appear dysfunctional 
rather than innovative. 
The battle lines forged in the autopsy of EU governance was that other budgetary 
functions needed enhancing. For many embattled Southern European governments facing the 
‘doom loop’ of banking and fiscal crisis, and those holding ambitions for a European welfare 
state, the EU needed the common budgetary tools overlooked at Maastricht. Along these lines, 
the Five President’s Report in 2015, issued by the leaders of the EU’s five supranational institutions, 
proposed strong fiscal cooperation, a European unemployment scheme and a Eurozone finance 
minister (European Commission, 2015a). For Northern European governments that felt they 
would foot the bill of such collectivised spending and debt, it was a lack of adequate expenditure 
control within the EMU that needed enhancing. If the EU’s economic governance was to be 
rules-based, then those rules needed to be flexed. As the Bundesbank head Jens Weidmann 
replied to French President Macron’s 2017 proposals for fiscal union, ‘I hear a lot of common 
liability, but little of common decision and control’ (Jones, 2017). 
In response to the crisis of European governance, the EU’s policy-making architecture 
underwent an overhaul. The resulting reforms were labelled as the New Economic Governance 
(NEG). A 2011 ‘Six-Pack’ and 2013 ‘Two-Pack’ of regulations and directives beefed up the debt 
and deficit rules of the SGP and introduced a new legal instrument covering macroeconomic 
imbalances (the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure - MIP).17 An intergovernmental treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (commonly 
referred to as the Fiscal Compact) mandated that balanced budgets be enshrined in domestic 
law. A relaunched development plan of Europe 2020 set new quantitative targets for poverty 
reduction and environmental protection. Finally, and eventually, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) introduced a financial stabilisation fund to conditionally bailout countries in 
fiscal distress.18 
 
17 The Six-Pack was made up of four Regulations 1175/2011, 1177/2011, 1173/2011, 1176/2011, and 1174/2011, and one Directive 
2011/85/EU. The Two-Pack was made up of two Regulations 473/2013 and 472/2013 
18 The ESM was established as an intergovernmental organisation in September 2012 to replace the previous temporary funds of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). The ESM required a Treaty change to Article 136 
on economic and monetary policy to get round the “no bailout” rules of Article 125. 
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For many scholars, the shakeup of EU governance dispensed with the open 
coordination of the 1990s and strengthened neo/ordoliberal legal imposition. Ryner and 
Cafruny, for example, observed that the ‘New Economic Governance…can be seen as a return 
to executive authority, hard law, and regulation to achieve the substantive [competitiveness] 
goals of Lisbon’ (Ryner & Cafruny, 2017, p. 125). Likewise, Oberndorfer characterised the 
changes as a movement ‘“back” to direct domination, which detaches itself even more strongly 
from “self-rule” and consensus’ as had characterised the OMC (Oberndorfer, 2015, p. 203). 
Bruff observed how, compared to the OMC, a ‘relatively open, dialogical, horizontal and “best 
practice” set of mechanisms had now hardened into a relatively closed, punitive, hierarchical and 
“the best practice” set of procedures’ (Bruff, 2017, p. 160). Making sense of this, scholars have 
often pointed to the ideological underpinnings of the NEG in ordoliberalism. Having first 
figured the financial crisis as one of reckless spending requiring austerity (Blyth, 2013), the 
changes to economic governance in the EU have resembled an ordoliberalism-inspired 
deepening of rules on debts and deficits (Ryner, 2015). 
Just as it was at the EMU’s founding discussed in chapter three, this chapter argues 
that the focus on rules and legal imposition in post-crisis EU governance is misleading. While 
rules were highly prominent in the heat of the crisis, they were political bargain chips. The rules 
of the Fiscal Compact and the enhanced sanctions of the NEG were a tribute to nationalist 
elements of creditor countries. As tributes, they unlocked the financial support instruments of 
the ESM and the ECB’s monetary firepower that was necessary to preserve the Euro. But, as 
the opening quote from political operator Thomas Wieser exclaims, the rules themselves have 
been watered down and selectively mobilised since the crisis. Alongside the strengthening of the 
SGP’s compliance procedure, a variety of escape clauses and exceptions were built in and have 
been widely used by the European Commission - most recently through the suspension of the 
SGP in the COVID-19 crisis. Similarly, the new macroeconomic Excessive Imbalance Procedure 
(EIP) sanctioning process was not triggered once throughout the crisis, despite a huge number 
of cases of excessive imbalances. The idea that supranational institutions could legally punish 
member states for failing to deal with current account or private debt imbalances largely beyond 
their control was unthinkable for national and EU policy-makers in the heat of the crisis. Instead, 
the Commission created a variety of new analytical categories for member states to avoid the 
sanctioning effect of being found in ‘excessive imbalances’.  
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 As this chapter will show, the NEG was not a resurgence of rules. Rather, the NEG 
posed once more the dilemma of constructing supranational authority along legal or financial 
lines that first arose most clearly in the 1990s. This time, though, the stakes were different. In 
establishing the EMU all that was at risk were the political ambitions of the Euro’s architects. In 
the 2010s, however, the price of failure of supranational governance was the collapse of a deeply 
interconnected financial system organised around the Euro, and the enormous social and 
economic damage this would bring. 
The chapter has three sections. First, I show how European policy-makers translated 
the crisis of transatlantic finance since 2008 into a crisis of the EU’s governance architecture. 
Rather than a crisis of global finance, the predominant interpretation of the crisis in the EU has 
been the failure of European governance mechanisms to force states to stick to fiscal rules and 
implement structural reforms to labour markets. Second, I show how European policy-makers 
built on this interpretation when they overhauled the governance system of the EU since 2010. 
At first glance, the NEG that was created appeared to resurrect rules. But, third, I show how 
upon closer inspection the NEG‘s rules were never as strict as we have theorised and, in practice, 
have been applied incredibly loosely. In the final chapter after this, I show how the widely 
recognised empowerment of authoritarian executive power in Europe should not be understood 




5.1 Financial Crisis as a Governance Problem  
 
A Crisis of Trans-Atlantic Finance 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 marked a perilous turn to the financial crisis. What 
began as a panic in sub-prime mortgage markets had led to the collapse of a central institution 
of global finance. This was no normal boom and bust. The wheels of global finance and the 
shadow banking system were coming undone. Adam Tooze noted a smugness among many 
European policy-makers watching the crisis unfold across the Atlantic (Tooze, 2018, p. 64). 
Observing the turmoil on Wall Street, many European officials felt themselves immune. Tooze 
quotes how the Italian finance minister Giulio Tremonti ‘boasted that Italy’s banking system 
149 
 
would be fine because “it did not speak English”’ (Tooze, 2018, p. 64). In an ironic turn given 
the crisis that was to shortly engulf Europe, German Chancellor Angela Merkel went as far as 
declaring that ‘Anglo-Saxon’ finance had failed and the Eurozone could offer some lessons to 
their US counterparts on banking regulation (L. Barber et al., 2008). 
As Tooze explains, this European narrative ‘was convenient, but it was self-deception’ 
(Tooze, 2018, p. 64). Indeed, by 2010 the Eurozone went from delivering sermons on prudence 
to Wall Street to questioning whether it would even survive. The revelations from the new 
Socialist government in Greece in October 2009 that the country’s deficit would reach 12.5%, 
rather than the 6-8% previously projected, threw the Eurozone into crisis (T. Barber, 2009). 
After a series of austerity budgets, by the spring of 2010 it was clear that Greece was effectively 
insolvent. A hastily and reluctantly cobbled together bailout package from the ‘Troika’ of 
institutions (the ECB, Commission, and the IMF) was delivered to Greece. The ‘extend and 
pretend’ logic of it, however, meant it neither settled the debt burden in Greece or financial 
market pressure on Greek bonds (Varoufakis, 2017). The crisis subsequently spread to countries 
facing similar fiscal pressures from banking sectors spiralling out of control. Crisis hit Ireland 
first; later Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus. 
While the story of the crisis is mostly familiar, explanations are less agreed upon. Paul 
Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz were quick to rush to the conclusion that the Optimal Currency 
Area (OCA) perspective that was critical of the Euro from its beginnings had been proven 
correct (Krugman, 2012; Stiglitz, 2016). According to an OCA analysis, the Eurocrisis was a case 
of a series of asymmetric shocks (Greek public debt, Irish and Spanish housing bubbles) in a 
monetary union that lacked the necessary tools for adjustment. A flat interest rate across the 
union was missuited to divergent economies and the Eurozone had no fiscal transfers with which 
to flatten asymmetric business cycles. Most importantly, the monetary union meant currency 
adjustment was unavailable as a policy response for countries like Greece entering recession. 
The Eurocrisis thus proved for scholars like Krugman and Stiglitz that the EU was not, indeed, 
an OCA.  
The claims surrounding an OCA are, however, a misnomer. As Waltraud Schelkle 
describes, in contrast to where OCA theory would direct our attention, ‘the shock causing the 
EA crisis was not asymmetric and idiosyncratic but followed the common shock of the financial 
crisis’ (Schelkle, 2017, p. 185). The Eurocrisis was not a perversity of either public debt nor a 
functional inevitability of the peculiar lopsided construction of the EMU as OCA would imply. 
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Much to the surprise of European policy makers, it was a crisis of finance. Not a financial crisis 
imported from Wall Street. But a crisis of European banks’ own making within the morass of 
trans-Atlantic finance.  
By the time the crisis hit, Europe was heavily ‘overbanked’ (Tooze, 2018, p. 95). 
Europe was home to the world’s three largest banks in terms of assets. RBS, Deutsche Bank, 
and BNP had balance sheets representing 17 percent of global GDP (Tooze, 2018, p. 95). In the 
massive expansion of credit that took place in the 2000s, ‘Europe’s banks were at the leading 
edge of the boom’ (Tooze, 2018, p. 88). Far from being insulated from Wall Street’s 
misadventures in securitised mortgages, Europe’s banks were heavily implicated. Indeed, the 
European financial system had come to operate as a ‘global hedge fund’ (Tooze, 2018, p. 71). 
Europe’s banks were heavily exposed globally, holding huge claims in both the United States 
and Asia. In Ireland, the ‘liabilities of its banks added up to 700 percent of GDP’ (Tooze, 2018, 
p. 95). But this was not restricted to the business models of small open economies. It touched 
the core of Europe in France and Germany – most notably through the case of Deutsche Bank. 
 
Zombie SGP and The Haunting Question of a European Fiscal Capacity 
The chaotic unravelling of this massive financial system following the US sub-prime 
crisis is what triggered the Eurozone crisis. While the crisis began from this common financial 
shock of the party ending on European banking misadventures, it manifest as a series of fiscal 
and sovereign debt crises across the EU. In response, the question of the fiscal capacity of the 
EU to support the Union was once again thrust into the spotlight.  
Whereas the OCA-laden debates of the 1990s were concerned with a fiscal capacity as 
a macroeconomic stabilisation and redistribution tool in a currency union, the stakes this time 
were squarely financial. The ‘doom loop’ setting in revealed the pressing need for a European 
fiscal capacity as a financial stabilisation instrument. Banks needed recapitalising with safe assets. 
The most stricken banks in countries like Spain and Ireland, however, were turning to national 
governments who were equally facing a liquidity crisis as sovereign bond yields shot up. A 
financial stability fund was needed that was large enough to recapitalise European banks and 
bailout governments stuck in the doom loop. A fiscal union may not have prevented the EU’s 
crisis, but a fiscal capacity was needed more than ever to rescue it.   
In contrast to this pressing need for an adequate bailout instrument, the limited 
mechanisms of fiscal coordination the EU did have were looking increasingly redundant. The 
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deficits being experienced during the crisis made a mockery of the SGP’s 3 percent /60 percent 
deficit and debt rules. In 2010, France was posting a deficit of 6.9 percent, Spain 9.5 percent, 
and Ireland a colossal 32 percent. All Eurozone countries with the exception of Luxembourg 
were in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (Hodson, 2011, p. 57). In such circumstances, the rules 
of the SGP appeared absurd.  
Facing rising public debt levels, the persistent diagnosis of the Eurozone crisis was 
that Europe suffered from a legacy public debt and profligate spending problem which the SGP 
had failed to resolve. Austerity made a comeback after 2010. In a ‘bait and switch’ the financial 
crisis was turned into a fiscal crisis in the minds of policy makers and electorates (Blyth, 2013). 
In what later proved to be based on flawed data, economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff’s influential paper Growth in a Time of Debt was widely mobilised by policy makers 
preaching the virtues of restraining public debt. Shifting attention from dealing with a European 
banking sector in crisis, the problem was recast as one of keeping European state budgets under 
control.  
Framing the financial crisis as one of public debt, European policy-makers turned their 
attention to the perceived governance problems of the SGP in tackling it. In doing so, policy-
makers did not challenge the validity of the SGP’s rules. Throughout reform negotiations for 
the NEG, policy-makers argued that the crisis of public debt was not for lack of clear and proper 
obligations concerning public finances. A pivotal report from van Rompuy’s TFEG observed 
that the SGP ‘remains broadly valid’ (Task Force on Economic Governance, 2010).19 Likewise, 
a Commission communication on reform proposals argued that ‘the rules and principles of the 
Stability and Growth Pact are relevant and valid’ (European Commission, 2010d).  
If the SGP was regarded as fine in principle, explanations of the Eurozone crisis were 
located in states not following the rules and the limited supranational instruments to compel 
them to do so. This required a significant revision of earlier perspectives. As late as 2008, the 
European Commission was arguing that after the reforms of 2005, ‘a weakening of 
implementation as feared by media and other commentators did not materialise’ (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 138). Nevertheless, by 2010 the NEG negotiations surfaced a perspective 
that the scale of public debt being accumulated through the crisis was a testament to the failure 
 
19 The Task Force on Economic Governance (TFEG) was established following the March 2010 European Council to present proposals for 
enhancing economic governance in Europe in the face of the unfolding Eurozone crisis (Council Concs March 2010, p6). Through a series of 
meetings between European finance ministers and officials from the Commission, Council and ECB, the details of the NEG were largely worked 
out over the summer of 2010. 
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of EU governance to control public expenditure. An EP official reported to Laffan and Schlosser 
that ‘non-compliance with rules was identified as the cause of the crisis’ (Laffan & Schlosser, 
2016, p. 329). Denmark offered a widely held perspective on this, arguing that ‘the root of today’s 
public-finance challenges is a not lack of sound rules, but the fact that rules have not been 
implemented and enforced effectively. Accordingly, the challenge is not to fundamentally 
overhaul the rules, but to strengthen the implementation of the rules’ (Government of Denmark, 
2010). 
In 2003, the failure of the SGP’s rules was the result of vocal and deliberate political 
choices from France and Germany in responding to a growing recession. In 2010, however, no 
one seemed to be in control. Amidst the doom loop between the banking sector and yields on 
sovereign debt, public finances were slipping out of the control of even the most zealous 
austerity-pursuing finance minister. Moreover, prior to the crisis, many of the now stricken 
countries like Ireland and Spain were posting healthy surpluses. How then to shift the blame for 
the crisis onto the national handling of public finances? 
In holding that the SGP’s rules were valid, officials argued that the problem was they 
were insufficiently enforced in the boom times of the 2000s. The argument was that 
governments failed to get their fiscal houses in order to prepare for rainy days. If they had, 
European officials argued that countries could have had sufficient buffers to face down the crisis. 
In a preparatory document for the TFEG, the diagnosis of the crisis was that ‘several Member 
States did not take the opportunity of good economic times to consolidate their budget and 
reduce their debt’ (Council of the European Union, 2010). The Commission similarly argued 
that ‘Member States failed to build up adequate buffers in good times’ (European Commission, 
2010d).  
At a time where banking sector balance sheets were many times the size of their host 
country’s GDP, the proposition that any boom-time buffers would have been sufficient to 
rescue a financial sector in crisis was clearly ludicrous. Nevertheless, the fault of the crisis was 
not found in the absence of European financial supervision, but in the weakness of the 
preventive instruments of the SGP to sufficiently control public expenditure before the crisis 
hit. The final TFEG report argued that the SGP ‘needs to be applied in a better and more 
consistent way’ (Task Force on Economic Governance, 2010). It was no good tackling a crisis 
once it was already here, went the argument. Closer scrutiny of member state budgets was 
necessary at an earlier stage to prevent a crisis before it arrived. If the changes of 2005 were to 
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broaden the range of fiscal evaluation from nominal figures to budgetary composition and 
sustainability. In 2010, reform was about saying that a more forthright intervention into national 
budgeting processes was needed to influence this composition and path to sustainability, rather 
than just disciplining states if they pushed over nominal values or an evaluated drift from 
sustainability. 
The Greek experience cast a long shadow over this framing. The revelations of the 
true size of Greece’s deficit in 2010 pushed opinion towards the idea that it was Southern 
European profligacy that bond markets were reacting to, rather than a European banking sector 
on ice. This was a dangerous game, however. All states and institutions shared some 
responsibility. An EDP had just been closed for Greece in 2007, despite widespread inaccuracies 
in their statistics that were seemingly missed (Hodson, 2011). Moreover, it was an open secret 
that Greece had fudged numbers to get into the Euro. But it was hard to cast stones in a currency 
union made of glass. The Greek statistical abuses case may have been flagrant. But as chapter 
three discussed, many countries had engaged in some kind of accounting gimmickry to enter the 
Eurozone. Moreover, it was not so long ago that France and Germany were publicly and willingly 
violating the terms of the SGP.  
Nevertheless, the scale of the deficits being posted in the Eurozone in a currency 
union supposedly founded on a principle of stability meant policymakers felt something had to 
be done. Europe had clearly lost control of its public finances. Whether it was caused by public 
or banking profligacy was moot. Rules had not cut it in the 2000s to coordinate fiscal policy 
because of the EU’s limited legal authority. But neither had the relatively non-invasive 
performance management of the governance turn. Mobilising a planning function in the EU had 
given supranational institutions a stake in policy-making, but it turned out to be poor at the 
actual task of governing. Something had to shift. 
 
Macroeconomic Imbalances and Crisis of Competitiveness  
Alongside public debt, macroeconomic imbalances were widely understood in the 
reform of EU governance as a major contributing factor to the Eurozone crisis. In a ‘consensus 
view’ amongst mainstream economists on the causes of the Eurozone crisis, blame was placed 
on the ‘standard culprits that have been responsible for economic crises since time 
immemorial… too much public and private debt borrowed from abroad’ (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 
2015, p. 19). Indeed, intra-European current account differentials had ballooned in the years 
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leading up to the crisis. Despite Germany’s global banks being at the forefront of the crisis of 
trans-Atlantic finance, the country’s high-volume of exports and dampened domestic demand 
meant they were registering high positive current account surpluses throughout the crisis years. 
In contrast, countries like Greece and Portugal were struggling with growing current account 
deficits and the financing problems that comes with it. Despite the framing of EU policy-makers, 
it was not as straightforward that German surpluses mirrored Southern European deficits, but 
rather that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ design of the EMU had created a divergent dynamic between 
the EU’s heterogenous economies (Dooley, 2019). As the Eurocrisis erupted, these 
macroeconomic sources of imbalance were increasingly turned to by policy-makers as a 
condition requiring treatment. 
Macroeconomic imbalances are longstanding feature of the EMU since its creation. 
The fact that they were now treated as a pathology was a sizeable turnaround from earlier 
perspectives. It was not in the too distant past that economists had been largely ambivalent to 
the observed build-up of current account imbalances, treating them as benign effects of 
Southern Europe ‘catching-up’ through massive inflows of capital and investment (Blanchard & 
Giavazzi, 2002). As late as 2008, the Commission was celebrating 10 years of the EMU through 
a triumphant report on the effects of free capital movement for macroeconomic stability. 
Imbalances from this perspective were seen somewhat positively, reflecting the efficiency gain 
for the European economy of deeper credit markets while also lowering macroeconomic risk by 
acting as ‘a channel for managing asymmetric shocks’ (European Commission, 2008, p. 94). To 
this extent, the remarkable turnaround in the perception of imbalances within the Eurozone has 
been described as a ‘revisionist consensus’ (Collignon, 2013). 
In defining the macroeconomic imbalances plaguing the Eurozone, a consensus 
quickly formed following the onset of the crisis that large current account imbalances in 
Southern Europe were a problem of asset bubbles and competitiveness divergences (Belke & 
Dreger, 2011; Giavazzi & Spaventa, 2010; Gros, 2012). A stream of publications from 
economists and political scientists began asserting that monitoring and resolving 
macroeconomic imbalances would be key for stabilising the Eurozone and preventing a future 
crisis. Macroeconomic imbalances were reassessed as no longer a vehicle for ‘catch-up’ 
development, but instead a pathology of specifically Southern European economies pursuing 
unsustainable economic models (Belke & Dreger, 2011). This corresponded to earlier arguments 
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epitomised by Sapir that Mediterranean and continental welfare models were inherently 
inefficient and unsustainable (Sapir, 2006). 
Competitiveness significantly framed this understanding of macroeconomic 
imbalances, building on longstanding concerns since Maastricht. Of concern were the 
divergences in relative competitiveness internally between Member States. In a manner that 
subsequently framed all subsequent discussions of competitiveness in crisis reforms, a 2008 
Commission report noted the ‘substantial and lasting differences across countries in terms of 
inflation and unit labour costs… [that] led to accumulated competitiveness losses and large 
external imbalances’ (European Commission, 2008, p. 6). This was a fact that had also been 
made on several occasions already by the ECB. In November 2008, an ECB note argued for ‘the 
need to monitor closely competitiveness in the euro area’ building on an observation that 
increasing intra-European disparities in labour costs and nominal wage growth may have 
implications for macroeconomic stability (ECB, 2008).  
While the financial sources of imbalances were also addressed in discussions, the 
predominant way to do this was to link them once more back to a pervading concern with labour 
competitiveness. For the Commission, the crisis was not one of the freedom of capital as such. 
It was the uncompetitive allocation of this credit that was the issue. The Commission argued 
that ‘low financing costs fuelled the misallocation of resources to often low productive uses, 
feeding unsustainable levels of consumption, housing bubbles and the accumulation of external 
and internal debt in some Member States’ (European Commission, 2010d). To this extent, 
financial imbalances were linked back to questions of competitiveness: asset bubbles were seen 
as a failure of national policy to facilitate credit inflows away from consumption and into 
productive industries. This was instead of treating the crisis more squarely as one of an 
overleveraged financial sector out of control.  
Building on this diagnosis of a crisis of competitiveness, policy-makers in the NEG 
negotiations argued that new governance tools of macroeconomic coordination were needed. 
Policy-makers widely felt that while fiscal policy had an established coordination mechanism in 
the SGP, a coordinated macroeconomic policy for Europe was alarmingly underdeveloped. 
Even where imbalances were not registered as a huge problem in 2008, a Commission report 
argued that the increasing economic interconnectedness of the EMU, and attendant possible 
spill-over risks that came with it, meant ‘there is a clear need to broaden surveillance to address 
macroeconomic imbalances’ (European Commission, 2008, p. 8). By 2010, this feeling was 
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affirmed. The Commission was explicit in its 2010 reform proposals that ‘it is now time to move 
to action and harness the framework of economic coordination and surveillance in the euro area 
in order to prevent future imbalances or detect and tackle them early on’ (European 
Commission, 2010d). This call to deepen economic coordination to remedy imbalances did not 
unfold in a governance vacuum. Indeed, the governance instruments of benchmarking 
competitiveness created at Lisbon had explicitly attempted to coordinate these issues. In a similar 
fashion to the perception that the SGP had failed, the NEG negotiations built on a similar 
reflection on the failures of Lisbon. 
 
Lisbon’s Autopsy 
Just as with fiscal policy, the crisis of competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances 
was interpreted ‘as a failure of governance, rather than a failure of politics or policy’ (Bulmer, 
2012, p. 19). Pathologised divergences in labour costs were seen not as product of political 
decision or macroeconomic dynamics. They were a failing of past governance mechanisms to 
make the necessary structural reforms opening labour markets that the EU had been preaching 
since Maastricht. A Commission communication in 2009 argued that ‘broader macroeconomic 
surveillance is urgently needed to spur a co-ordinated policy response to the competitiveness 
challenge’ (European Commission, 2009). Likewise, a German contribution to the TFEG argued 
that ‘the existing system of economic surveillance has failed to identify and tackle structural 
imbalances and competitive weaknesses in euro area Member States’ (Government of Germany, 
2010).  
By 2010, it was a widely held opinion that the tools of social and welfare coordination 
set in motion at Lisbon had failed. Mocking the grandiose ambitions of Lisbon, The Economist 
asked ‘Do Europeans want a dynamic economy?’ (Charlemagne, 2010). The Economist’s answer 
was apparently not, given how profoundly the Lisbon Strategy ‘had failed’. Dissections of 
Lisbon’s failure had been rumbling since as early as 2005 after the scathing mid-term report of 
Wim Kok (Kok, 2004). Copeland wrote how compared to the relative speed with which the 
Single Market had been accomplished, ‘the lack of concrete progress emanating from Lisbon is 
striking’ (Paul Copeland, 2012, p. 232). Indeed, Tilford and White saw that, if anything, ‘the gap 
between the best and the worst performing countries is arguably wider in 2010 than it was in 
2000’ (Tilford & Whyte, 2010, p. 3). 
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As is customary in discussions of EU governance, the problem for the EU was not its 
objectives or politics, it was a problem of implementation. Iain Begg was representative of this 
perspective in arguing ‘strategic issues can now be regarded as largely settled… A sense of 
urgency about implementation is now needed’ (Begg, 2006, p. v). Similarly, the mid-term Kok 
report saw that ‘Lisbon’s direction is right and imperative, but much more urgency is needed in 
its implementation’ (Kok, 2004, p. 16). The OMC came in for sharp criticism as the centre piece 
of the EU’s managerial instruments. The Commission’s evaluation of Lisbon considered that 
while the OMC was meant to drive policy change through the peer pressure of benchmarking, 
it ended up as just ‘a reporting device rather than one of policy development’ (European 
Commission, 2010c). Gaming seemed to be rife in the benchmarking exercises of the OMC. 
Some states seemingly only engaged with the process when it fitted pre-existing domestic 
agendas (Magnusson, 2005, p. 110). Others reported activities within the OMC they had already 
done, rather than responding to the agreed criteria the OMC exercises were aiming for (Begg, 
2007).  
The Commission felt that Lisbon had become overly elaborate – ‘the original strategy 
gradually developed into an overly complex structure with multiple goals and actions and an 
unclear division of responsibilities and tasks’ (European Commission, 2010c). Indeed, the 
number of disjointed and overlapping coordination mechanisms had proliferated since the 
launch of the OMC. The Kok report lamented that the Lisbon Agenda had spiralled into more 
than a hundred indicators (Kok, 2004, p. 43). There was a Sustainable Development Strategy, an 
Energy Policy for Europe, and the Employment Strategy. In addition, there were OMsC for 
social protection,  social inclusion, pensions, immigration, and education. All required reporting 
from states at different times and to differing standards. The result was that Lisbon had become 
‘everything and thus nothing’ (Dawson, 2011, p. 195). Benchmarking competitiveness had 
certainly given supranational institutions a stake in policy-making, and empowered a public 
management class in the process, but it was widely seen to have failed in delivering on its stated 
goals of boosting competitiveness and convergence.  
Evaluating this, the widely held conclusion was that the problem of implementation 
was not the logic of performance management but the intensity it had been applied. The 
assumption that peer pressure through managerial techniques of benchmarking would generate 
policy change had proven illusory.  What was needed was a firmer hand. Bulmer observed that 
‘if peer review is to be effective, stronger sanctions may be needed’ (Bulmer, 2012, p. 46). 
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Likewise, the Sapir report evaluating the progress of Lisbon in 2003 was already scathing of the 
leverage the OMC could mobilise to achieve its goals, stressing that ‘the gap between objectives 
and means must be bridged for the EU to fulfil its commitments’ (Sapir, 2003, p. 156).  
The dilemma reflected a key problem triggering the move to managerial instruments 
like benchmarking competitiveness or fiscal performance management in the first place - the 
lack of financial instruments or legal authority to leverage administrative action. Searching for 
such means, reflections on Lisbon asked how the small EU budget, as well as national fiscal 
policies, could be better aligned with the reform agenda in a manner of budgetary planning. The 
Sapir report argued that currently ‘the EU budget is a historical relic’ (Sapir, 2003, p. 162). Its 
excessive focus on the CAP meant the EU had little alignment between its spending and its 
purported strategic priorities. Likewise, Wim Kok’s report saw that ‘national and European 
Union policies, including their budgets, must better reflect the Lisbon priorities’ (Kok, 2004, p. 
7). By 2010, the Commission’s reflection on the Lisbon Strategy was also concerned with finding 
ways for the ‘Lisbonisation of structural funds’ (European Commission, 2010c). While the EU 
was good at making grand objectives, all were concerned that it struggled to find ways to translate 
this into budget lines and policy change. In searching for ways to pursue the goal of 
competitiveness, the ghosts of budgetary planning roamed the corridors of Brussels.  
 
 
5.2 The Price to Save the Euro 
Building on this perceived crisis of fiscal and macroeconomic governance, the EU’s governance 
system underwent an overhaul in 2010. In putting together the NEG, the European Council 
President Herman van Rompuy’s ‘Task Force on Economic Governance’ (TFEG) took centre 
stage. The result, according to Michelle Chang, was that the Commission was forced ‘to share 
the spotlight in an issue that it would normally be the sole agenda setter’ (Chang, 2013, p. 259). 
Parallel proposals issued by the Commission in 2010 attempted to steal the initiative from the 
TFEG (European Commission, 2010d). While the proposals did not differ substantially from 
the TFEG’s, it reflected a jostling for a leadership role over who would set the terms of the 
NEG (Falkner, 2018). Also notable in this jostling was a Franco-German deal agreed at Deauville 
that unlocked political agreement on the NEG. For Chang, the deal was the apex of 
‘intergovernmental meddling in the economic governance reform process’, side-lining both the 
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Commission and van Rompuy (Chang, 2013, p. 261). The active role of the Council and national 
governments in setting the terms of crisis interventions led Christopher Bickerton, Dermot 
Hodson, and Uwe Puetter to assert the rise of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’, as the supranational 
Commission was further displaced from its political leadership role in the EU (Bickerton et al., 
2015).  
Testament to the Commission’s marginalisation as a political leader was it being 
overlooked when it came to wielding the financial bazookas that would put the crisis to bed. 
Instead, it was the ECB that was relied upon to solve the crisis once it eventually undertook 
bond purchases and quantitative easing. To this extent, Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt talk of a 
‘subtle disempowerment’ of the Commission through the crisis as authority has flowed into the 
reluctant arms of the ECB (da Conceição-Heldt, 2016). It was a similar story in the fiscal 
measures that were ultimately undertaken. Early efforts at stimulus post-2007 were an 
uncoordinated national affair (Tooze, 2018). The Commission’s attempt to enhance a 
supranational fiscal capacity in crisis responses, through their 2011 proposal for Eurobonds, 
gained little momentum and was quickly shut down (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015). When the 
bailout fund of the ESM was eventually agreed, it was set up outside the EU framework as a 
separate inter-governmental treaty – excluding the Commission from a substantive role. Just as 
in the Maastricht debates, states refused to give the Commission any significant role as a 
supranational fiscal authority. Reflecting this, national official interviewees told Pierre Schlosser 
that in the crisis reforms ‘we didn’t trust the Commission’ and that any meaningful fiscal role for 
the Commission ‘is not legitimated in the eyes of Member States’ (Schlosser, 2019, p. 176). 
 
Refounding EMU’s Debt and Deficit Rules 
While the Commission did not gain powers as a financial actor in the NEG, their legal 
powers were seemingly beefed up through strengthened rules on debts, deficits, and 
competitiveness. The most politically visible changes on this front were the bolstering of the 
EU’s rules on debts and deficits through the ‘Six-Pack’ reforms. The SGP underwent three major 
changes in the reforms. First, sanctions were added to the preventive arm of the SGP. Since the 
changes of 2005, states were reporting against their move towards country-specific budgetary 
objectives (Medium Term Objective - MTO). There was, however, no mechanism to pressure 
states moving towards their MTOs until they exceeded the deficit threshold of 3% and 
disciplinary proceedings could be launched in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The 
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concern that states had not used the ‘good times’ when public finances may have nominally been 
fine, but their underlying balance less secure, pushed the argument that the SGP needed a means 
to intervene into national finances before an excessive deficit hit.  
The second change broadened disciplinary measures for states exceeding the 60 
percent debt limit. Previously, only breaching the deficit limit was a trigger for the EDP. The 
financial crisis had though been figured as one of public debt, reflecting Greece’s legacy of large 
public debt and Ireland’s explosion of public debt after taking on colossal banking liabilities. 
Consequently, the NEG added a mechanism to launch sanctions for exceeding debt limits.  
The final major change to the SGP was the introduction of reverse qualified majority 
voting (RQMV). The effect was to empower the Commission in the procedural steps of the 
SGP. The political suspension of the SGP in 2003 via blocking votes in the Council, against 
Commission proposals to launch EDPs against France and Germany, hung heavily in the air in 
this decision. The move to RQMV was intended to enhance the automaticity of sanctioning – a 
key desire of the ECB. A Commission proposal was to be considered adopted unless a majority 
in the Council could block it. The changes made to the SGP vastly ramped up its legal 
disciplinary intent - sanctions were intended to be adopted earlier, on more issues, and with less 
political manoeuvring. 
The culmination of the turn to authoritarian austerity, however, came in 2012 with the 
Fiscal Compact. The Pact was an intergovernmental treaty signed by all Eurozone members and 
non-eurozone members (with the exception of the Czech Republic and the UK). That it was 
agreed outside the EU’s legislative framework was telling of its severity. The level of 
constitutionalised austerity it called for had no legal foundation within the EU (Oberndorfer, 
2015). At the heart of the Fiscal Compact was an agreement to integrate into national 
constitutions a balanced budget rule, akin to what Germany had adopted in its ‘debt brake’ in 
2009, and to establish independent fiscal boards to supervise national spending. If countries did 
not comply with the treaty, there was the possibility the Commission could refer the case to the 
ECJ. The pact seemingly confirmed that rules were back in the EU. Austerity had gone 
constitutional again after a brief hiatus of managerial ‘governance’ in the 2000s. 
 
Constitutionalising Competitiveness 
While rules on debts and deficits were somewhat familiar, a significant shift of the 
NEG was to adopt a rules-based, rather than voluntary, system of macroeconomic coordination. 
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The BEPGs and the various OMsC in employment and welfare had been the centrepiece of the 
governance turn. In a familiar pattern of governance of stepping outside established institutions, 
political resistance to traditional joint budgetary instruments meant the OMsC in particular 
worked at the margins of EU institutions as an intergovernmental process. An option during the 
EU Constitutional Treaty debates in the mid-2000s to institutionalise these OMsC had been 
rejected. Governments preferred to keep them voluntary and marginal to traditional policy-
making (Kenneth A. Armstrong, 2012, p. 211). 
The diagnosis that the crisis stemmed from an implementation deficit of 
macroeconomic coordination, producing the severe imbalances of the 2010s, radically changed 
this perspective. In response, the managerial logic of benchmarking competitiveness was 
intensified and given legal foundation in the NEG. The key instrument of this was a brand new 
mechanism the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). The MIP was a major shift in EU 
governance. Herman van Rompuy argued in October 2010 that the MIP would be ‘in my view 
the biggest innovation’ of the NEG (European Council, 2010). Through the MIP, benchmarking 
competitiveness was institutionalised in the EU’s regulatory structure.  
The centre-piece of the MIP is a scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators which, 
through upper and lower thresholds, monitors possible imbalances. Building on a diagnosis that 
internal competitiveness divergences were the cause of the crisis, the scoreboard has a heavy 
bias. Current account thresholds are skewed towards monitoring deficits over surpluses. The 
threshold for a problematic current account is a deficit of 4% of GDP, but it is 6% for surpluses. 
Notably, this threshold was fractionally above the surplus Germany was posting as the MIP was 
agreed (Interview 13, National permanent representative official). More revealing is the 
prominence given to unit labour costs, a key competitiveness indicator for the EU. Unit labour 
costs only constitute imbalances when increasing by more than 9% over three years. In contrast, 
excessive wage restraint cannot constitute an imbalance in the MIP. 
The MIP’s structure was largely modelled on the SGP, divided between preventive 
and corrective arms. In the preventive arm, the Commission monitors possible imbalances 
through an annual Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) based on reading the scoreboard. Where an 
imbalance is identified by the Commission, countries can be subject to closer examination 
through In-Depth Reviews (IDR). This consists of a detailed report on the nature of imbalances 
within a country. Where an ‘excessive imbalance’ is detected, the Commission can make a 
recommendation to the Council to place a state in the corrective arm of the MIP: the Excessive 
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Imbalance Procedure (EIP). The EIP places countries under significant Commission 
monitoring. At its most extreme, the EIP contains the possibility of applying annual fines of 0.1 
percent of GDP in cases of repeated non-compliance with reform recommendations.  
The adoption of the MIP marked a significant shift in EU governance. Benchmarking 
competitiveness had used performance management of welfare, labour market, and 
macroeconomic policies as a solution to political resistance to supranational institutions wielding 
common financial resources, but also legal instruments of budget sanctions through the SGP. 
The MIP’s adoption continued to reject that common financial resources would carry the burden 
of bringing macroeconomic instability.20 Instead, the MIP attempted to resolve instability by 
bringing together the managerial logic of benchmarking with a drive to bolster the legal powers 
of supranational institutions. The Commission would scoreboard the EU’s diverse national 
economies. States falling foul of analytically determined thresholds would be legally compelled 
to respond. Managerialism seemed to be given teeth.  
 
Meeting the Rhineland’s Tribute 
The ramping up of rules and sanctions in the NEG dominated news headlines of EU 
crisis responses. Their significance for understanding how the NEG has functioned is, however, 
of less use. Instead, the purpose of drastically scaling up rules on debts, deficits, and 
competitiveness was relevant in their function as political tributes. Rules opened the door for 
intergovernmental and ECB agreement to establish crisis resolution instruments in the ESM and 
the ECB’s bond purchases, rather than actually operable administrative instruments of the NEG.  
What was necessary to resolve the crisis was not impossible to imagine: the Eurozone 
needed a massive recapitalisation of Europe’s banks; a broad and accessible European bailout 
fund to defend smaller states at risk of being overwhelmed by banking liabilities; and a 
combination of creditor involvement in debt restructuring and a much more activist sovereign 
bond purchasing programme to stabilise bond markets spooked by bondholder haircuts. 
While Treaty restrictions on bailouts and debt monetarization were an obstacle, EU 
rules are made to be broken. The blockages were in the end political (Mody, 2018; Tooze, 2018). 
Creditor states – notably Germany and the Netherlands – refused to countenance debt 
 
20 While the ESM did create a common fund, its financial assistance was for emergencies and came with tight 
conditions. In terms of day-to-day macroeconomic governance, the MIP reflected the emphasis placed on 
managerial planning rather than resource allocation. 
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mutualisation. This politically ruled out sovereign bond purchases and recapitalisations 
undertaken by the ECB or via Eurobonds. The extension of financial support to indebted 
countries was not opposed by Germany in principle. But it had to either come with severe 
bondholder haircuts or impose taxing austerity measures on recipient countries if it was to use 
German taxpayer money. For the ECB, however, bondholder haircuts were out of the question 
without an adequate and permanent stabilisation fund. Without this fund, the ECB felt haircuts 
would unleash turmoil on bond market, as creditors of other indebted governments jumped ship 
lest they were next in line. For France, financial stability was likewise paramount. The country 
stood at the top of a colossal Eurozone pyramid of debt (Tooze, 2018, p. 260). Resolving the 
insolvency of Greece through debt restructuring was less important than preventing the toppling 
of this pyramid that led through the banking liabilities of Ireland and Spain, up to the vast public 
debts of Italy, and finally France with its massive debts and even bigger banking liabilities (Tooze, 
2018, p. 260). The crisis of the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, heavily exposed to Greek sovereign 
debt, and already suffering from the fallout of its US operations, testified to this French fear 
(Pignal, 2011). 
The result of these clashing priorities was years of lurching between crises as the EU’s 
institutions and Member States tested each other’s resolve. Each tentative step towards a final 
resolution came with extracting the tribute of fiscal and competitiveness rules, but never quite 
enough to put an end to the crisis. After the first Greek bailout in May 2010, the ECB’s 
concession to EU governments was to launch the Securities Market Programme (SMP) of bond 
buying in May 2010, but it was never enough and too temporary to have any lasting effect.  
Ireland’s 85 billion bailout in November 2010 revealed this inter-institutional 
brinkmanship most clearly (Tooze, 2018, p. 287). In October 2010, France and Germany agreed 
at Deauville to establish a more lasting stabilisation arrangement, in what would become the 
ESM in 2013, along with settling political agreement to the terms bolstering the SGP. The 
agreement came with a vow that private creditors would have to contribute to any future bailout 
assistance. The deal enraged the ECB, fearing the pronouncement would wreak havoc in bond 
markets. In reaction, the infamous ‘Irish letters’ removed the ECB’S Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance from Ireland and demanded that they immediately apply to Eurozone governments 
for a bailout. The ECB was not going to do the financial stabilisation job it felt Eurozone 
governments should be doing. 
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After the ECB had flexed its muscles, it was revealed that extracting monetary 
cooperation from the ECB required fiscal concessions. The agreement on the ‘Six-Pack’ reforms 
in 2011, significantly bolstering economic governance rules, in return extracted the relaunch of 
the Longer-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) from the ECB that had expired. But it was 
the sweeping rules of the Fiscal Compact that unlocked the ECB’s full balance sheet arsenal and 
German agreement to put an end to the incessant sovereign debt and banking crises in the 
Eurozone (Schlosser, 2019, p. 46). Registering the political commitment the Fiscal Compact 
implied, and as the ESM was taking effect, Draghi’s 2012 ‘whatever it takes’ speech signalled 
that the ECB was prepared to purchase bonds on a scale that would put sovereign debt risks to 
bed. Indeed, the turn to QE in 2015, by an ECB that had hitherto been fiercely resistant, revealed 
the monetary financing doors rules unlocked in the Eurozone.  
 
 
5.3 The Familiar Slippage of Rules 
While the NEG strengthened the stridency of the rules-based system of fiscal and 
macroeconomic coordination, in a familiar pattern of the EU the implementation proved 
something  different. To begin with, while the resurrection of rules in the NEG has dominated 
our critical theorisations of the EU, the rules were never as stringent as commonly imagined. In 
relation to the SGP, while the added automaticity gained a lot of attention, the resulting 
regulation changes were not as strict as the politics surrounding them suggested. The idea to add 
sanctions into the preventive arm of the SGP was first raised by the Commission in proposals 
of May 2010. The Commission proposed that interest bearing deposits could be applied to 
member states making insufficient progress towards their budgetary objectives (European 
Commission, 2010d). From this initial proposal, in the early negotiations within the TFEG the 
options placed on the table were draconian. Threats ranged from a widely shared view that access 
to EU funds or Council voting rights should be made conditional on adhering to fiscal rules, to 
an extreme perspective from Slovakia for an ‘ultimate penalty in the form of orderly exit from 
the Eurozone’ (Council of the European Union, 2010; Government of Slovakia, 2010). Among 
the most forthright was the ECB. They argued that automatic ‘sanctions should be initiated in 
any case when a country exceeds the 3% of GDP deficit limit’ (ECB, 2010b). 
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In the end, however, while the ECB was willing to flex its balance sheet, it was left 
disappointed with the outcome of the Six-Pack. The application of sanctions in the preventive 
arm were not automatic, although they were applied through RQMV. In response to the 
publication of the TFEG report, the ECB complained that the proposals ‘do not go as far as the 
quantum leap in the economic governance of Monetary Union that it has been calling for’ (ECB, 
2010a). Of particular complaint was that there was ‘insufficient automaticity’ in the use of 
sanctions. In a September 2011 paper, the ECB complained that the reforms ‘still leave a 
considerable degree of administrative and political discretion at each stage of the process’ 
(Schuknecht et al., 2011). 
Indeed, despite the well-publicised beefing of rules and sanctions in the Eurozone, the 
new SGP had significant discretion and complicating ambiguities built into it. The addition of 
an expenditure benchmark into assessments of budgetary performance, alongside the already 
ambiguous indicator of a structural deficit, diluted the simplicity of the SGP by creating options 
over how compliance was determined. Testament to this, the expenditure benchmark has been 
‘effectively allowing cherry-picking by Member States of the measure less unfavourable’ in 
determining their compliance with fiscal rules (European Fiscal Board, 2019, p. 85). Other forms 
of flexibility built into the reformed SGP included an unusual events clause, an escape clause for 
severe economic downturns, and a series of permitted factors in assessing whether to open an 
EDP (European Fiscal Board, 2019, p. 83). This was in addition to the flexibility already added 
in 2005 on allowances for structural reform, implicit liabilities, and investment. While the beefed 
rules of the SGP made headlines, the significance of the actual reforms in 2011 vastly 
complicated the governance of deficits and debts through a number of new procedural steps 
and allowances.  
It was not only the reformed SGP that was less stringent than the news headlines 
suggested. The centrepiece of the new constitutionalised regime of austerity, the Fiscal Compact, 
was almost entirely devoid of administrative procedures to ensure its implementation. While it 
made big claims on states implementing balanced budget rules, its integration into EU 
governance has merely been based on voluntary reporting within the European Semester. 
Instead of being significant to how fiscal coordination has operated in the EU since its adoption, 
the Pact was a tribute. A review in 2017 from the Commission found that most countries had 
broadly complied with implementing the Fiscal Compact’s provisions (European Commission, 
2017a). But this implementation was seemingly in name rather than substance. For the ECB, the 
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Commission’s report swept the Fiscal Compact under the carpet – many countries had not 
effectively transposed the agreement but had only signalled an intention to do so (ECB, 2017). 
Instead, for the ECB ‘the slow and incomplete transposition of the fiscal compact is 
disappointing’ (ECB, 2017, p. 3). 
Likewise to the SGP, the new MIP fell far short of what was imagined in the draconian 
beefing up of rules for the Eurozone. What was meant to be a rules-based system of 
macroeconomic coordination was instead described by Scharpf as ‘an entirely discretionary 
regime whose scope of delegated authority far exceeds the limits of generally allowable 
delegation in constitutional democracies’ (Scharpf, 2015a, p. 393).  
The original intention of the MIP for some actors, notably the ECB, was much more 
strident than what was eventually created. The Commission were strong advocates for sanctions 
in the MIP. In the Commission’s words, ‘No sanction - no attention’ (European Commission, 
2010a). Although, this was a turnaround from the Commission’s early musings on a new 
mechanism for imbalances. In their communication of May 2010, there was no mention of 
sanctions in a new tool for macroeconomic imbalances. The most stringent proposals from the 
ECB argued that scoreboard indicators should be used prominently within the procedure to 
automatically trigger disciplinary action. The ECB sought to play down the relevance of 
judgement within the interpretation of the scoreboard and rely more directly on a quantitative 
signalling drawn directly from indicators. To do so, the ECB proposed a traffic light system for 
the MIP where breaching a statistical threshold would lead to automatically increasing levels of 
surveillance and sanctions (ECB, 2010c). For its part, the final TFEG report proposed the MIP 
would use the same sanction regime as the SPG – thereby including the possibility of sanctions 
also in the preventive part (Task Force on Economic Governance, 2010). While sanctions were 
added to the MIP, they did not come close to the pacing or severity that the ECB or TFEG 
hoped for. Indeed, the ECB expressed strong dissatisfaction with the final TFEG report – let 
alone the final product – ‘that financial sanctions have not been explicitly retained under the 
macroeconomic surveillance procedure’ (ECB, 2010a).  
The watering down of sanctions in the MIP built from a premise that countries 
opposed the right of supranational institutions to punish states for macroeconomic 
developments largely beyond their control. Sanctioning states for the presence of a nominal 
imbalance in levels of private debt or wage developments, where governments had little direct 
policy control, was not palatable for most. Cyprus spoke for many in October 2010 saying that 
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‘it has to be clear what Governments are capable of doing in these circumstances and whether 
it is in their control to rectify the situation’ if sanctions are to be used in the MIP (Government 
of Cyprus, 2010). The Commission admitted this in asserting that the staging of any sanctioning 
regime must consider ‘the fact that not all policy levers are under the direct control of national 
governments and that economic policy tends to have a lagged impact on the correction of 
imbalances’ (European Commission, 2010b). 
The eventual design of the MIP’s sanction regime was not the automaticity of the 
ECB’s hope, but a discretionary decision from the Council built from interpretative analytical 
judgement by the Commission. This was a point pushed by France in the TFEG negotiations. 
France made clear they were ‘not convinced by the opportunity to include financial sanctions 
rather than reputation sanctions’ (Government of France, 2010). Nevertheless, France conceded 
they would be willing to go along with MIP sanctions on the condition ‘there should be no 
automaticity at all’ - implying sanctions must be linked to non-cooperative behaviour from states, 
based on a political judgement of the Commission and Council, and not simply the presence of 
an imbalance (Government of France, 2010). Likewise, a Commission/Council interviewee 
reported that the nature of macroeconomic imbalances means ‘you cannot make a mechanical 
system with these things because they are very judgemental’ (Interview 17, DG 
ECFIN/ECOFIN Council official). The diversity of possible macroeconomic problems beyond 
those captured in the scoreboard, the political sensitivities surrounding them, and the capacity 
of governments to actually respond to them, meant that using a managerial instrument of 
macroeconomic coordination, like the scoreboard of the MIP, would necessitate a discretionary 
approach rather than one that could adhere to fixed procedural rules. 
If the rules of the NEG were loose, the implementation of them was even looser. The 
onset of recession meant that the flexibility of the EU’s new rules has been actively mobilised. 
This has most visibly manifest in the deliberate introduction of flexibility into the application of 
the SGP since 2014. European Council conclusions in June 2014 said that the need for economic 
growth ‘requires making best use of the flexibility that is built into the existing Stability and 
Growth Pact rules’ (European Council, 2014). Following this up, the Commission issued an 
‘interpretative’ communication in January 2015 that reconsidered the margins of discretion that 
could be flexed in the SGP (European Commission, 2015b). The Commission highlighted three 
factors that would give national governments greater ‘fiscal space’ while remaining compliant 
with the SGP – public investment (specifically contributions to EU investment programmes) 
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would not count towards deficits; structural reforms would be taken into greater consideration; 
and a country’s position in its business cycle would be considered (Sarmento, 2018, pp. 29–30).  
Stretching this flexibility to its fullest, and giving almost total latitude to the 
Commission in its assessments, was the 2017 addition of a provision for a ‘margin of discretion’ 
into the preventive arm (European Fiscal Board, 2019, p. 21). The change came out of heated 
clashes between Brussels and Italy over the country’s budgetary plans in 2016 (Brunsden, 2016). 
Compromising with the Italian government, the Commission proposed adding a ‘margin of 
discretion’ which allows Member States to be compliant with the rules, even if the indicators 
suggest deviation from their MTO. The addition was only used for 2018, being dismissed by 
member states (European Fiscal Board, 2019, p. 86). Nevertheless, the use of the provision 
reflected how far the SGP had come from the draconian rules proposed in 2011. Whereas the 
NEG had preached rules, in practice it was political discretion which was implemented. For 
Hodson, the intensity and frequency that the rules of the SGP have been put aside since the 
NEG was adopted ‘challenge[s] claims that the Stability and Growth Pact entails a rigid set of 
fiscal rules’ (Hodson, 2017, p. 128).  
Likewise to the SGP, the MIP has never been applied as it was intended in the strict 
rules of the NEG. Building on the concerns raised in the negotiations, the sanctioning procedure 
of the MIP has proven impossible to mobilise. As one national official reported, the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure (EIP) ‘has not been used and it will not be possible to use it’ (Interview 7, 
national permanent representative official). The procedure began at the end of 2011 and, despite 
years of crisis and many countries experiencing excessive imbalances, the EIP has never been 
triggered. In a context where many countries are experiencing different forms of imbalances in 
a highly dynamic crisis, mobilising a legal sanctioning regime comes with great political risk for 
the EU over who to target, how to weight the severity of different imbalances, and when to 
initiate a proceeding. As one national government interviewee described, after the initial failure 
to trigger the EIP for current account divergences (a core imbalance) at the height of the 
Eurozone crisis, the idea of then using the sanction process for other imbalances and at other 
times became politically unthinkable (Interview 8, national permanent representative official).  
Indeed, for the Commission, the EIP has been ‘politically difficult to handle’ 
(Interview 16, DG ECFIN official). While almost every country has triggered the MIP’s 
scoreboard thresholds, and some severely, the Commission has opted instead to creatively tweak 
the MIP’s procedural steps rather than use the instrument as it is laid out in the regulations. The 
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first five years of the MIP saw the Commission invent as many as six categories of imbalance to 
avoid launching an EIP while escalating country monitoring (European Commission, 2020, p. 
36).21 While this was regularised to four categories after 2015, it reflected the lengths of 
administrative gimmickry the Commission has gone to in the MIP to avoid using it as the strict 
procedural instrument that it was originally intended to be. 
This challenge of using the MIP as a legal instrument reflects the longstanding 
dilemma of supranational authority. The Commission had carved itself a managerial role of 
information processing in the reforms of the 2000s. Adding teeth to this role as the MIP had 
attempted neglected that the reason for this managerial function was the limited legal authority 
of supranational governance. While the MIP attempted to legalise managerialism (Hodson, 
2018), the implementation of the procedure revealed that the EU continued to suffer from an 
inability to mobilise its legal instruments as they were written in the regulations.  
 
Conclusion 
The Eurozone crisis led to an overhaul of economic governance. The euphoria around a new 
age of ‘governance’ hit the wall of financial crisis and recession in the 2010s. In the NEG, it 
appeared that managerial coordination was being replaced by the original neo/ordoliberal 
intent of the EMU as an international monetary constitution that used rules to discipline 
member states. Sanctions on excessive debts, deficits, and competitiveness would apply earlier 
and more harshly than had previously been the case. As this chapter has shown, however, and 
as was the case with the original SGP, there were severe limits on the extent to which national 
governments would allow themselves to be bound by supranational legal authority. In the end, 
the sanctioning powers of the EU’s governance system was never usable as laid out in the 
regulations and directives of the NEG. The chapter has argued that this inability to mobilise 
the legal authority of European institutions since the crisis reflects the enduring dilemma of 
supranational authority in Europe.  
The next chapter will show how, while the EU’s rules did not live up to their intentions, 
supranational institutions have nevertheless found ways to expand their stake within policy-
making. Alongside the legal sanctioning powers created in crisis responses, a ‘silent revolution’ 
 
21 For the sake of demonstrating the level of administrative sophistry used in the MIP, these six categories are: "no imbalances"; "imbalances, 
which require monitoring and policy action";  imbalances, which require monitoring and decisive policy action; "imbalances, which require 
specific monitoring and decisive policy action"; "excessive imbalances, which require specific monitoring and decisive policy action"; 
"excessive imbalance with EIP". 
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of policy surveillance considerably broadened the managerial planning authority of the 
European Commission. In doing so, a democratic paradox has opened. On one side, the 
managerialisation of EU governance has meant policy-making has become reduced to an intra-
executive regime of performance management which, on its own KPIs, is severely failing. For 
public managers like Scharpf and Majone, the implications of this are that tight limits need to 
be placed on the trajectory of European integration. In contrast to this perspective, the 
European Commission continues to see its legitimacy as hinged on the use of number-based 
policy instruments. In a managerialised EU, managerial planning has increasingly become 








"What is going on is a silent revolution… The member states have accepted - and I hope 
they understood it exactly – but they have accepted very important powers of the European 
institutions regarding surveillance, and a much stricter control of the public finances” 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, March 2010 (Phillips, 2011) 
 
The Eurozone crisis triggered an overhaul of the EU’s governance system creating the New 
Economic Governance (NEG). Initially, it appeared in the NEG that the Eurozone would 
become the rules-based union dreamed of by neoliberals. In this imaginary neoliberal world, 
legal limits on debts, deficits, and competitiveness would be enforced through supranational 
legal intervention. As it turned out, the politics of the Eurozone crisis was not dictated by the 
rule of law, but a discretionary executive politics between national governments in the 
conference rooms of the Eurogroup and the data analysis of the Commission’s . The previous 
chapter showed how, while the EU wrote a lot of rules through the crisis, they have rarely been 
mobilised as the legal instruments they were imagined to be. 
This development that the EU’s crisis responses were often outside the law and driven 
by executive politics has not been lost on the critical literature on the EU. Crum spoke of the 
rise of an ‘executive federalism’ operating outside of parliamentary oversight (Crum, 2013). 
Bonefeld similarly saw an ‘assertion of executive managerialism’ and the ‘coming to power of an 
“unbound” executive’ in Eurozone crisis responses (Bonefeld, 2017, p. 756). A huge number of 
concepts arose to account for this development in the EU, such as authoritarian statism 
(Sandbeck & Schneider, 2014), bureaucratic Caesarism (Durand & Keucheyan, 2015), 
authoritarian neoliberalism (Bruff, 2016), crisis constitutionalism (Bieling, 2015), authoritarian 
liberalism (Bonefeld, 2017), and authoritarian constitutionalism (Oberndorfer, 2015). What 
united these concepts was a view that whereas ‘new constitutionalist’ political institutions have 
always stood behind neoliberal integration (Bieler & Morton, 2001; Gill, 1998), there has been 
since the crisis a more activist state imposition of neoliberalism by the executives of Europe in 
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national capitals and the corridors of Brussels and Frankfurt. This ‘authoritarian’ turn to 
integration was defined by a deeper depoliticisation of economic governance into rules on debts, 
deficits, and competitiveness, and a greater use of executive power to attack rights and mandate 
neoliberal adjustment (Bieling, 2015, p. 105; Bruff, 2014, p. 115). 
Despite scholars identifying the rise of a discretionary executive politics in the EU 
since the crisis, it is puzzling that many of the concepts mobilised to make sense of it continue 
to speak to the authority of rules governing the Eurozone that have never been used. In contrast, 
this final chapter argues that the displacement of rules governing the Eurozone by an ‘executive 
managerialism’, in Bonefeld’s words, should be interpreted as a consolidation of the managerial 
turn first taken as ‘governance’ in the 1990s. In doing so, I show the distinctive managerial forms 
of supranational authority that have been consolidated into the day-to-day policy-making of the 
EU by placing them in the historical context built across the thesis. Alongside the toughened 
sanctions of the NEG came the ‘silent revolution’ described by former Commission President 
Barroso. In the spirit of boosting compliance with the Eurozone’s rules, member states agreed 
in the NEG to open their books to the scrutiny of the European Commission, as they had done 
similarly in the reforms to the SGP in 2005. As the legal authority of the NEG slipped away in 
the face of resistance to the use of the EU’s sanctioning powers, the Commission has 
nevertheless been left with an expanded authority as a planner through its sweeping monitoring 
and evaluation capacities. 
As a way to make sense of the issue of democracy in the EU’s ‘authoritarian’ slide, this 
chapter shows how the consolidation of the EU’s managerial state has opened a democratic 
paradox. Rather than leading to a depoliticisation of governance into technocratic rule, I show 
there has been a divergence in the understanding of the managerial sources of legitimation EU 
institutions appealed to since the governance turn of the 1990s. For the public management 
community as represented by Majone and Scharpf, the crisis exposed the limits to both the EU’s 
ability to govern effectively and (thereby) the extent to which an effectiveness criterion could be 
adequately applied to the EU. Increasingly, public managers have taken the view that the EU 
must either move its managerial interventions out of public view or scale back its interventions. 
European officials, however, have taken a sharply different perspective. Facing a legitimacy crisis 
after years of austerity, the Juncker Commission in particular embarked on a mission to 
strengthen the EU’s social agenda by deepening the tools of quantified managerial planning. 
Getting measurement right through managerial instruments has become increasingly tied to the 
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political ambitions of the Commission and the criterion they seek to be judged. This is more 
than the use of numbers as symbolic instruments of legitimation, rather it is the redefinition of 
democracy in the idiom of public management that is being attempted by European institutions. 
The politics of numbers as instruments of supranational governance has thus taken on a double 
meaning - on one side a symbol of democratic impoverishment in the EU and on the other side 
a source of its redemption. 
 
 
6.1 The 'Silent Revolution' of the New Economic Governance  
As the previous chapter established, the Commission was excluded from managing financial 
resources of its own and was never able to wield the legal authority embodied in the new rules 
of the NEG. Nevertheless, the changes of Barroso’s ‘silent revolution’ spoke to the fact that 
what was agreed in the NEG opened the door to a subtle empowerment of the Commission 
along lines besides financial and legal. Instead, the Commission’s planning powers were 
enhanced. Two changes of the NEG most significantly reveal this shift. First, the ‘Two-Pack’ of 
regulations on fiscal coordination and, second, the introduction of the coordination architecture 
of the ‘European Semester’ (See also Bauer and Becker, 2014). 
The 2013 Two-Pack was a complement to the 2011 Six-Pack discussed in the previous 
chapter. Unlike the earlier reforms of the NEG, the Two-Pack was squarely initiated by the 
Commission. The framing of the measures was to tidy up the loose ends of the NEG from the 
2010/2011 negotiations (Schlosser, 2019, p. 61). The measures were uncontroversial among 
member states, passing the legislative process without controversy (Falkner, 2018, p. 242). The 
first part of the Two-Pack (Regulation 472/2013) normalised and institutionalised the deep 
levels of surveillance of countries receiving financial assistance from the Eurozone’s many 
bailout mechanisms and in ‘post-programme’ monitoring. To this extent the regulation brought 
into the legal framework of the EU the monitoring and conditionalities built into the assortment 
of European bailout instruments (Schlosser, 2019, p. 62). The second part of the Two-Pack 
(Regulation 473/2013) was seemingly innocuous. It synchronized the fiscal calendars of member 
states to better coordinate budgetary planning. Contained in its provisions, though, was a 
bombshell. Controversially, the Commission was given the authority to review draft budgets of 
member states even before national parliaments had considered them (Schlosser, 2019, p. 66). 
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The change dealt a blow to core principles of fiscal sovereignty that the control of public finance 
lies first and foremost with legislatures. Instead, the change placed the Commission as a layer of 
managerial evaluation between elected parliaments and the discharge of public finance. 
This latter shift was key in the silent revolution by expanding the Commission’s 
managerial oversight. As discussed in chapter four, the move to fiscal sustainability and quality 
in 2005 had shifted Commission scrutiny of fiscal policy from achieving nominal rules to 
reviewing the contents of budgets. The NEG invigorated this process. Seemingly, it was only 
once the changes were passed that their enormity was registered. Provisions within the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty had made possible a greater level of supranational intrusion into national fiscal 
policy. Interviewees reported to Laffan and Schlosser that the Two-Pack stretched this legal base 
‘to their full potential’ (Laffan & Schlosser, 2016, p. 243). Indeed, the Commission was taken 
aback by the willingness of states to submit themselves to such supranational budgetary scrutiny, 
telling Laffan and Schlosser that ‘with some historical distance it is a folly. Never on earth could 
we have imagined this a few years ago’ (Laffan & Schlosser, 2016, p. 243).  
Just as had happened in 2005, national governments refused to countenance 
empowering the Commission as a financial or legal authority. But they overlooked the 
empowerment of the institution as a managerial monitor of fiscal performance. The 
Commission’s weak legal authority, despite the new rules of the NEG, meant it was mostly 
unable to force states to change their budgets. A battle with Italy in 2019 was testament to this 
(Smith-Meyer, 2019). Nevertheless, the terms of the NEG invigorated the Commission’s 
positionality within European policy-making as a managerial evaluator of fiscal policy 
performance such that it could even engage in battles like that with Italy in the first place. What 
was needed was a means for the Commission to capitalise on its managerial function of planning 
rather than compelling.  
The second change opened the door to such a possibility with the introduction of the 
European Semester. The Semester was created in 2010 as part of the Six-Pack.22 Its purpose was 
the ‘coordination of coordination’ of the EU’s many policy mechanisms (Kenneth A. 
Armstrong, 2012, p. 225). Economic governance in the EU was a mess of intergovernmental 
coordination. Reporting existed for Joint Employment Reports; the SGP; OMsC on social 
 
22 Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 




protection, inclusion, and others; reporting from the remnants of Lisbon; not to mention new 
reporting under the MIP, the European Systemic Risk Board, the European Fiscal Board, 
Competitiveness Authorities, or Europe 2020. All broadly existed under the banner of economic 
governance. But they were uncoordinated and, at times, contradictory. The purpose of the 
Semester was to construct a single coordination cycle where all would feed in together.  With 
the Commission at the analysis and reporting apex, a yearly Annual Growth Survey delivers a 
broad analysis based on all mechanisms, followed by Country Reports/In-Depth Reviews 
commenting on individual country situations. Following this, the Commission issues Country-
Specific Recommendations agreed by the Council and in dialogue with the Parliament to feed 
into national policy-making processes. This ‘vertical’ governance system has increasing levels of 
obligation through the various legal mechanisms like the SGP/MIP/ESM (Jordan et al., 2020). 
 The Semester was meant to consolidate and simplify the EU’s complicated governance 
system. In practice, the Semester has placed the Commission more squarely at the centre of a 
singular planning process in the EU. This has been a development noted by the Fiscal Board in 
a recent evaluation of the NEG (European Fiscal Board, 2019). The board observed that the 
NEG had brought a ‘bilateralisation’ of coordination that was ‘increasingly based on negotiations 
between the Commission and the member states concerned’ rather than intergovernmental 
deliberations in the Council as was previously the case (European Fiscal Board, 2019, p. 87). 
Two major reasons for this bilateralisation are the legal and technical uncertainties of 
coordination through the Semester’s unitary planning process. 
Besides the Treaties, the legal base for policy coordination between member states that 
the Semester has consolidated is spread across a variety of separate policy instruments like the 
SGP/MIP/ESM/Europe 2020 and more. Sonja Bekker has noted that rather than clarifying 
these steps, the Semester has introduced a high level of ambiguity in terms of what procedure is 
actually being mobilised in the issuing of which recommendations (Bekker, 2013, p. 16). In 
issuing singular policy recommendations to states, the Commission therefore has a variety of 
mechanisms and data sources to choose from, which often pull in opposite directions. While the 
SGP might preach austerity, Europe 2020 beckons states towards targets on poverty reduction. 
The Commission therefore has significant discretion to pursue different lines of argument in 
proposing recommendations, while still able to frame them through the objectivity of a 
quantitively-grounded analysis in the range of scoreboards and indicators guiding policy in the 
EU’s planning system. 
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In addition to the legal ambiguity of the Semester’s many instruments, the Fiscal 
Board’s noted bilateralisation has been a paradoxical consequence of the introduction of reverse 
qualified majority voting (RQMV) in the NEG. RQMV was meant to improve the automaticity 
of sanctions. Commission proposals for policy adjustment would need a majority in the Council 
to be voted down. The political unpalatability of legal sanctions, though, has meant there is more 
informality to the Commission’s bilateral evaluation of national policies. By engaging bilaterally 
through country visits and exchanges (made possible because of the expanded reporting 
requirements of the NEG), the Commission avoids reaching a situation where a proposal is put 
before the Council that legally would be difficult to strike down (because of RQMV) but is too 
politically controversial for governments to accept. As seen in the last chapter, the SGP/MIP 
have had all sorts of acceptable deviations and modified interpretations of compliance built into 
them. The result has been that changes that were meant to remove political discretion through 
deepened rules have instead recalibrated discretion bilaterally between the Commission and 
national governments. While the Commission finds itself unable to use its instruments as a legal 
tool, the Commission has been empowered through this weakness as a managerial evaluator of 
national policies in its day-to-day interactions with governments.  
Alongside these legal sources of managerial empowerment, the growing complexity of 
what it means to be compliant with EU rules has enhanced the Commission’s role as an 
information processor. Definitions of compliance with the EU’s rules is increasingly determined 
not be the achievement of nominal quantitative targets, but complex and contextual evaluations 
of dynamic policy performance data. As a result, more onus has been put on the shoulders of 
analysts in the EU’s technical institutions, rather than high-level political discussions between 
national representatives in the Council’s committee halls, to deliver assessments of what 
compliance means.  
The MIP is a prominent example of this. Competitiveness monitoring certainly took a 
more legalised form in the MIP. But the decision to move away from the automaticity of 
sanctions via the scoreboard, discussed in the previous chapter, has meant that high levels of 
discretion has been built into the procedure. The scoreboard, rather than a procedural 
mechanism, is instead envisaged as ‘filtering device for detecting prima-facie cases of possible 
imbalances deserving further investigation’ (European Commission, 2016b, p. 6). It is judgement 




While weakening the MIP as a ‘rules-based’ mechanism where discipline follows 
automatically from a reading of indicators, the MIP has instead become an ambiguous and open 
ended managerial instrument reliant on an interpretation of the scoreboard. By selectively 
mobilising indicators, or even developing a country analysis outside of what the scoreboard 
implies, the Commission has vast scope to use the MIP as a vehicle of its empowerment as an 
information processor. Indeed, this casting of the MIP as a managerial tool for policy planning 
rather than a technical-legal instrument of discipline has been explicitly advocated by EU 
institutions. The Five Presidents report in 2015, for example, argued that the purpose of the 
MIP was to ‘not just detect imbalances but also to encourage structural reforms’ (European 
Commission, 2015a, p. 8). Likewise, an interviewed government official described how ‘At the 
end of the day my bottom line is the procedure is just a way to force countries to do something 
on the reform side’ (Interview 13, national permanent representative official).  
The sum of these changes has been that the beefing of rules in the NEG did not 
empower the Commission’s ordoliberal legal authority as has commonly been theorised. Instead, 
it has consolidated the Commission’s role as an information processor and strategiser that builds 
on a totally different conception of governance compared to ordoliberalism. Rather than order 
and discipline, the Commission’s management function emphasises its capacity to process 
dynamic performance data in order make responsive strategic decisions on the necessary 
direction of national reform. Barroso’s ‘silent revolution’ has therefore had the consequence of 
empowering the Commission as a planner in the sense of public management discussed in 
chapter two. 
While the legal and coercive capacity of the Commission to actually compel states to 
follow its recommendations and analysis is severely constrained. What is important here is that 
the NEG has evolved to privilege the Commission’s role as an analyst to (selectively) judge policy 
performance and engage with national governments directly in steering their choices. It is a 
testament to the building of supranational governance through planning, rather than legal-
financial authority. As the next section will demonstrate, this fact is revealed through an analysis 
of how the Commission has used the NEG’s ambiguities to steer the EU’s planning machine in 
line with its own political priorities. 
 
Pursuing Policy Through the Planning Infrastructure 
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The empowerment of the Commission’s management function since the crisis has been 
recognised by scholars of administrative reform like Michael Bauer and Stefan Becker (Bauer & 
Becker, 2014). Others have downplayed the significance of this enlarged managerial function for 
the Commission, treating it as a weakness given the Commission’s side-lining as an agent of 
change in the EU compared to national governments or the ECB (da Conceição-Heldt, 2016). 
In this framing, the Commission has merely become responsible for the implementation of the 
policies of powerful European governments, while the most interesting supranational forms of 
agency are found in the extraordinary monetary interventions of the ECB. I argue here that the 
Commission’s enlarged managerial function is not a technical or neutral one. The Commission 
has been using its information processing and strategic planning capacities to pursue its own 
political objectives. The significance of this is not the depoliticisation of economic governance, 
or how quantitative performance management tools create neoliberal subjects. Rather, it is how 
the Commission heavily relies on the managerial formatting of public policy to build its stake in 
policy-making. 
A major example of this is how the Commission has used its consolidated planning 
infrastructure to pursue austerity not only in terms of the governance of deficits and debts in the 
SGP, but across a broad range of economic and social policies. This has been a development 
noted by Bart Vanhercke, Mark Dawson, Amandine Crespy, and Paul Copeland, among others 
(Paul Copeland & Daly, 2015; Dawson, 2011, p. 192; Vanhercke, 2011, p. 41). The first major 
step in this direction was in the Greek bailout’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of April 
2010 (Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017). In a push for drastic levels of austerity from a Greek state in 
fiscal distress, the MoU came with ‘detailed instructions for reforming the healthcare sector’ 
(Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017, p. 484). Through the MoU, the premise of budgetary reductions 
was used to make claims on other aspects of social and economic policy in terms of their fiscal 
consequences. Just as pension reforms were mobilised in the budgetary battles of the 2000s as a 
means to open state books, healthcare has become an increasingly prominent site for the 
Commission to broaden its interventions.  
Building on this, it has become a widely commented feature of the Semester that there 
has been a blurring of social/economic and fiscal policy goals in the EU. Kenneth Armstrong 
highlights that whereas social affairs previously had relative autonomy from the austerity logic 
of the core of the SGP, centred around the proceedings of OMsC on pensions, social exclusion, 
or poverty, the effect of the Semester has been to ‘cannibalize’ social affairs into fiscal regulation 
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(K. A. Armstrong, 2012, p. 287). Daly and Copeland likewise observe how this shift has been a 
process of transforming social policy in the EU from an ‘add on’ of the 1990s/2000s governance 
agenda, to a ‘dependence on’ austerity-led budgetary policies (Paul Copeland & Daly, 2015). The 
legal and technical ambiguity of the Semester has been important to this. It has allowed the EU 
to pursue a policy objective of austerity not just through the budgetary coordination of the SGP. 
Increasingly, the Commission through the Semester is able to make financial claims on a range 
of social and economic issues. In this way, the Commission has flexed its planning capacities. 
While it is not able to force adjustments, its has a position in a Europeanised policy-making 
process to subtly intervene and steer the terms of policy in line with its own objectives.   
This supranational pursuit of a fiscal policy through the economic and social policies 
of member states goes both ways. While the overwhelming trend of recent years has been 
towards the pursuit of austerity, the Commission has also attempted to mobilise its planning 
architecture to expand spending in a context of recession. The recently lax approach taken to 
enforcing the SGP has come from the objective of the Juncker Commission in particular to 
mobilise the budgets of member states in a common European direction. A 2016 
communication from the Commission argued that while ‘[m]onetary policy has been supportive 
of growth in recent years… this is less the case for fiscal policy’ and made the case for more 
expansionary fiscal policies in member states not in breach of the SGP to boost demand within 
Europe via a ‘positive fiscal stance’ (European Commission, 2016a). This sentiment echoed 
through the EU’s planning system, reflecting how the Commission has an infrastructure to 
pursue political objectives – even if it cannot force anyone to follow them.  
A notable area where the idea of spending growth echoed was within the MIP. 
Recently, the Commission has more vigorously targeted current account surpluses as an 
imbalance needing rectifying through boosting domestic demand in countries like Germany or 
the Netherlands. The 2017 Alert Mechanism Report (the yearly report of the MIP) observed that 
a ‘symmetric post-crisis correction did not take place in countries with positive current account 
balances’ reflecting ‘aggregate demand dynamics that continue to lag behind that of economic 
activity’ (European Commission, 2017e). Building on this diagnosis, Germany’s 2017 Country 
Specific Recommendations called for the country to ‘[u]se fiscal policy to support domestic 
demand and achieve a sustained upward trend in investment’ (European Commission, 2017d).  
Limits of the EU’s means of financing means the Commission cannot pursue its fiscal 
objectives themselves. Likewise, weak legal authority means the Commission cannot compel 
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governments to follow its recommendations. But this is arguably beside the point. Instead, the 
point is that the EU has built this supranational planning architecture of analysis and 
recommendations using the format of public management precisely because of its limitations as 
a traditional nation-state. The significance of this is how the force and format of public 
management has come to shape supranational governance. The governance agenda of the 1990s 
opened this new managerial approach to policy-making, giving the Commission a new function 
unlike traditional state functions. Rather than distributing resources or enforcing law, the EU’s 
executive would set strategy and scrupulously monitor policy performance. The Eurozone crisis 
consolidated this role, centring the Commission as an agent of performance monitoring and 
analysis. This has not been a neutral function. Indeed the Commission has always seen itself as 
a political actor. But rather than launching grand initiatives or exercising political leadership as 
the past ‘entrepreneurial’ Commissions may have done, supranational executive authority today 
takes a managerial form. 
As the opening of the chapter described, this ‘silent revolution’ has been a troubling 
development for scholars remarking at the rise of an ‘executive managerialism’. The democratic 
implications of the rise of supranational managerial planning has been a major feature of post-
crisis discussions of the EU. As the next section discusses, this has been a conversation that 
public managers have likewise participated in. Having helped build supranational governance in 
the EU, public managers began to raise concerns over its direction. 
 
 
6.2 Democratic Problems of European Governance 
The adoption of the NEG amidst the Eurozone crisis has been widely condemned as a perilous 
turn to depoliticised and undemocratic governance in Europe. This was an ironic twist, given 
the original ambitions of the governance agenda in the 1990s. When a new managerial approach 
to supranational policy-making was introduced as ‘governance’ in the 1990s/2000s, its public 
management and Third Way social democrat advocates had normative ambitions. Governance 
was originally pitched not only as a way to develop European policy-making capacities. In 




As chapter four discussed, public managers like Majone and Scharpf argued that 
despite lacking the traditional democratic institutions of elections, parliaments, or political 
contestation, the EU’s could nevertheless be legitimated. Rather than its connection to an 
electorate or demos, public managers saw accountability to a managerial criterion of output 
effectiveness as the source of the EU’s legitimacy. Majone argued, for example, that in the EU 
‘effectiveness and legitimacy, although conceptually distinct, are intimately related’ (Majone, 
2012, p. 190). While Majone and Scharpf had disagreements over the scope of this output 
effectiveness criterion for EU legitimacy, it was shared between them that management could 
offer a democratic basis for EU governance. Output effectiveness went beyond normative 
claims to ‘peace and prosperity’. It was a conjoining of management and democracy. It was 
legitimacy by results. 
The effect of the crisis was to undermine the basis of effectiveness legitimacy in the eyes 
of public managers like Scharpf and Majone. Amidst turmoil in sovereign bond markets and 
government balance sheets in the Eurozone, the EU began to look more of a problem than a 
managerial problem-solver. Scharpf was blunt on the matter. He wrote that ‘the present 
combination of policy-making regimes in Europe must appear as an unmitigated failure in terms 
of both problem-solving effectiveness and political legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 2015a, p. 396). Having 
hitched legitimacy to a criterion of output effectiveness, the Eurozone crisis thus threw the EU’s 
democratic basis into doubt for public managers. As the effectiveness of European (non)action 
in the crisis hit the rocks, the EU’s legitimacy went with it. Majone saw that the conjoining of 
effectiveness and legitimacy had become ‘precisely the problem’ (Majone, 2012, p. 190). 
Elsewhere, Majone argued that it was the ‘connection between effectiveness, legitimacy and 
systemic stability that makes so worrisome the unsatisfactory economic performance of the EU’ 
(Majone, 2009, p. 45). Scharpf made a similar point, arguing that ‘output-oriented justifications… 
have lost most of their plausibility’ (Scharpf, 2009, p. 26).  
Legitimacy through effectiveness was based on a premise that managerial forms of 
governance had to operate out of the spotlight. Supranational institutions in part built their 
authority in the EU since the 1990s not by ruling directly over citizens, but instead drawing on 
public management to construct an intra-executive policy-making system of performance 
management. Public management argued that this was legitimate as long as it was delivering 
results, such as improved living standards in the name of competitiveness. Crucially, this 
managerial architecture could not be legitimated if it had to rely on its connection to populations 
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or along majoritarian principles. Scharpf described how the EU’s output legitimacy depended 
upon operating ‘below the threshold of political visibility’ (Scharpf, 1999, p. 23). Likewise, this 
was the logic of Majone’s ‘non-majoritarian institutions’, such as regulatory agencies or central 
banks. These institutions did not depend on their democratic input. Instead they were 
legitimated by the lines of managerial accountability to other institutions in assessing their results. 
The problem, however, was that the creeping development of EU governance and the 
experience of the Eurozone crisis meant citizens were increasingly directly exposed to the 
decisions of supranational institutions. The intensity of market integration in Europe had meant, 
since at least the 1990s, supranational institutions were a growing presence in the minds of 
populations. Majone described how ‘the actual consequences of decisions taken at the European 
level are now so much more visible than they were in earlier stages of the integration process’ 
(Majone, 2012, p. 12). This built on the fact that the spread of non-majoritarian institutions into 
new policy domains had gone a lot further than was imagined or recommended by Majone in 
the 1990s (Majone, 2001). The Eurozone crisis amplified this exposure of citizens to 
supranational institutions. The crisis of the Euro, and burden on inter/supranational institutions 
to resolve it, meant previously unheard of European officials filled newspaper frontpages 
questioned over the state of the union. For countries experiencing bailouts, this exposure was 
even more severe. Through bailouts, supranational institutions of the Commission, IMF, and 
ECB that were external to national democratic processes were positioned to make fundamental 
decisions over the sensitive area of public finance.   
This problem of exposure was not seen by public managers as a crisis of legitimacy 
for non-majoritarian institutions as such. It was a uniquely European problem. Unlike non-
majoritarian institutions at a national level, the crisis had revealed how EU institutions were cut 
adrift from accountability to other democratic institutions which could operate oversight 
(Majone, 2012, p. 170). Scharpf developed this point, highlighting how the crisis broke the 
‘legitimacy intermediation’ that had operated in the EU, whereby national institutions acted as 
democratic cover for the EU by cutting its interventions short when they stretched domestic 
political settlements too far (Scharpf, 2009). Instead, the situation of the Eurozone crisis was 
that ‘for the first time… the exercise of European governing functions must depend on its own 
legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 2009, p. 26). The trouble with supranational institutions finding their own 
legitimacy (rather than their legitimacy by results) was that the democratic credentials of the 
managerial system proved unsurprisingly flimsy. For Scharpf, the problem was intrinsic to 
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supranational rule. Repeating a point he had made in the 1990s, Scharpf argued that because 
there was no European demos, ‘supranational EU government cannot be legitimated, even 
indirectly, by input-oriented arguments (Scharpf, 2009, p. 20).  
Lacking input legitimacy was not for lack of trying though. For the EU, the normative 
ambition of the governance agenda in the 1990s and 2000s was that the tools of public 
management could transcend stale and out-dated representative democracy and create a new 
form of deliberative, participatory, and transparent policy-making. The governance agenda was 
intended to bring citizens closer to European policy-making. Through routine consultation 
exercises, publicly visible scoreboards, benchmarking practices tracking policy progress, and well 
circulated strategy agendas, public management would deliver a new era of participatory 
democracy. Within the internal Commission think tank, the FSU, it was argued that the EU 
‘needs to be opened up and liberated from the shadowy world it currently inhabits – civil society 
needs to be engaged in and by European action’ (Lebessis & Paterson, 1999, p. 11). Likewise, 
the premise of the White Paper on Governance in 2001 was to advocate a new democratic ethos 
around techniques of inclusion and participation through consultation, dialogue, and 
transparency. This democratic hope was especially visible as a motivation in the preparatory 
work of the White Paper (Sloat, 2003). 
Things never quite worked out that way. While the governance agenda preached 
participation and transparency, even before the suspension of democratic norms at the height 
of the Eurozone crisis through bailouts, EU policy-making was read as harbouring the ‘spectre 
of executive governance’ (Dawson, 2011, p. 208). According to Stijn Smismans or Beate Kohler-
Koch, the implementation of the OMC failed in its participatory intent (Kohler-Koch, 2010; 
Smismans, 2008a). As Mark Dawson describes, the OMC has not expanded participation but 
has instead been ‘overrun with unaccountable forms of executive power’ at the expense of 
traditional sites of democratic accountability in parliaments and the judiciary (Dawson, 2011, 
p235). Likewise, the reliance on managerial techniques of centralised strategy-setting and 
performance monitoring in the OMC led Stijn Smismans to argue that it ‘could rather be dubbed 
an “Open Method of Centralisation”’ (Smismans, 2004). Owen Parker similarly argues that the 
visions of a participatory and deliberative governance contained ‘exclusionary implications’ from 
the beginning in building a democratic philosophy that cut out existing representative democratic 
institutions (Parker, 2019). 
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Placing the managerial techniques of the governance agenda in the history of planning 
reveals how this outcome is unsurprising. Fundamental to the legacy of budgetary planning, that 
the EU’s managerial instruments built on, was that governance required a central political 
authority that could set strategic parameters and process information measuring performance. 
The idea of expanding democratic participation of citizens within the EU, while expanding the 
Commission’s role as a managerial planner, was thus an oxymoron. Participation in the EU has 
instead come to mean something closer to the broader trend of the governance turn (discussed 
in chapter two) of pursuing policy outside existing institutional frameworks. Rather than the 
legislative Community method, EU governance is an elaborate intra-executive apparatus 
populated by policy consultancies, lobbyists, corporations, corporatized civil society, regulatory 
agencies, and member state bureaucracies gravitating around European public communication 
strategies, benchmarking exercises, or policy evaluation contracts.  
For both Scharpf and Majone, the consequences of the crisis of EU legitimacy was to 
flirt with the idea that EU governance as a managerial process had overextended. Majone 
suggested that ‘the depth of the current crisis justifies the widespread opinion that integration 
has gone too far’ (Majone, 2012, p. 19). Similarly, Scharpf felt that ‘from the perspective of pro-
European social democrats, therefore, the common currency ought to be dismantled or, if its 
beneficiaries prevent this, it should be allowed to collapse (Scharpf, 2015b, p. 270). 
Both were, however, careful to not overly commit to this proposition. Scharpf hedged 
his dismantling agenda with the comment that it is ‘by no means a shared conclusion’ that 
integration should be scaled back (Scharpf, 2015b, p. 270). Majone clarified that the solution was 
not a reversal of integration, but a strengthened managerial accountability framework for the 
EU. Repeating his previous arguments, Majone argued the EU must not aim for ‘a poor imitation 
of national parliamentary institutions’ but a more advanced system of accountability by results 
(Majone, 2012, p. 192). Scharpf similarly foresaw redemption in returning to a problem-solving 
philosophy of public management. To achieve this, Scharpf proposed remaking the EU at a 
smaller scale via differentiated integration (Scharpf, 2003). Alternatively, Scharpf found solace 
in the EU potentially returning to operating below the radar. For Scharpf, the ECB’s monetary 
solution to the Eurozone crisis would usefully ‘drastically reduce the political salience of rescue 
credits in the public opinion of creditor states’ (Scharpf, 2009, p. 30). 
Public managers like Scharpf and Majone were anxious that the EU had overextended 
its authority such that a managerial criterion of legitimacy was being stretched to the limit. While 
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they attempted to find ways to deal with this development – either reversing integration or 
diminishing its political visibility – a very different conception of managerial legitimacy was being 
mobilised within the institutions of the EU. For the Commission, the answer to the EU’s 
legitimacy crisis post-crisis was not to scale back. It was to use the practices of managerial 
governance to scale up a political project upon which it sought to be held directly accountable 
in the minds of citizens. 
 
 
6.3 Legitimacy by Numbers? 
For the public managers who had set the tone of the governance turn, the Eurozone crisis 
revealed the overextension of output effectiveness. The direct exposure of citizens to 
unaccountable European intervention, in a crisis of the EMU that shed any pretentions of 
effective governance, meant integration had to be seriously rethought. Public managers 
proposed that either it had to be scaled back, made more accountable by results to majoritarian 
institutions, or its interventions hidden from public view. For the European Commission, 
however, so often the point of criticism for the unaccountability of European governance, its 
pursuit of legitimacy has not come from scaling back managerial techniques nor deferring to 
majoritarian institutions. Rather, since the crisis the Commission has doubled down on the 
public management formatting of EU governance.  
Facing political pressure from an emerging economic crisis and an upcoming re-
election campaign in late 2009, the Barroso Commission turned to the tools of public 
management to boost its political profile. Unlike the lengthily negotiated intergovernmental 
Lisbon Strategy, its follow-up Europe 2020 was rushed out as a Commission initiative in the 
final months of Barroso’s presidency. Facing a backlash at a perception that the Commission 
was doing nothing besides supporting austerity in response to the emerging financial crisis in 
late 2009, Barroso sought to make the quantitative targets of Europe 2020 personally attached 
to his second presidency and the barometer on which he was to be judged (Kenneth A. 
Armstrong, 2012, p. 214; Paul Copeland & Daly, 2015, p. 147).  
This political work of the Barroso Commission was more than just the use of 
quantitative targets as symbolic legitimacy claims in hedging neoliberal hegemony. Rather, it 
reflected how the EU’s supranational institutions have increasingly used quantitative indicator-
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based governance as both the format of their organisational empowerment to pursue political 
objectives that it can stake its legitimacy credentials on. As such, not only did Europe 2020 signal 
the Commission’s political interests through the targets that were set in the strategy, it served a 
function of creating legitimate purpose to recalibrate EU planning. While the Commission has 
little financial or administrative capacity to achieve the targets, creating them was an attempt to 
recalibrate the political orientation of the EU’s planning machinery upon. Amidst a growing 
economic crisis, a managerial Commission evaluating poverty reduction or employment is a lot 
more palatable to critical citizens than one monitoring austerity. Europe 2020 was thus more 
than a symbolic use of numbers, it was an infrastructural shift in EU planning that was hoped 
to build its legitimacy. 
In the end, the events of the sovereign debt crisis and the massive reform agenda of 
the NEG in 2010/2011 overtook Europe 2020. The political logic of Europe 2020 was, however, 
invigorated as Jean-Claude Juncker replaced Barroso as Commission President in 2014. Despite 
Scharpf arguing supranational government cannot be legitimate by its input, Juncker pitched his 
Commission as claiming a political mandate like no other before. Juncker had come to office 
through the so-called Spitzenkandidat process whereby the Commission President would be 
drawn from the largest political grouping in the European Parliament. Juncker actively mobilised 
this mandate, declaring in his 2015 State of the Union Address that he ‘wanted to lead a political 
Commission. A very political Commission’ (Juncker, 2015). Indeed, the Juncker Commission 
has been described as ‘the most political Commission ever’ (Peterson, 2017).  
Adopting the language of accounting and risk swirling amidst the bond market strife 
of the Eurozone crisis, Juncker in 2014 focused the political ambitions of his presidency on 
achieving a ‘social triple-A’ for the EU (BBC, 2014). In June 2013, European Council 
Conclusions had declared that ‘the social dimension of the EMU should be strengthened’ 
(European Council, 2013). Juncker tapped into this national governmental current to build a 
campaign for president that promised to reboot ‘Social Europe’. In a speech to the European 
Parliament, Juncker argued the ‘internal market is not more important than social affairs’ 
(Mahony, 2014). After Juncker’s appointment as Commission President, he delivered on this by 
declaring that ‘employment and social aspects are being further emphasised’ (European 
Commission, 2015d, p. 4).  
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL) had earlier attempted a 
‘defensive move’ to invigorate a social response to European recession through its 2013 ‘Social 
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Investment Package’ encouraging states to maintain social protection investments (Sabato & 
Corti, 2018, p. 64). Amidst a national trend for austerity, and the Commission’s lack of fiscal or 
administrative levers of its own to redirect national policy, the plan came to little. Instead, the 
Juncker Commission turned to public management to deliver its political ambitions. The Juncker 
Commission has attempted to achieve its ‘social triple-A’ through a series of tweaks and 
manipulations to the planning infrastructure of the NEG. To do so, the Juncker Presidency has 
stridently mobilised the managerial infrastructure created by the Kinnock reforms discussed in 
chapter four (Becker et al., 2016; Bürgin, 2018; Dinan, 2016; Kassim et al., 2017). In particular, 
the Secretariat-General (SG), empowered as part of the Kinnock reforms, has been a key part 
of the Juncker Commission’s political work. The SG has emerged as a central node in the 
Semester, steering the various coordination processes in line with the priorities of the 
Commission Presidency (Savage & Verdun, 2016, p. 109). 
The MIP has been one major site where this has been visible. What was originally 
imagined as a technical scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators, one interviewee said has 
become ‘a Christmas tree, everybody wants to put something on it’ (Interview 13, national 
permanent representative official). Most enthusiastically decorating the MIP’s tree has been the 
Commission Presidency. The MIP scoreboard has become one site where the Commission 
Presidency has attempted to assert its political interest in social policy through performance 
management. Already, in October 2013, the Commission had introduced a range of additional 
auxiliary indicators to the MIP on poverty and social exclusion, youth unemployment, long-term 
unemployment, and labour market participation. After Juncker’s appointment as Commission 
President, the Commission expanded this list to include three employment indicators (on the 
activity rate, long-term unemployment, and youth unemployment) into the MIP’s headline 
scoreboard (European Commission, 2015c). Interviewees from the Commission reported that 
this addition was driven by the Commission Presidency delivering on its political commitments 
to expand the remit of social policy (Interview 16, DG ECFIN official). 
The additional social indicators in the MIP was not met favourably by national 
officials. In 2014, the ECOFIN Council criticised the addition. They argued that any additions 
needed to ‘carefully preserve the nature of the procedure’ in terms of its focus on 
macroeconomic imbalances as traditionally conceived in competitiveness terms (ECOFIN 
Council, 2014). Going further, ECOFIN Council Conclusions in January 2016 directly criticised 
the inclusion of social indicators in the main scoreboard, arguing ’social and labour market 
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indicators are not relevant for identifying macro-financial risks’ (ECOFIN Council, 2016). It was 
not just the EU’s finance ministers that opposed the presidency’s tampering with the MIP. The 
Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council was also critical, 
despite the streamlining of social policy into economic governance seemingly being a project 
they would support. EPSCO Conclusions from June 2015 observed that ‘CSRs concerning 
employment and social issues must be maintained within the EPSCO remit and should not 
systematically become part of the MIP process’ (EPSCO Council, 2015). Interviewees reported 
that the stance of EPSCO built on a feeling that the broadening of the MIP was a power grab 
from finance ministries to encroach on social affairs (Interview 17, DG ECFIN / ECOFIN 
Council official).  
Despite these protestations, the Commission Presidency’s drive to use managerial 
techniques to politically demonstrate a commitment to social policy was unrelenting. In 2017, it 
was not just the MIP’s scoreboard where social issues were to be made more prominent, a 
scoreboard for social policy itself was to be created. The communication launching the so-called 
European Pillar on Social Rights (EPSR) said a scoreboard of social indicators would ‘serve to 
assess progress towards its social triple-Aʼ (European Commission, 2017c). The adoption and 
development of the social scoreboard was squarely a project of the Commission Presidency,  
‘without involving the Member States through the SPC [Social Protection Committee] and the 
Employment Committee (EMCO)’ (Sabato & Corti, 2018, p. 57). 
For the Commission, the scoreboard was meant to expand the prominence of EU 
social policy governance. In a follow-up report outlining the scoreboard’s operation, the 
Commission argued that ‘the scoreboard will facilitate a stronger consideration of employment 
and societal challenges within the European Semester’ (European Commission, 2017b). Sabato 
and Corti note, however, that as a tool developed within the offices of the Commission 
Presidency, the effect of the scoreboard’s unclear role and methodology will be to ‘likely to 
weaken, not strengthen, the monitoring of Member State employment and social protection 
performance’ (Sabato & Corti, 2018, p. 58).  
This fact that Sabato and Corti do not consider the social scoreboard as actually useful 
to improve social protection reflects what Copeland and Daly describe as a ‘longstanding 
proclivity in the EU to getting measurement right’ (Paul Copeland & Daly, 2015, p. 155). 
Regardless of what the Commission Presidency’s intentions were with the scoreboard, its 
significance is how managerial policy instruments have become a key vehicle for EU 
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supranational institutions  to pursue political objectives upon which they seek to base their 
legitimacy. Its job was not to improve social policy – indeed the EU’s institutions have little 
administrative, financial, or legal scope to impact policy outcomes. But neither was it merely 
symbolic – the Presidency’s expansion of social indicators has had significant material effects in 
reorienting the EU’s planning machinery, much to the frustration of national ministers. Instead, 
the purpose of the use of numbers by the Commission Presidency has been political and its 
effects infrastructural. Whereas public managers more broadly see the EU’s governance by 
management as reaching its limits, for EU institutions themselves numbers continue to hold a 




While the Eurozone’s rules have failed to bite, the European Commission has expanded its 
stake within policy-making. By reading the reforms made to the EU since the crisis through 
the legacy of the governance turn of the 1990s, the ‘silent revolution’ of surveillance noted by 
former Commission President Barroso takes on greater significance. Since the Eurocrisis, the 
Commission has vastly expanded its ability to gaze into the policies of member states. What 
was meant to be a means to enforce the rules of the Eurozone has, instead, been used to 
empower the Commission as a centre of strategy and information processing. While the 
Commission has little ability to force member states to obey particular rules or adopt specific 
policies, this is beside the point to make sense of the Commission’s empowerment as an 
institution. I have argued the Commission has developed a cognitive authority within a 
European policy-making system that builds on the social forces and format of public 
management. This cognitive authority is not the sanctity of the Commission’s expertise in the 
eyes of EU governments or citizens. It is the European Commission’s positionality within a 
Europeanised policy-making system that allows it to process the information and pass 
judgement on the policy performance of others.  
 The political implications of the EU’s empowerment through public management is how 
it moves us beyond thinking about the democratic issues of the cognitive authority of IOs in 
terms of depoliticisation. I have shown how the politics of numbers in supranational governance 
has not depoliticised policy-making. It has opened a legitimation paradox. I have shown how a 
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public management community has not judged European institutions by their technocratic 
expertise, but by the performance of their KPIs. Complicatedly, while these KPIs have proven 
disastrous through the crisis, European institutions have attempted to continue mobilising 
numbers as a means to legitimate themselves by reorienting their planning machinery in line with 
administratively set political objectives. The significance of this is the complicated relationship 
planning has established in EU governance as questions of democracy are increasingly equated 
with managerial forms of rule. In the conclusion to the thesis, I consider the implications of the 
consolidation of a managerial approach to policy-making for the future of the European Union 





The European Union has an affliction familiar to many IOs. It lacks an autonomous means to 
raise finance and allocate resources and has no independent infrastructure to implement its 
decisions. Despite the relative weakness of IOs, this thesis has addressed the fact that since at 
least the 1990s they have become a formidable presence in everyday life. The OECD can make 
headlines with its PISA rankings of global education systems. Through the Eurocrisis years, one 
dull Eurogroup meetings could decide the fate of countries in fiscal distress. The WTO can 
hardly meet without protesters massing outside. Taking note of this, international relations 
literature has since the 1990s taken IOs seriously as actors in world politics. What were once 
considered as merely tools of powerful states are considered by scholars like Barnett and 
Finnemore as independent bureaucracies with their own instrumental purpose and power 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). The power of IOs did not unfold as it had for national states. 
Rather than financial resources or legal authority akin to national state power, scholars have 
noted that a key aspect in the rise of IOs was a suite of managerial techniques of quantitative 
benchmarking, ranking, and other indicator-based techniques that build ‘cognitive authority’ 
through ‘analytical institutions’ (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).  
The rise of supranational institutions in global politics, and the importance of managerial 
instruments in this rise, led to Rhodes, Rosenau, Czempiel and others point to a shift taking 
place from the central authority of national government to a more diffuse and multi-level 
‘governance’ (Rhodes, 1996; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). European integration at the end of 
the millennium was a prominent indicator of the governance turn. Supranational institutions of 
the EU have become powerful and visible actors of Europeanised policy-making. Despite being 
constrained in a way similar to other IOs, the EU is unique insofar as its governing 
responsibilities are closer to that of a state. Organisations like the United Nations, World Bank, 
or WHO may similarly suffer from an exteriority to national policy-making. But the scale of their 
exteriority means the follies of these organisations is comparatively minor. In contrast, the deep 
market integration and monetary union in the EU means the governance failure of its 
supranational institutions risks monetary collapse and economic catastrophe. Facing the 
constraints of an IO, and the responsibilities of a state, supranational institutions in the EU have 
built a stake in policy-making through benchmarking, scoreboarding, strategy writing, and policy 
evaluation practices that make up the day-to-day of ‘EU governance’. 
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Critical scholars of European integration have predominantly understood the rise of 
this peculiar form of supranational power through the history of neoliberalism. Scholars 
highlight how neoliberal rule in the EU uses international law and political authority to ‘encase’ 
(Slobodian, 2018), ‘constitutionalise’ (Gill, 1998) or ‘embed’ (van Apeldoorn et al., 2009) markets 
through the agency of a US-centred transnational capitalist class (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007; van 
Apeldoorn, 2003). The political weight of neoliberalism as a global project is seen to constrain 
the progressive use of political institutions - in particular budgetary ones - at every level of 
governance and use supranational authority to enthrone market order. The managerial 
instruments of EU governance are read by critical literature through this international neoliberal 
project of constraint. Most predominantly, rather than thinking in terms of the instrumental 
power created through managerial tools of supranational governance, a governmentality 
perspective is relied upon. This perspective reduces instruments like benchmarking to how they 
are presumed to structure the behaviour of national governments to perform as good neoliberal 
subjects.  
 This thesis has argued that the EU’s peculiar ‘governance’ arrangements are not best 
understood through the history of the neoliberal project. By mobilising the lineage of 
neoliberalism, critical literature of integration ends up conflating the managerial techniques of 
international policy making with the marginalisation of a progressive use of public finance that 
has defined the EMU. By drawing significance from the ways political institutions are 
constrained, we neglect the technical forms of power that have been constructed at a 
supranational level. In doing so, we miss the ways in which power has been wielded in the EU 
not through neoliberal rules but through managerial planning. 
Rather than the suppression of the progressive use of public finance, I have instead 
argued that the rise of EU governance should be understood as the construction of budgetary 
planning at a supranational level. Chapter two showed how the noted ‘governance turn’ of the 
1990s should be understood in the context of the history of public finance. I showed that a new 
kind of ‘budgetary planning’ arose in the 1960s and spawned a new class of public managers 
practicing techniques of systems/policy analysis. The chapter argued that the governance turn 
should be understood in terms of the efforts of this class of public managers to reapply their 
techniques of strategic performance management outside of the sphere of budgetary 
appropriations, where their efforts ran aground in the fiscal crisis of the 1970s. 
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Chapter three to six showed how this rereading of governance as planning makes 
possible a critical reconceptualization of European policy-making since the 1990s. This involved 
retelling the history of European integration not as the rise of neoliberalism, but instead in terms 
of the responses to a dilemma of supranational authority that has affected Europe since at least 
Maastricht in 1992. Chapter three unravelled this dilemma of supranational authority as a 
‘management deficit’ facing European institutions expressed by public managers in the 1990s. 
This management deficit spoke to how, while the agreement at Maastricht placed increasing 
policy obligations at the door of supranational institutions, the agreement neglected the 
organisational and financial means to deliver on these obligations. Most notably, the chapter 
showed how, while moving to a common currency and common market, the EU was politically 
denied the financial resources that could perform a stabilisation or redistribution role. Alongside 
this, however, the instruments of expenditure control the EU possessed through the legal 
instrument of the SGP were limited in their usability against national governments refusing to 
be subject to supranational intervention into public finance.  
Chapter four showed how this dilemma of supranational authority was responded to 
in ways which were taken to mark the rise of ‘governance’. Chapter four argued that while the 
EU lacked the financial resources to perform budgetary functions of stabilisation or 
redistribution and lacked the legal clout to perform a budgetary function of expenditure control, 
supranational authorities have built their authority as planners. This has meant turning the 
European Commission into a centre of strategy and information processing mobilising the 
forces and format of public management. While these innovations are often reduced to a 
neoliberal social policy, I showed in chapter four how social policy was merely the most 
prominent area of a broader shift. Benchmarking competitiveness involved repurposing a 
peripheral managerial instrument of comparing industrial performance into a major regulatory 
innovation of EU governance. While the EU was limited in its traditional governing capacities 
of legal enforcement or resource allocation, benchmarking competitiveness provided a means 
for supranational institutions to gain a stake in policy-making as a planner. This planning 
function was formatted considerably differently to neo/ordoliberalism. Whereas 
neo/ordoliberalism preached order, rules, and stability; public management advanced a flexible, 
discretionary, and responsive approach to governance that emphasised the importance of 
information-driven strategic decision-making.  
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Developing this point, chapter four went on to explore how public management 
influenced the core of the neoliberal EU - the fiscal rules of the SGP. As the legal authority of 
the SGP’s rules faltered in the early 2000s, the SGP was reformed in 2005 to build in greater 
flexibility. While often seen as a weakening of the SGP, instead I argued it was its 
managerialisation. Less emphasis was placed on adhering to nominal rules, but the Commission 
considerably expanded its capacity to monitor the performance of national budgeting policy 
along lines of fiscal ‘sustainability’ and budget ‘quality’. The result was that, while the EU had 
limited financial resources of its own, and little legal clout to enforce expenditure control, the 
SGP reform set in motion a capacity of the European Commission to use the SGP as a planning 
tool suggesting strategic directions for fiscal policy.  
Finally, the chapter considered how the rise of EU governance brought a growing 
influence of public management as a distinct class over the form of EU institutions. To do so, I 
explored the ‘Kinnock reforms’ made to the EU Commission at the turn of the millennium. 
Here, I showed how the reforms were not just to improve the competence of an institution in 
crisis after the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 amidst a fraud scandal. Rather, the 
reforms involved a pivot to building the political weight of managers within EU institutions. The 
significance of this was that as the EU turned to the format of public management to develop a 
supranational governance capacity, the social forces of public management have increasingly 
taken a powerful place within the EU’s institutions. 
In chapters five and six I have shown that since the Eurocrisis there has been a 
consolidation of a managerial format to EU policy-making. Critical observers saw in the EU’s 
crisis responses an invigoration of the rules said to encase markets through the New Economic 
Governance (NEG) and the punitive austerity of bailout programmes. In contrast, I showed 
how the crisis is better read as a restatement of the longstanding dilemma of supranational 
authority in the EU. As happened in the 1990s, the creation of common budgetary instruments 
like ‘Eurobonds’ or an adequate European bailout fund were consistently blocked during the 
Eurocrisis by creditor governments refusing to spend across borders. The distinction was that 
in the 1990s/2000s the need for a common budget was hypothetical, whereas in the heat of the 
Eurozone crisis the failure to develop sufficient common financial resources risked tearing the 
Euro currency apart.  
Despite not managing to develop common budgetary instruments, however, the 
invigorated rules highlighted by critical scholars once again failed to bite. Opposition to the use 
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of supranational legal authority to impose limits on public finance meant the new rules for fiscal 
and macroeconomic policy coordination have become more complicated, vague, and selectively 
applied than ever.23 What has been invigorated through the crisis, however, is the role of 
supranational institutions as planners. While the incapacity of EU institutions to exert legal 
authority is relatively unchanged, the reforms of the NEG considerably expanded the depth and 
breadth of supranational institutions’ ability to gaze into the policies of national governments. 
The historic rise of managerial forms of power in the EU is well recognised by critical 
literature. Scholars like Bonefeld and van Apeldoorn well recognise that since the 1990s 
supranational institutions have grown in authority through executive politics, managerial policy 
instruments, and a suspension of traditional representative democratic norms. I have argued in 
this thesis though that our typical theorisations of these changes through the lineage of 
neoliberalism has focused our attention on the ways in which public policy has been constrained 
at a national level, rather than addressing the kinds of political institutional power that has been 
constructed supranationally. By instead addressing an alternative lineage of managerial 
governance, I have highlighted the distinctive social forces and format of public management in 
building supranational rule today.  
There are two major political implications of this argument. First, the implications of 
EU planning for the fumbling, but persistent, attempt to develop the ‘missing’ budgetary 
functions of the EU of macroeconomic stabilisation, resource redistribution, or expenditure 
control. Second, implications for the political contestation within and against the EU’s planning 
apparatus geared towards relentless austerity. 
First, the terms of EU fiscal politics have since the creation of the EMU centred on 
whether the union can, or should, perform the budgetary functions of stabilisation, distribution, 
and/or expenditure control. This is the push and pull between austerity and stimulus; rules and 
discretion; control and liability. Progressive politics in this context have focused on lightening 
the expenditure control burden on national governments and creating European instruments for 
stabilisation and redistribution. Recent proposals from a group of 14 French and German 
economists, led by French economist Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, have focused discussions on such 
options for Eurozone reform (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018). They highlight a macroeconomic 
perspective on the desirability to develop the range of ‘missing’ budgetary functions through 
 
23 Countries receiving bailouts of course were subject to the whim of supranational institutions and foreign governments, but the grounding for 
this was rarely EU rules but rather international executive politics 
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common deposit insurance, a simpler expenditure rule focused on long-term debt reduction, a 
mechanism for sovereign-debt restructuring, a Euro area fund to absorb economic shocks, and 
a ‘euro area safe asset’ to ease financing pressures on the EU’s most exposed nations.  Likewise, 
a reform proposal coming from the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) has argued that the 
SGP should be replaced entirely by fiscal and macroeconomic policy coordination instruments 
that can use common resources to ‘drive upward convergence between regions’ and mobilise 
public investment towards a Green New Deal (Álvarez et al., 2019). Many of these proposals 
are included in the political guidelines of the new Commission of Ursula von der Leyen, 
including broadened convergence funds, a banking union with a Single Resolution Fund, and a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme.  
What these proposals often assume is that the EU has a limited budgetary capacity 
that needs strengthening. Building a progressive EMU is therefore seen as constructing a 
budgetary capacity for the EU. As I have shown, though, the EU does have a budgetary capacity. 
It is just one built on planning rather than resource allocation. In a managerial EU where 
executives dominate, numbers rule, and majoritarian institutions are shut out, we should be 
addressing the implications of adding financial resources into this extant planning system. 
Indeed, the condition of an ‘emergency brake’ applied by national governments to the use of 
COVID-19 recovery grants, recurrent discussions on making cohesion funds conditional on 
adopting structural reforms determined by analysts in Brussels or Frankfurt, or the idea that 
ECB sovereign bond buying would be conditional on meeting certain rules, reveals the stakes of 
inserting financial resources into existing EU managerial planning. Rather than liberating public 
finance for progressive causes, the addition of financial resources would more likely provide 
coercive financial-administrative leverage to the EU’s existing planning system. Public finance 
would therefore not move according to need, but rather according to analytical assessment of 
the EU’s executive institutions. 
This challenge of the supranational or intergovernmental decision over the allocation 
of public finance is one of the reasons why the EU has never developed common budgetary 
instruments. The reality is that a political or fiscal union is extremely unlikely in Europe. As the 
FT assesses, ‘the idea of a “fiscal union” complete with a “euro area treasury” remains the stuff 
of political fantasy’ (Brunsden, 2019). More pressing politically is engaging with or against the 
planning infrastructure that does exist in the EU. Progressive proposals for reform to EU 
governance have often focused on getting measurement right. The logic is that if the EU has the 
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right strategic targets, and its information processing gaze is directed in the right direction, then 
more democratic and progressive outcomes are likely to follow. Francesco Corti, Sebastiano 
Sabato, and Bart Vanhercke have recently proposed the idea of a ‘Social Imbalances Procedure’, 
to match the legalised instruments of fiscal and macroeconomic coordination in the realm of 
social affairs (Corti et al., 2019). Elsewhere, the Independent Annual Growth Survey (iAGS) 
puts forward the case to shift numeric targets away from the ‘fiscal and macroeconomic rules of 
the SGP’ to instead focus on the ‘whole range of economic, social, and environmental challenges’ 
(Timbeau et al., 2019).24 Proposed indicators from the iAGS include public investment, the 
gender pay gap, unemployment, income inequality (GINI), or greenhouse gas emissions. 
Similarly, ETUI has proposed an ‘integrated scoreboard of economic, social and environmental 
indicators’ to coordinate EU policies ‘well beyond numerical fiscal targets’ biased towards 
austerity (Álvarez et al., 2019).  
This move neglects the forms of power created by the managerial shift of European 
governance. The techniques of benchmarking or scoreboarding were meant to coordinate the 
policies of EU member states that were of common interest within an integrating region. As the 
scale and depth of the Eurozone crisis will attest, however, ‘governance’ was of little use 
coordinating policies to either prevent or resolve the crisis. As I have argued in this thesis, the 
significance of managerial policy techniques has therefore not necessarily been to deliver policy 
outcomes in the EU, but to develop supranational institutions’ stake within policy-making 
through the forces and format of public management. I have shown in the thesis how what is 
important in quantitative techniques like benchmarking and scoreboarding is less the object that 
is being governed or the direction of the bureaucratic gaze. Instead, what is important has been 
the infrastructural power derived from constructing a policy-making machinery that judges the 
performance of others. The EU, and other IOs, have built their ‘cognitive’ authority and gained 
a stake in Europeanised/globalised policy-making by positioning themselves as information 
processors of the policy performance of others. As part of this process, a new class of public 
managers have become increasingly central actors within policy-making, occupying pivotal 
positions within public institutions at a range of levels.  
Reckoning with this fact suggests that shifting the gaze of European institutions onto 
more progressive policy objects like social or environmental indicators, while worthy, will not 
 
24 The iAGS is a parallel to the Commission’s Annual Growth Survey. It is released by a group of economists linked to the Social Democrat 
European Parliament group 
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address the forms of social power governing policy-making. Moreover, given EU governance 
was constructed because of the distance of supranational institutions from policy 
implementation, it is unlikely to substantively affect policy outcomes as intended. Instead, what 
is required is a reversal of the lines of accountability created through the EU’s managerial 
planning system. Recognising that numbers have a strong grip on policy-making, whereas 
benchmarking or scoreboarding places supranational institutions as cognitive actors, authorised 
to judge the performance of others downwards, greater attention needs to be placed on building 
lines of accountability that travel upwards from citizens to supranational institutions. There is 
an entire politics of measurement that comes with this shift, potentially focusing on the 
sustainability returns on EU investment, the social protections built into lending criteria, or 
lobbying access to institutions. What matters is that if numbers rule modern governance, then 
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